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SECTION 5 OF THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT: A ONCE AND 
FUTURE REMEDY? 
MICHAEL J. PITTS† 
For almost four decades, Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act has re-
quired certain states and localities to garner federal pre-approval prior to 
implementing any changes in laws that affect voting.1 Initially designed 
to remedy the persistent recalcitrance of southern states in providing Af-
rican-Americans equal access to the electoral process, Section 5 repre-
sents one of the greatest and lengthiest federal encroachments on the 
power of state and local governments in United States history and has 
been characterized as “unique and stringent,”2 “reminiscent of old Re-
construction days,”3 and “an unprecedented federal intrusion into the 
governing processes of the states.”4 
Section 5 seemingly raises serious constitutional concerns, as it 
most certainly burdens and usurps the power of state and local govern-
ments. But the United States Supreme Court has consistently upheld Sec-
tion 5’s constitutionality5 as a valid exercise of congressional enforce-
ment power.6 Likewise, the federalist majority on the Rehnquist Court7 
  
 † Attorney, United States Department of Justice, Civil Rights Division, Voting Section. 
J.D., Georgetown University Law Center; B.S.J., Northwestern University. The opinions in this 
Article do not necessarily reflect those of the United States Department of Justice. Thanks to Jenni-
fer Pitts, Bob Berman, Kris Brenneis, Jon Greenbaum, Tim Lambert, Peyton McCrary, and Brad 
Brooks-Rubin for their helpful comments. 
 1. Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 438 (codified as amended at 42 
U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1973 to 1973bb-1 (2000)). Section 5 is at 42 U.S.C. § 1973c.  
 2. Laughlin McDonald, The Quiet Revolution in Minority Voting Rights, 42 VAND. L. REV. 
1249, 1250 (1989). 
 3. Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 595 (1969) (Black, J., dissenting). 
 4. Daniel Hays Lowenstein, You Don’t Have to Be Liberal to Hate the Racial Gerrymander-
ing Cases, 50 STAN. L. REV. 779, 790 (1998); see also Giles v. Ashcroft, 193 F. Supp. 2d 258, 260 
(D.D.C. 2002) (calling Section 5 “a severe process”); Ellen D. Katz, Federalism, Preclearance, and 
the Rehnquist Court, 46 VILL. L. REV. 1179, 1181 (2001) (describing Section 5 as “dramatically 
shift[ing] the balance of power between the federal government and the States”); Charlotte Marx 
Harper, Lopez v. Monterey County: A Remedy Gone Too Far?, 52 BAYLOR L. REV. 435, 449 (2000) 
(describing Section 5 as a “severe intrusion by the federal government into state electoral auton-
omy”). 
 5. City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 177 (1980); Georgia v. United States, 411 
U.S. 526, 540-41 (1973); South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 308 (1966). 
 6. The congressional enforcement power, as it relates to voting, resides in Section 5 of the 
Fourteenth Amendment and Section 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment. Section 5 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment states “[t]he Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provi-
sions of this article.” U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5. Section 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment states 
“[t]he Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.” U.S. CONST. 
amend. XV, § 2. This Article will refer to both of these constitutional provisions more generally as 
Congress’s “enforcement power,” except in Part IV when it becomes necessary to make a distinction 
between the two. A general reference to Congress’s “enforcement power” also avoids confusion by 
eliminating the need to constantly clarify between the two Section 5s—the one in the Voting Rights 
Act and the one in the Fourteenth Amendment. 
File: Pitts Macro Created on: 4/19/2004 2:16 PM Last Printed: 8/11/2004 4:00 PM 
226 DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81:2 
appears unwilling, at least for now, to nullify this broad Voting Rights 
Act remedy.8 
Opponents of this tremendous power wielded by the federal gov-
ernment can take solace in the fact that it might end soon. Section 5 ex-
pires in 2007.9 Yet, the clock has expired on Section 5 three times previ-
ously and each time Congress has extended it.10 At this point, with a con-
servative Republican president and Congress, Section 5’s chances for 
extension may appear dicey. However, the last extension of Section 5 
occurred with a conservative Republican president and Republican Sen-
ate majority.11 Indeed, Republican politicians often support the remedies 
the Voting Rights Act provides to minority voters.12 
Politics aside, if Congress chooses to extend Section 5, it will al-
most certainly be subjected to another challenge as an inappropriate ex-
ercise of congressional enforcement power—a challenge it may not sur-
vive. Why? Because the limits of Congress’s enforcement power have 
recently changed. In the landmark case of City of Boerne v. Flores,13 and 
in several subsequent cases,14 the Court has delivered a “significant and 
  
 7. The federalist judges on the current Supreme Court are Chief Justice William H. 
Rehnquist, and Justices Antonin Scalia, Clarence Thomas, Sandra Day O’Connor, and Anthony M. 
Kennedy. See generally, Amy Bach, Movin’ on Up with the Federalist Society: How the Right Rears 
Its Young Lawyers, NATION, Oct. 1, 2001, at 11 (describing the modern Federalist Society and its 
members). 
 8. See Lopez v. Monterey County, 525 U.S. 266, 287 (1999) (Lopez II). 
 9. 42 U.S.C § 1973b(a)(8). 
 10. Section 5 was extended in 1970, 1975, and 1982. Voting Rights Act Amendments of 
1970, Pub. L. No. 91-285, §§ 2, 5, 84 Stat. 314, 314-15 (1970); Voting Rights Act Amendments of 
1975, Pub. L. No. 94-73, §§ 204, 206, 405, 89 Stat. 402, 402-05 (1975); Voting Rights Act Amend-
ments of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-205, § 2(b)(8), 96 Stat. 131, 133 (1982). 
 11. Peter J. Rubin, Reconnecting Doctrine and Purpose: A Comprehensive Approach to Strict 
Scrutiny After Adarand and Shaw, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 75 (2000) (remarking on how the 1982 
extension and revision of the Voting Rights Act was approved by a Republican-controlled Senate 
and signed by President Ronald Reagan). 
 12. See Hugh Davis Graham, Voting Rights and the American Regulatory State, in 
CONTROVERSIES IN MINORITY VOTING 177, 191-92 (Bernard Grofman & Chandler Davidson eds., 
1992) (noting that “Republican presidential administrations . . . have warmed to the prospect of 
redistricting arrangements that concentrate black and Hispanic Democrats in urban jurisdictions”); 
ABIGAIL M. THERNSTROM, WHOSE VOTES COUNT? 9 (1987) (describing how Voting Rights Act 
enforcement under the Reagan Administration differed little from previous administrations); see also 
Adam Cohen, Why Republicans Are Shamelessly in Love with the Voting Rights Act, N.Y. TIMES, 
Mar. 24, 2002, § 4, at 14 (describing the Republican Party’s support of “max black” redistricting 
after the 1990 census). This Article uses the term “minority” to encompass those groups that gener-
ally benefit from application of the Voting Rights Act—namely African-Americans, Asians, Latinos, 
and Native Americans. 
 13. 521 U.S. 507 (1997). 
 14. See, e.g., Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 360 (2001) (holding 
that Congress could not subject states to suits under Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act); 
United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 627 (2000) (holding that Congress could not subject private 
individuals to suits under the Violence Against Women Act); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 
62, 67 (2000) (holding that Congress could not subject states to suits under the Age Discrimination 
in Employment Act); Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 
627, 630 (1999) (holding that Congress could not subject states to suits for patent infringement). But 
see Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 123 S. Ct. 1972, 1984 (2003) (allowing Congress to subject 
states to suits under the Family and Medical Leave Act); Tennessee v. Lane 124 S. Ct. 1978 (2004) 
(allowing Congress to subject states to suits under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act). 
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lasting cutback”15 on Congress’s ability to exercise its enforcement 
power, circumscribing its use through application of the congruence and 
proportionality test.16 
As a result, this Article focuses on the basic question of whether an-
other extension of Section 5 will pass muster under the Court’s more 
recent decisions. In doing so, it is the intent of this Article to establish the 
framework for the coming, likely passionate,17 debate over the constitu-
tionality of Section 5 beyond 2007. 
To answer the question posed, this Article provides a review of the 
history and structure of Section 5 (Part I) before examining the limits of 
Congress’s enforcement power, both when Section 5 was initially upheld 
as a constitutional exercise of that power and after the Rehnquist Court 
more recently limited Congress’s ability to exercise it (Part II). This Ar-
ticle then moves from the hardpan of the descriptive to the swamp of the 
predictive,18 by trying to realistically analyze how a moderately conser-
vative, federalist-leaning Court19 might view an extension of Section 5—
ultimately concluding that the statute would not pass the congruence and 
proportionality test applied by such a Court (Part III).20 But, despite the 
likelihood that Section 5 will not survive the congruence and proportion-
  
 15. 1 LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 947 (3d ed. 2000). 
 16. See Boerne, 521 U.S. at 519-20 (establishing the doctrine of congruence and proportional-
ity); Kimberly E. Dean, In Light of the Evil Presented: What Kind of Prophylactic Antidiscrimina-
tion Legislation Can Congress Enact After Garrett?, 43 B.C. L. REV. 697, 725 (2002) (noting that 
applications of the congruence and proportionality test represent “the Court’s clear attempt to dimin-
ish Congress’s [enforcement] power”). 
 17. The 1982 extension and amendment of the Act was marked by discordant debate, espe-
cially in the Senate; although the focus of much of this debate was Section 2 of the Act. See Thomas 
M. Boyd & Stephen J. Markman, The 1982 Amendments to the Voting Rights Act: A Legislative 
History, 40 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1347, 1393-95 (1983) (describing the fractious tenor of the Sen-
ate hearings). 
 18. Roger C. Hartley, Enforcing Federal Civil Rights Against Public Entities After Garrett, 28 
J.C. & U.L. 41, 82 (2001) (describing how “[m]oving to a discussion of likely effects of a legal 
development is a bit like moving from the hardpan to the swamp”).  
 19. Thus, all predictions are made with the caveat that the situation could change if a shift in 
membership occurs that causes the Court to be less inclined to diminishing federal power over the 
states or if the Court substantially changes the contours of the congruence and proportionality doc-
trine. However, these scenarios appear unlikely. 
 20. Professor Pamela Karlan has argued that, despite Boerne, Section 5 remains a proper 
exercise of congressional enforcement power. Pamela S. Karlan, Two Section Twos and Two Section 
Fives: Voting Rights and Remedies After Flores, 39 WM. & MARY L. REV. 725, 726 (1998). This 
Article concurs with her assessment with regard to the constitutionality of the current extension of 
Section 5. See also Giles, 193 F. Supp. 2d at 265 (describing a challenge to the current extension of 
Section 5 as “entirely frivolous in light of overwhelming Supreme Court precedent”). However, 
Professor Karlan’s article was written prior to the Court’s six subsequent applications of the congru-
ence and proportionality test and did not speculate on whether another extension of Section 5 would 
continue to remain an appropriate exercise of Congress’s enforcement power. Karlan, supra, at 740-
41. 
Two more recent pieces have also concluded that Section 5 remains constitutional under the 
congruence and proportionality standard. See Paul Winke, Why the Preclearance and Bailout Provi-
sions of the Voting Rights Act Are Still a Constitutionally Proportional Remedy, 28 N.Y.U. REV. L. 
& SOC. CHANGE 69, 71 (2003); Victor Andres Rodriguez, Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 
After Boerne: The Beginning of the End of Preclearance?, 91 CAL. L. REV. 769, 776, 798 (2003). 
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ality test, this Article sets forth two means by which Section 5 can still be 
saved. First, this Article explores in some detail whether the Court will 
carve out an exception to the congruence and proportionality test for 
voting rights remedies (Part IV). Second, even if Section 5 is subjected to 
the test, this Article sets forth three ways in which Congress could revise 
the statute to conform to the test while still providing adequate protection 
for the gains made by minority voters since passage of the Voting Rights 
Act (Part V). 
I. THE RATIONALE FOR ENACTING SECTION 5 AND HOW IT WORKS 
A. Section 5: Why It Was Enacted 
The Voting Rights Act was passed in 1965 after almost a century of 
overt, rampant, and purposeful discrimination against minority voters, 
most notably against African-Americans in the Deep South.21 The initial 
goal of the Act was to provide African-American voters with access to 
the ballot because, at the time, numerous state and local governments 
used the discriminatory application of literacy tests or other devices, such 
as tests of good moral character, to prevent African-Americans from 
registering to vote.22 The discriminatory application of these tests was 
generally performed by voter registrars who often excused white appli-
  
 21. In 1870, the Fifteenth Amendment was ratified, guaranteeing that the right to vote could 
not be “denied or abridged . . . on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude.” U.S. 
CONST. amend XV, § 1. Following ratification of the Amendment, Congress passed several laws 
designed to eradicate voting discrimination against African-Americans. See, e.g., Enforcement Act 
of 1870, ch. 114, 16 Stat. 140, 140 (1870) (guaranteeing the right to vote “without distinction of 
race, color, or previous condition of servitude” and providing for penalties for interfering with the 
right to vote); Enforcement Act of 1871, ch. 99, 16 Stat. 433, 433-34 (1871) (providing for the 
appointment of federal officials to oversee and monitor elections). However, these Acts did little to 
end discrimination. See Voting Rights: Hearings on H.R. 6400 Before Subcomm. No.5 of the House 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong. 3-4 (1965) [hereinafter House Hearings] (statement of United 
States Attorney General Nicholas deB. Katzenbach) (describing post-Civil War attempts to guaran-
tee the right to vote as “neither adequately enforced, nor of long duration” and later repealed). 
In the late nineteenth century, as Reconstruction ebbed, southern states began to implement 
numerous devices, such as literacy tests, to massively disenfranchise African-American voters. See 
Emma Coleman Jordan, Taking Voting Rights Seriously: Rediscovering the Fifteenth Amendment, 64 
NEB. L. REV. 389, 397 (1985) (listing “gerrymandering, poll taxes, literacy tests, ‘grandfather 
clauses,’ white primaries, malapportionment, residency requirements, . . . fraud, and violence” as 
methods used to disenfranchise African-American voters). During the twentieth century, the Su-
preme Court gradually found some, but not all, of these practices to be unconstitutional. See Lassiter 
v. Northampton County Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45, 53-54 (1959) (refusing to declare all literacy 
tests unconstitutional); Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73, 89 (1932) (upholding a challenge to Texas’s 
white primary); Myers v. Anderson, 238 U.S. 368, 382-83 (1915) (invalidating Annapolis, Mary-
land’s grandfather clause); Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S. 347, 367-68 (1915) (invalidating Okla-
homa’s grandfather clause); Giles v. Harris, 189 U.S. 475, 485-86 (1903) (dismissing, for lack of 
jurisdiction, challenges to Alabama’s grandfather clause, literacy test, and property ownership re-
quirements for voter registration). 
 22. For example, as a condition of registration in the State of Alabama, an applicant had to be 
able to “read and write any article of the United States Constitution . . . be of good character and 
embrace the duties and obligations of citizenship.” United States v. Alabama, 192 F. Supp. 677, 678 
(M.D. Ala. 1961). In the State of Louisiana, an applicant had to “‘understand and give a reasonable 
interpretation of any section’” of either the Constitutions of the United States or of Louisiana. United 
States v. Louisiana, 225 F. Supp. 353, 357 n.6 (E.D. La. 1963). 
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cants from taking the tests, gave them easier versions of the test, pro-
vided assistance in taking the test, or gave passing scores despite serious 
errors in their answers, while African-American applicants took difficult 
versions of the tests, were prevented from receiving outside assistance, 
were given failing scores for even the most marginal error, and were not 
informed if their application was rejected.23 Moreover, even if an Afri-
can-American applicant passed the test, the registrant might not be issued 
a registration certificate.24 And when all of these other tactics failed, ju-
risdictions would just resort to old-fashioned intimidation.25 
The United States Department of Justice tried to halt these disgrace-
ful tactics through litigation brought under the Civil Rights Acts passed 
by Congress in 1957, 1960, and 1964.26 But Department of Justice en-
forcement failed to provide African-Americans with access to the bal-
lot.27 African-American voters continued to feel the burden of racial dis-
crimination as evidenced by continued low registration rates.28 Litigation 
proved onerous and slow.29 More significantly, even victory in federal 
court would fail to end discrimination in registration. Often, when a court 
enjoined a state or local government from engaging in a particular dis-
criminatory practice, the jurisdiction would simply switch to a new dis-
criminatory device not covered by the injunction.30 
  
 23. See, e.g., Alabama, 192 F. Supp. at 679-81 (describing the discriminatory application of 
literacy tests in Macon County); see also Louisiana, 225 F. Supp. at 383 (describing how the state’s 
test requiring interpretation of the constitution was discriminatorily applied by giving African-
Americans difficult sections to interpret while whites were given easy sections). 
 24. Alabama, 192 F. Supp. at 680.  
 25. See, e.g., United States v. Mississippi, 339 F.2d 679, 683 (5th Cir. 1964) (describing how 
the registrar of Walthall County brandished a pistol when African-Americans attempted to register). 
 26. The Civil Rights Act of 1957 authorized the Attorney General to seek an injunction 
against any person who interfered with the right to vote in a racially discriminatory manner. Civil 
Rights Act of 1957, Pub. L. No. 85-315, § 131, 71 Stat. 634, 637-38 (1957). The Civil Rights Act of 
1960 gave the Attorney General access to local voting records, authorized courts to conduct voter 
registration, and allowed suits against state parties. Civil Rights Act of 1960, Pub. L. No. 86-449, §§ 
303, 601, 74 Stat. 86, 88, 90-92 (1960). The Civil Rights Act of 1964 required literacy tests to be 
administered wholly in writing, created a presumption of literacy for certain persons, provided for 
expedited hearings of certain voting cases before three-judge panels, and required the collection of 
registration and voting statistics in certain jurisdictions. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-
352, §§ 101(a)(2)(C), 101(c), 101(h), 801, 78 Stat. 241, 241-42, 266 (1964). 
 27. House Hearings, supra note 21, at 5. For an excellent, concise discussion of the Depart-
ment of Justice’s enforcement efforts between passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1957 and the Vot-
ing Rights Act of 1965, see Laughlin McDonald, The 1982 Extension of Section 5 of the Voting 
Rights Act of 1965: The Continued Need for Preclearance, 51 TENN. L. REV. 1, 15-25 (1983). 
 28. House Hearings, supra note 21, at 4. 
 29. Voting Rights: Hearings on S. 1564 Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th 
Cong. 9-14 (1965) (statement of United States Attorney General Nicholas deB. Katzenbach) (dis-
cussing the length of time necessary to obtain judicial relief in voting cases). 
 30. Armand Derfner, Vote Dilution and the Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982, in 
MINORITY VOTE DILUTION 145, 149 (Chandler Davidson ed., 1984) (noting that new discriminatory 
tools were sometimes implemented within twenty-four hours of the eradication of the previous 
discriminatory tools). 
In addition, to evade a court order, some local officials established rules to make registration 
extremely difficult, if not impossible. Charles S. Bullock, III & Richard E. Dunn, The Demise of 
Racial Districting and the Future of Black Representation, 48 EMORY L.J. 1209, 1210 n.7 (1999) 
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To combat these tactics, Congress passed the Voting Rights Act of 
1965,31 providing a number of remedies designed to bring an end to vot-
ing discrimination, the most important of which were found in Sections 
4, 6, and 5.32 Section 4, the “original heart”33 of the Act, suspended cer-
tain jurisdictions’ use of literacy tests and other devices that served as the 
predominant means for disenfranchising minority voters.34 Section 6 
provided for the appointment of federal examiners to conduct voter regis-
tration in certain places.35 Lastly, Section 5 froze into place the voting 
laws in certain states and localities, requiring federal approval of any 
changes to these laws, so that once a discriminatory law was suspended 
under the Act or successfully challenged through litigation, a new dis-
criminatory law could not be enacted as a replacement for the old dis-
criminatory law.36 Of these three core remedies, Section 5 was, and re-
mains, the most novel and drastic.37 
  
(describing “dilatory tactics” of registration officials such as “extending breaks when no registration 
applications were accepted, having irregular office hours, and refusing to allow more than one appli-
cant at a time to apply”). 
 31. Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 438 (codified as amended at 42 
U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1973 to 1973bb-1 (2000)). 
 32. Sections 4, 6,and 5 are currently at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973b, 1973d, and 1973c. In addition to 
these remedies, Section 10 of the Act directed the Attorney General to institute litigation against poll 
taxes. 42 U.S.C. § 1973h(b). The need for such litigation, however, was soon largely obviated by a 
Court decision finding all poll taxes to be in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Harper v. Va. 
Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 666 (1966). 
 33. Derfner, supra note 30, at 149. 
 34. 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(a)(1). Section 4 banned the use of a “test or device” which was defined 
as: 
[A]ny requirement that a person as a prerequisite for voting or registration for voting (1) 
demonstrate the ability to read, write, understand, or interpret any matter, (2) demonstrate 
any educational achievement or his knowledge of any particular subject, (3) possess good 
moral character, or (4) prove his qualifications by the voucher of registered voters or 
members of any other class. 
Id. § 1973b(c).  
When Congress extended Section 5 in 1975, it broadened the coverage to include discrimina-
tion against members of language minority groups. Id. § 1973b(f). At the same time, Congress 
expanded the definition of the term “test or device” to include: 
[A]ny practice or requirement by which any State or political subdivision provided any 
registration or voting notices, forms, instructions, assistance, or other materials or infor-
mation relating to the electoral process, including ballots, only in the English language, 
where the Director of the Census determines that more than five per centum of the citi-
zens of voting age residing in such State or political subdivision are members of a single 
language minority. 
Id. §1973b(f)(3).  
 35. Id. § 1973d. 
 36. Id. § 1973c. The Senate Judiciary Committee’s 1982 Report on the Voting Rights Act 
Extension explained how Congress properly anticipated the implementation of new, discriminatory 
devices after passage of the Act: 
Following the dramatic rise in registration, a broad array of dilution schemes were em-
ployed to cancel the impact of the new black vote. Elective posts were made appointive; 
election boundaries were gerrymandered; majority runoffs were instituted to prevent vic-
tories under a prior plurality system; at-large elections were substituted for election by 
single-member districts, or combined with other sophisticated rules to prevent an effec-
tive minority vote. The ingenuity of such schemes seems endless. Their common purpose 
and effect has been to offset the gains made at the ballot box under the Act. Congress an-
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B. Section 5: How It Works 
The drastic nature of the Section 5 remedy comes from its abroga-
tion of the autonomy of some state and local governments in all matters 
related to voting. A detailed description of how it works follows, but this 
is the basic framework: Section 5 prevents certain state and local gov-
ernments (usually those with a history of discrimination in voting) from 
implementing any change in voting laws, no matter how minor, until a 
federal authority determines that the change does not discriminate 
against minority voters in either purpose or effect. 
About the only limitation of Section 5 is its geographic scope—it 
does not apply nationwide. Rather, a coverage formula determines the 
areas subject to its strictures.38 The coverage formula represents an effort 
to target those places where discrimination seemed most rampant be-
cause: (1) a literacy test, or other similar device, had been employed; and 
(2) there was reduced participation in the election process, as evidenced 
by low registration or turnout rates.39 Generally, two types of jurisdic-
  
ticipated this response. The preclearance provisions of Section 5 were designed to halt 
such efforts. 
S. REP. NO. 97-417, at 7 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 177, 183. 
 37. Peyton McCrary, Bringing Equality to Power: How the Federal Courts Transformed the 
Electoral Structure of Southern Politics, 1960-1990, 5 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 665, 686 (2003) (describ-
ing Section 5’s preclearance requirement as the “most novel feature of the Act—and, to those con-
cerned with the operation of our federal system, the most intrusive”). As the Supreme Court noted, 
the reason for this drastic scheme was to “shift the advantage of time and inertia from the perpetra-
tors of the evil to its victims.” South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 328 (1966). 
 38. When the Act initially passed, the entire States of Alabama, Alaska, Georgia, Louisiana, 
Mississippi, South Carolina, and Virginia were covered, along with forty counties in North Carolina, 
and a few other counties in Arizona, Hawaii, and Idaho. S. REP. NO. 94-295, at 12 (1975), reprinted 
in 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 774, 778. Currently, Section 5 covers all or parts of sixteen states. The States 
of Alaska, Alabama, Arizona, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, South Carolina, Texas, and Virginia 
are covered in their entireties. 28 C.F.R. app. pt. 51 (2003). Parts of California, Florida, Michigan, 
New Hampshire, New York, North Carolina, and South Dakota are also covered. Id. 
 39. United Jewish Orgs. of Williamsburgh, Inc. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144, 156-57 (1977) (plu-
rality opinion) (describing how jurisdictions were covered by Section 5 “whenever it was 
administratively determined that certain conditions which experience had proved were indicative of 
racial discrimination in voting had existed in the area”); see also Timothy G. O’Rourke, Voting 
Rights Act Amendments of 1982: The New Bailout Provision and Virginia, 69 VA. L. REV. 765, 772-
73 (1983) (noting that the coverage formula “rests on the rationale that the conjunction of low voter 
registration or turnout and the use of a literacy test . . . establishes a presumption that discrimination 
exists in the voting process”). 
When initially passed, the coverage formula applied to those places with lower participation 
rates and that used a test or device as of November 1964. When extended in 1970, the coverage 
formula applied to those places with lower participation rates and that used a test or device in No-
vember 1968. When extended in 1975, the coverage formula applied to those places with lower 
participation rates and that used a test or device in November 1972. See U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Civil 
Rights Division, Voting Section, About Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/voting/sec_5/types.htm (last visited Jan. 25, 2004) (discussing history of 
coverage formula) [hereinafter U.S. Dep’t of Justice, About Section 5]. The current coverage formula 
reads as follows: 
The provisions of subsection (a) of this section shall apply in any State or in any political 
subdivision of a State which (1) the Attorney General determines maintained on Novem-
ber 1, 1964, any test or device, and with respect to which (2) the Director of the Census 
determines that less than 50 per centum of the persons of voting age residing therein were 
registered on November 1, 1964, or that less than 50 per centum of such persons voted in 
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tions are covered: states and counties.40 And, if a state or county is sub-
jected to Section 5, so are all of its political subjurisdictions. In a covered 
state such as Texas, for example, not only do actions of the legislature 
need federal approval, so do voting-related actions of counties, cities, 
school districts, and water districts.41 Federal approval is also required 
for certain changes made by political parties in these covered jurisdic-
tions.42 
In these covered areas, Section 5 freezes into place the laws and 
procedures related to voting as of the date of coverage and requires a 
jurisdiction to obtain federal approval, commonly referred to as “pre-
  
the presidential election of November 1964. On and after August 6, 1970, in addition to 
any State or political subdivision of a State determined to be subject to subsection (a) of 
this section pursuant to the previous sentence, the provisions of subsection (a) of this sec-
tion shall apply in any State or any political subdivision of a State which (i) the Attorney 
General determines maintained on November 1, 1968, any test or device, and with re-
spect to which (ii) the Director of the Census determines that less than 50 per centum of 
the persons of voting age residing therein were registered on November 1, 1968, or that 
less than 50 per centum of such persons voted in the presidential election of November 
1968. On and after August 6, 1975, in addition to any State or political subdivision of a 
State determined to be subject to subsection (a) of this section pursuant to the previous 
two sentences, the provisions of subsection (a) of this section shall apply in any State or 
any political subdivision of a State which (i) the Attorney General determines maintained 
on November 1, 1972, any test or device, and with respect to which (ii) the Director of 
the Census determines that less than 50 per centum of the citizens of voting age were reg-
istered on November 1, 1972, or that less than 50 per centum of such persons voted in the 
Presidential election of November 1972. 
42 U.S.C. § 1973b(b). 
 40. The two types of entities to which the coverage formula applies are states and “political 
subdivisions.” The term “political subdivision” is defined as “any county or parish, except that 
where registration for voting is not conducted under the supervision of a county or parish, the term 
shall include any other subdivision of a State which conducts registration for voting.” 42 U.S.C. § 
1973l(c)(2). In the vast majority of states, voter registration is conducted on the county or parish 
level. However, Section 5 coverage currently extends to several towns in Michigan and New Hamp-
shire. 28 C.F.R. app. pt. 51. 
 41. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973b(a)(1), 1973c (providing for coverage of states and “any political 
subdivision of such State[s]”); see also 28 C.F.R. § 51.6 (2003) (“All political subunits within a 
covered jurisdiction (e.g., counties, cities, school districts) are subject to the requirement of section 
5.”). 
 42. Morse v. Republican Party of Va., 517 U.S. 186, 205 (1996) (holding that a fee charged to 
delegates at the state nominating convention was a voting change subject to the preclearance re-
quirement). 
The Department of Justice has issued the following guideline to determine which changes 
made by political parties need federal approval: 
A change affecting voting effected by a political party is subject to the preclearance re-
quirement:  
(a) If the change relates to a public electoral function of the party and 
(b) If the party is acting under authority explicitly or implicitly granted by a covered ju-
risdiction or political subunit subject to the preclearance requirement of section 5. 
For example, changes with respect to the recruitment of party members, the conduct of 
political campaigns, and the drafting of party platforms are not subject to the preclearance 
requirement. Changes with respect to the conduct of primary elections at which party 
nominees, delegates to party conventions, or party officials are chosen are subject to the 
preclearance requirement of section 5. 
28 C.F.R. § 51.7 (2003). The guidelines promulgated by the Attorney General have traditionally 
earned substantial deference from the courts in light of the Department of Justice’s prominent role in 
implementing the statute. Lopez v. Monterey County, 525 U.S. 266, 281 (1999) (Lopez II). 
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clearance,” to implement a change in voting laws or practices.43 One 
avenue to preclearance is through a declaratory judgment—from a three-
judge panel of the United States District Court for the District of Colum-
bia—that the voting change does not have the purpose or effect of deny-
ing or abridging the right to vote on account of race, color, or language 
minority status.44 A second route is through submission of the voting 
change to the Attorney General of the United States.45 The Attorney 
General then has sixty days to review the change to determine whether 
the jurisdiction has proven that the change is not discriminatory in pur-
pose or effect.46 If the Attorney General either does not object to the vot-
ing change or affirmatively indicates no objection will be made, then the 
covered jurisdiction can enforce the change.47 Since the onset of Section 
5, the vast majority of jurisdictions have opted to submit changes to the 
  
 43. 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (requiring federal pre-approval whenever a covered jurisdiction “shall 
enact or seek to administer any voting qualification or prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice, or 
procedure with respect to voting different from that in force or effect on” the applicable date of 
coverage). 
 44. Id. (allowing states and political subdivisions to “institute an action in the United States 
District Court for the District of Columbia for a declaratory judgment that such [voting] qualifica-
tion, prerequisite, standard, practice, or procedure does not have the purpose and will not have the 
effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or color, or in contravention of the 
guarantees set forth in section 1973b(f)(2)”). 
When Section 5 was initially enacted, the United States District Court for the District of Co-
lumbia received jurisdiction over declaratory judgment actions involving preclearance because 
southern district judges often expressed hostility to minority voting rights. See Chandler Davidson & 
Bernard Grofman, The Voting Rights Act and the Second Reconstruction, in QUIET REVOLUTION IN 
THE SOUTH 378, 379 (Chandler Davidson & Bernard Grofman eds., 1994) (describing how southern 
federal district court judges would “hamstring” claims brought by private plaintiffs or the Depart-
ment of Justice under the Civil Rights Acts of 1957, 1960, and 1964). But see 111 CONG. REC. 
10354-55 (1965) (statement of Sen. Hart) (describing the need for uniformity of interpretation of the 
preclearance provisions as the reason for placing jurisdiction in the D.C. District Court). 
 45. 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (allowing voting changes to be enforced without a declaratory judg-
ment from the United States District Court for the District of Columbia if the change is “submitted 
by the chief legal officer or other appropriate official of such State or subdivision to the Attorney 
General and the Attorney General has not interposed an objection” to the change). The Attorney 
General has delegated responsibility for making Section 5 determinations to the Assistant Attorney 
General for the Civil Rights Division. 28 C.F.R. § 51.3 (2003). 
 46. 42 U.S.C. § 1973c. 
 47. Section 5 provides that a change becomes precleared if the Attorney General fails to 
interpose an objection to the change within sixty days of its submission. Id. Thus, a change can be 
precleared without any formal action by the Attorney General. However, if the Attorney General 
determines that a change merits preclearance prior to the sixty-day deadline, the Attorney General 
may affirmatively preclear the change prior to the sixtieth day. Id. When the Attorney General pro-
vides preclearance prior to the sixtieth day, “the Attorney General . . . reserve[s] the right to re-
examine the submission if additional information comes to [light] . . . which would otherwise require 
[an] objection.” Id.; see also 28 C.F.R. § 51.43 (2003). 
If the Attorney General deems a submission to be incomplete, a written request for additional 
information can be sent to the jurisdiction within the initial sixty-day period. 28 C.F.R. § 51.37(a) 
(2003). This request stops the clock until the Attorney General receives a complete response and 
another sixty-day period commences. 28 C.F.R. §§ 51.37(c), (d); see also Branch v. Smith, 123 S. 
Ct. 1429, 1436 (2003) (allowing for an extension of time if the Attorney General makes a request for 
additional information that is “neither frivolous nor unwarranted”); Georgia v. United States, 411 
U.S. 526, 539-41 (1973) (allowing the Attorney General to suspend the sixty-day clock until the 
complete submission is received). 
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Attorney General rather than undergo the time and expense involved in 
federal district court litigation.48 
Section 5 applies broadly to all standards, practices, and procedures 
that affect voting, no matter how minor.49 Changes affecting voting in-
clude: changes in methods of election, districting plans, annexations, 
rules for candidate qualifying, procedures for casting write-in votes, and 
locations of polling places.50 Thus, the federal government must scruti-
  
 48. See U.S. Dep’t of Justice, About Section 5, supra note 39 (noting that ninety-nine percent 
of preclearance requests go through the Attorney General); see also Drew S. Days III, Section 5 and 
the Role of the Justice Department, in CONTROVERSIES IN MINORITY VOTING 52, 53 n.2 (Bernard 
Grofman & Chandler Davidson eds., 1992) (noting that an overwhelming number of jurisdictions 
choose to seek approval for voting changes from the Attorney General). 
When the Attorney General objects to a change, a jurisdiction still has the option to seek a 
declaratory judgment in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. 28 C.F.R. § 
51.11 (2003) (“Submission to the Attorney General does not affect the right . . . to bring an action in 
the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia . . . .”). A decision by the Attorney General to 
preclear a change is not reviewable in any court, but such a decision does not prevent a voting 
change from being attacked as violative of other provisions of federal or state law. See Morris v. 
Gressette, 432 U.S. 491, 501-02 (1977) (explaining that the Attorney General’s decision to preclear 
is not subject to judicial review); see also Reno v. Bossier Parish Sch. Bd., 520 U.S. 471, 477-78 
(1997) (Bossier I) (illustrating that a precleared change may be challenged under any applicable 
provision of federal or state law); 28 C.F.R. § 51.49 (2003) (same). 
 49. Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 564-72 (1969). In Allen, the Court rejected a 
narrow construction of Section 5, noting that the Voting Rights Act was “aimed at the subtle, as well 
as the obvious, state regulations which have the effect of denying citizens their right to vote because 
of their race,” and that Congress’s intent in passing Section 5 was to “reach any state enactment 
which altered the election law of a covered State in even a minor way.” Allen, 393 U.S. at 565-66; 
see also Dougherty County v. White, 439 U.S. 32, 43 (1978) (“§ 5 must be given the broadest possi-
ble scope”) (internal quotes omitted). 
Since Allen, the Court has placed some, but very little, limit on the scope of Section 5. In 
Presley v. Etowah County Comm’n, 502 U.S. 491 (1992), the Court decided that changes in the 
powers and duties of elected officials do not constitute voting changes subject to Section 5 preclear-
ance. Presley involved changes made to the authority of county commissioners in Etowah and Rus-
sell Counties, Alabama. Presley, 502 U.S. at 495, 499. Prior to the changes, individual commission-
ers had broad authority to fix roads in their individual districts whereas after the changes, individual 
commissioners had far less authority. Id. at 495-99. In the case of Etowah County, this change oc-
curred after voting rights litigation led to the election of an African-American commissioner. Id. at 
496-97. 
The Presley Court held that these shifts of power were not voting changes subject to Section 5, 
acknowledging that while Section 5 was “expansive within its sphere of operation,” a change had to 
have some nexus to voting in order to be subject to the preclearance requirement. Id. at 501-03. The 
Court also provided guidance on the types of changes subject to Section 5 review, delimiting four 
broad categories: (1) “changes involve[ing] the manner of voting;” (2) changes “involve[ing] candi-
dacy requirements and qualifications;” (3) “changes in the composition of the electorate that may 
vote for candidates for a given office;” and (4) changes “affecting the creation or abolition of an 
elective office.” Id. at 502-03. 
 50. The Department of Justice has provided the following list as examples of changes which 
affect voting: 
(a) Any change in qualifications or eligibility for voting. 
(b) Any change concerning registration, balloting, and the counting of votes and any 
change concerning publicity for or assistance in registration or voting. 
(c) Any change with respect to the use of a language other than English in any aspect of 
the electoral process. 
(d) Any change in the boundaries of voting precincts or in the location of polling places. 
(e) Any change in the constituency of an official or the boundaries of a voting unit (e.g., 
through redistricting, annexation, deannexation, incorporation, reapportionment, chang-
ing to at-large elections from district elections, or changing to district elections from at-
large elections). 
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nize and approve everything from a city’s annexation of vacant land to a 
state’s adoption of new congressional districts.51 So, by way of hypo-
thetical, if Tombstone, Arizona, moves its polling place from the local 
elementary school to city hall, it must obtain preclearance.52 
To secure preclearance, a jurisdiction has the burden of proving53 
the voting change does not have a discriminatory effect or purpose.54 A 
change discriminatory in effect is one that leads to a retrogression of the 
ability of minority voters to effectively exercise the electoral franchise.55 
A change discriminatory in purpose is one adopted with the intent to 
cause a retrogression of the ability of minority voters to effectively exer-
cise the electoral franchise.56 Retrogression is measured by reference to 
the existing, or “benchmark,” practice.57 
  
(f) Any change in the method of determining the outcome of an election (e.g., by requir-
ing a majority vote for election or the use of a designated post or place system). 
(g) Any change affecting the eligibility of persons to become or remain candidates, to ob-
tain a position on the ballot in primary or general elections, or to become or remain hold-
ers of elective offices. 
(h) Any change in the eligibility and qualification procedures for independent candidates. 
(i) Any change in the term of an elective office or an elected official or in the offices that 
are elective (e.g., by shortening the term of an office, changing from election to appoint-
ment or staggering the terms of offices). 
(j) Any change affecting the necessity of or methods for offering issues and propositions 
for approval by referendum. 
(k) Any change affecting the right or ability of persons to participate in political cam-
paigns which is effected by a jurisdiction subject to the requirement of Section 5. 
28 C.F.R. § 51.13 (2003). 
 51. City of Pleasant Grove v. United States, 479 U.S. 462, 467 (1987) (annexation of vacant 
land); Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S 630, 634 (1993) (congressional redistricting). 
 52. See Perkins v. Matthews, 400 U.S. 379, 387 (1971) (requiring preclearance if a covered 
jurisdiction changes the location of a polling place). Tombstone is covered because the entire State 
of Arizona is subject to Section 5. See supra note 38. 
 53. 28 C.F.R. § 51.52(a) (2003) (providing that “[t]he burden of proof is on a submitting 
authority when it submits a change to the Attorney General for preclearance”); Wilkes County v. 
United States, 450 F. Supp. 1171, 1177 (D.D.C. 1978) (“In an action for a declaratory judgment 
under Section 5, the burden of proof is on the plaintiff.”). 
 54. 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (allowing preclearance of a change so long as it “does not have the 
purpose and will not have the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or 
color, or in contravention of the guarantees set forth in section 1973b(f)(2)”). 
 55. Georgia v. Ashcroft, 123 S. Ct. 2498, 2503 (2003); City of Lockhart v. United States, 460 
U.S. 125, 134 (1983) (holding that voting changes were entitled to preclearance because changes 
“did not increase the degree of discrimination against blacks”); Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130, 
141 (1976) (holding that “the purpose of [§] 5 has always been to insure that no voting-procedure 
changes would be made that would lead to a retrogression in the position of racial minorities with 
respect to their effective exercise of the electoral franchise”); Texas v. United States, 866 F. Supp. 
20, 27 (D.D.C. 1994) (explaining that “preclearance [must] be denied under the ‘effects’ prong of 
Section 5 if a new system places minority voters in a weaker position than the existing system”). 
 56. Reno v. Bossier Parish Sch. Bd., 528 U.S. 320, 340 (2000) (Bossier II). The standards for 
evaluating annexations are slightly different than for evaluating other voting changes. An annexation 
can be precleared if it retrogresses minority voting strength, so long as the method of election of the 
jurisdiction fairly reflects the minority voting strength remaining after the annexation occurs. City of 
Richmond v. United States, 422 U.S. 358, 371-72 (1975). In Richmond, the Court held there was no 
discriminatory effect in an annexation that reduced the City’s African-American population by ten 
percentage points—from 52 to 42 percent. Richmond, 422 U.S. at 363. The Court concluded that no 
such effect existed because the city had four (out of nine) single-member districts with a majority of 
African-American population. Id. at 371-72. 
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An unprecleared voting change cannot be enforced. A voting 
change in a covered jurisdiction “will not be effective as law[] until and 
unless [pre]cleared,”58 and failure to obtain preclearance “renders the 
change unenforceable.”59 If a voting change has not been precleared, the 
Attorney General or a private plaintiff may challenge any attempted en-
forcement of the change in a local federal district court.60 These cases are 
commonly known as “Section 5 enforcement actions” and such an action 
will almost always lead to an injunction prohibiting any implementation 
of the unprecleared change.61 
Jurisdictions can remove themselves from Section 5’s preclearance 
requirement by obtaining a declaratory judgment from the United States 
District Court for the District of Columbia, a so-called “bailout.”62 To 
obtain a bailout, the jurisdiction must prove that during the last ten years: 
(a) no discriminatory test or device (e.g., a literacy test) has been used; 
(b) no court has judged the jurisdiction or any of its political subdivisions 
to have denied or abridged the right to vote; (c) no federal examiners 
have been assigned to register voters; (d) the subjurisdiction and all po-
litical units within it have complied with Section 5; (e) no Section 5 ob-
jection by the Attorney General or unfavorable declaratory judgment has 
been issued by the United States District Court for the District of Colum-
bia; (f) the subjurisdiction and all its political units have eliminated vot-
  
An annexation can be found to have a discriminatory purpose if the jurisdiction engages in a 
racially selective annexation policy. Pleasant Grove, 479 U.S. at 467. Pleasant Grove upheld a 
lower court denial of preclearance to an annexation of white residents when the city refused, for 
racial reasons, to annex an area where African-Americans resided. Id. at 465-72. The Court has 
described such racially motivated annexation procedures as objectionable because it indicates a 
purposeful attempt to retrogress minority voting strength in the future. Bossier II, 528 U.S. at 340. 
 57. 28 C.F.R. § 51.54(b)(1) (2003) provides: 
In determining whether a submitted change is retrogressive the Attorney General will 
normally compare the submitted change to the voting practice or procedure in effect at 
the time of the submission. If the existing practice or procedure upon submission was not 
in effect on the jurisdiction’s applicable date for coverage . . . and is not otherwise legally 
enforceable under Section 5, it cannot serve as a benchmark, and . . . the comparison shall 
be with the last legally enforceable practice or procedure used by the jurisdiction. 
Id. Thus, the benchmark practice is almost always either the practice in place as of the date of cover-
age or any practice that has received preclearance since the applicable coverage date.  
 58. Connor v. Waller, 421 U.S. 656 (1975) (per curiam). 
 59. Hathorn v. Lovorn, 457 U.S. 255, 269 (1982). 
 60. 42 U.S.C. § 1973j(d) (Attorney General); Allen, 393 U.S. at 555 (private party).  
 61. Clark v. Roemer, 500 U.S. 646, 652-53 (1991) (“If voting changes subject to § 5 have not 
been precleared, § 5 plaintiffs are entitled to an injunction prohibiting the State from implementing 
the changes.”). Clark does, however, leave some wiggle room for jurisdictions to avoid an injunction 
preventing enforcement of a change. For example, if an injunction against enforcement of a change 
was sought on the eve of an election and equitable principles existed that justified allowing the 
change to be enforced. Clark, 500 U.S. at 654-55. 
Implementing a voting change without preclearance could lead to a court ordering a new elec-
tion to be held without use of the unprecleared change. See NAACP v. Hampton County Election 
Comm’n., 470 U.S. 166, 182-83 (1985) (instructing the district court to order a new election if the 
implemented, unprecleared change fails to receive post-election preclearance); John P. MacCoon, 
The Enforcement of the Preclearance Requirement of Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 29 
CATH. U. L. REV. 107, 124-27 (1979) (describing the potential for retrospective relief under Section 
5). 
 62. 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(a)(1). 
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ing procedures and methods of election which inhibit or dilute equal ac-
cess to the electoral process, have engaged in constructive efforts to 
eliminate intimidation and harassment of persons exercising the right to 
vote, and have engaged in constructive efforts to provide convenient 
opportunities for registration and participation by minority citizens; and 
(g) the jurisdiction is not engaged in any statutory or constitutional viola-
tion of the right to vote on account of race, color, or membership in a 
language minority group.63 The jurisdiction must also provide public 
notice of its intent to bail out and present evidence of minority participa-
tion in voting, including data on trends in registration and voting and 
disparities between minority and non-minority electoral participation.64 
As is evident from the above description, Section 5 provides a tre-
mendous prophylactic tool in preventing voting-related discrimination 
and perhaps serves as the principal reason the Voting Rights Act “has 
been hailed by many to be the most effective [piece of] civil rights legis-
lation ever passed in this country.”65 Yet it simultaneously imposes a 
substantial burden on state and local governments because they must 
seek approval from federal officials before implementing even the most 
minor of voting changes. In addition, the price for failure to get preclear-
ance is steep—basically, an automatic injunction against enforcement of 
the change, and a great deal of proof and expense is necessary to bail out 
of this scheme.66 Section 5 places such a great burden on state and local 
governments that it would seemingly be unconstitutional. But, so far, the 
Supreme Court has soundly rejected every such challenge to the statute. 
  
 63. Id. §§ 1973b(a)(1)(A)–(F), 1973b(f). 
 64. Id. §§ 1973b(a)(2), 1973b(a)(4). 
 65. Extension of the Voting Rights Act: Hearings on H.R. 939, H.R. 2148, H.R. 3247, and 
H.R. 3501 Before the Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House Comm. of the 
Judiciary, 94th Cong. 1 (1975) (statement of Rep. Edwards); see also Scott Gluck, Congressional 
Reaction to Judicial Construction of Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 29 COLUM. J.L. & 
SOC. PROBS. 337, 340 (1996) (describing Section 5 as “the single most important provision of the 
Voting Rights Act and the key to preventing electoral discrimination”); Lani Guinier, No Two Seats: 
The Elusive Quest for Political Equality, 77 VA. L. REV. 1413, 1419 (1991) (calling Section 5 the 
“heart of the Voting Rights Act”). 
 66. A few other aspects of Section 5 underscore the stringent nature of the remedy. First, in 
making submissions to the Attorney General, a jurisdiction must submit the change in “some unam-
biguous and recordable manner . . . .” McCain v. Lybrand, 465 U.S. 236, 249 (1984); 28 C.F.R. § 
51.27(c) (2003) (requiring a “clear statement of the change explaining the difference between the 
submitted change and the prior law or practice”) (emphasis added). This requirement has resulted in 
ambiguities in submissions being resolved against the jurisdictions. See, e.g., Boxx v. Bennett, 50 F. 
Supp. 2d 1219, 1227 (M.D. Ala. 1999) (noting the “presumption that any ambiguity in the scope of 
the preclearance request must be construed against the submitting jurisdiction”) (internal quotes 
omitted). Second, Section 5 is so broad that even a change approved by any federal court other than 
the United States District Court for the District of Columbia is subject to preclearance to the extent 
the changes reflect the underlying policy choices of the jurisdiction. 28 C.F.R. § 51.18 (2003) 
(“Changes affecting voting that are ordered by a Federal court are subject to the preclearance re-
quirement of Section 5 to the extent that they reflect the policy choices of the submitting author-
ity.”); McDaniel v. Sanchez, 452 U.S. 130, 150-51 (1981). Third, decisions of state courts that result 
in voting changes also must be precleared. See Hathorn, 457 U.S. at 265 n.16 (noting that “the 
presence of a [state] court decree does not exempt the contested change from § 5”); see also LULAC 
of Tex. v. Texas, 995 F. Supp. 719, 726 (W.D. Tex. 1998) (subjecting a decision of the state su-
preme court to preclearance review). 
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II. FROM KATZENBACH TO BOERNE TO HIBBS: CHANGES IN THE SCOPE OF 
CONGRESS’S ENFORCEMENT POWER AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE 
CONGRUENCE AND PROPORTIONALITY TEST 
The Supreme Court, on two occasions, has extensively considered 
whether Section 5 represents a proper exercise of Congress’s enforce-
ment power. In South Carolina v. Katzenbach67 and City of Rome v. 
United States,68 the Court ceded broad enforcement power to Congress 
and easily upheld the statute’s constitutionality.69 More recently, how-
ever, in City of Boerne v. Flores,70 the Court has evinced a willingness to 
put much more severe limitations on Congress’s enforcement power. 
This Section briefly explains the changes wrought by the Court in creat-
ing the congruence and proportionality test first set forth in Boerne and 
then provides a detailed description of how the Court has applied the test. 
A. The Shift from a Broad to a Narrow Enforcement Power 
South Carolina v. Katzenbach represented the Court’s first foray 
into the constitutionality of Section 5. In Katzenbach, the Court upheld 
Section 5, employing a highly deferential standard that gave Congress 
“full remedial powers” to use “‘all means which are appropriate’”71 to 
eliminate unconstitutional voting discrimination.72 This power allowed 
Congress to pass any “appropriate” legislation to carry out the “letter and 
spirit of the constitution . . . .”73 
After setting forth this deferential framework, the Court encoun-
tered little difficulty in finding Section 5 a rational remedy for Congress 
  
 67. 383 U.S. 301, 327 (1966). 
 68. 446 U.S. 156, 174-75 (1980). 
 69. In Georgia v. United States, 411 U.S. 526 (1973), the Court reaffirmed the constitutional-
ity of Section 5 in a single sentence: “And for the reasons stated at length in South Carolina v. 
Katzenbach, we reaffirm that the Act is a permissible exercise of congressional power under [§] 2 of 
the Fifteenth Amendment.” Georgia, 411 U.S. at 535 (internal citations omitted). 
The Court’s decision in Lopez v. Monterey County, 525 U.S. 266 (1999) (Lopez II), also dis-
cussed Section 5’s relationship with Congress’s enforcement power. But Lopez II provided a much 
less comprehensive discussion of the issue than in Katzenbach and City of Rome, and appeared to 
principally rely on these precedents. See Lopez II, 525 U.S. at 283-84. This Article gives in-depth 
treatment to Lopez II in Part IV. 
 70. 521 U.S. 507 (1997). 
 71. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 326 (quoting McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 
421 (1819)).  
 72. This deferential standard led the Court to reject the state’s argument that Congress could 
only “forbid violations of the Fifteenth Amendment in general terms” while “the task of fashioning 
specific remedies or of applying them to particular localities must necessarily be left entirely to the 
courts.” Id. at 327. 
 73. Id. at 326. The Court also noted: 
Whatever legislation is appropriate, that is, adapted to carry out the objects the amend-
ments have in view, whatever tends to enforce submission to the prohibitions they con-
tain, and to secure to all persons the enjoyment of perfect equality of civil rights and the 
equal protection of the laws against State denial or invasion, if not prohibited, is brought 
within the domain of congressional power. 
Id. at 327 (quoting Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 345-46 (1879)). 
File: Pitts Macro Created on: 4/19/2004 2:16 PM Last Printed: 8/11/2004 4:00 PM 
2003] SECTION 5 OF THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT 239 
to employ in the eradication of voting-related discrimination.74 While 
recognizing that Section 5 represented an “uncommon exercise of 
congressional power,” the Court held that “exceptional conditions 
[could] justify legislative measures not otherwise appropriate.”75 These 
exceptional conditions included the lengthy and despicable history of 
voting-related discrimination in many of the jurisdictions covered by 
Section 5,76 including these jurisdictions’ resort to the “extraordinary 
stratagem” of creating new rules to perpetuate discrimination even in the 
face of federal court decrees to the contrary.77 Thus, with the Court 
ceding broad enforcement authority to Congress, Section 5 had survived 
its first constitutional challenge.78 
Following Congress’s extension of Section 5 in 1970 and 1975,79 
the Court, in City of Rome v. United States,80 considered whether Katzen-
bach had been correctly decided and whether Section 5 continued to rep-
resent a proper exercise of Congress’s enforcement power. 81 Once again 
the Court ceded broad enforcement power to Congress, finding that Con-
gress could provide a broad remedy to protect voting rights so long as the 
legislation was “appropriate.” 
While once again giving Congress wide latitude in the exercise of 
its enforcement power, the Court provided three principal rationales for 
upholding Section 5.82 First, it was appropriate for Congress to ban vot-
  
 74. In Katzenbach, the Court also separately upheld the coverage formula used to determine 
which localities would be required to preclear voting changes—a formula also used to require these 
same jurisdictions to suspend literacy tests and to allow federal examiners to register voters. Id. at 
329-33. The Court held that in the places covered by the formula “actual voting discrimination” had 
occurred and that the bailout procedures provided enough of a safeguard to eliminate any potential 
“overbreadth” of coverage. Id. at 330-31. 
 75. Id. at 334. 
 76. Id. at 329-31. The Court opened its opinion with an extended discussion of the history of 
voting-related discrimination, relying heavily on the legislative history from passage of the Act. Id. 
at 308-15. 
 77. Id. at 335. 
 78. Justice Black dissented in Katzenbach, as he was unconvinced that federalism allowed 
such great congressional intrusion into state lawmaking. See id. at 355-62 (Black, J., concurring and 
dissenting). In his view, Section 5 marked a complete distortion of the American constitutional 
structure of government because requiring a state to “beg” federal authorities for approval of its laws 
rendered meaningless any distinction between federal and state power. Id. at 358 (Black, J., concur-
ring and dissenting). He continued: “It is inconceivable to me that such a radical degradation of state 
power was intended in any provisions of our Constitution or its Amendments.” Id. at 360 (Black, J., 
concurring and dissenting). To support his view, Justice Black cited the original intent of the framers 
who chose to deny Congress the power to veto state laws, a power that Congress, in Justice Black’s 
view, was now asserting through passage of Section 5. Id. at 360-62 (Black, J., concurring and 
dissenting).  
 79. See supra note 10. 
 80. City of Rome involved the denial of a declaratory judgment for preclearance in the United 
States District Court for the District of Columbia. City of Rome, 446 U.S. at 172-73. The city had 
unsuccessfully sought approval of changes to its boundaries and the method of electing its council. 
Id. at 159-62. 
 81. Id. at 174 (characterizing the city’s argument as one that asked the Court “to do nothing 
less than overrule our decision in South Carolina v. Katzenbach”). 
 82. These three reasons corresponded with the city’s three principal contentions in this case 
which were: (1) Congress did not own enforcement power broader than the substantive rights en-
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ing changes with a discriminatory effect because Congress could have 
“rationally” concluded that it was necessary to prevent implementation 
of changes having a discriminatory effect in jurisdictions with a “demon-
strable history of intentional racial discrimination in voting . . . .”83 Sec-
ond, Section 5 was consistent with principles of federalism because the 
Fifteenth Amendment specifically allowed for an expansion of federal 
power at the expense of state sovereignty. Therefore, the Court saw “no 
reason” to depart from its view in Katzenbach that Section 5 represented 
an appropriate means for Congress to carry out its Fifteenth Amendment 
responsibilities.84 Third, the Court rejected the idea that Section 5 had 
outlived its usefulness, despite the increase in minority participation in 
voting and office-holding, by deferring to congressional findings indicat-
ing the need for the Section 5 remedy to prevent a backsliding of these 
gains.85 The Court also noted that an additional seven years for Section 5 
seemed appropriate in view of the ninety-five year history of voting dis-
crimination between the end of the Civil War and passage of the Voting 
Rights Act.86 In short, the Court found extension of the Act to be “plainly 
a constitutional method of enforcing the Fifteenth Amendment.”87 
  
compassed in the Constitution; (2) the remedy violated principles of federalism; and (3) the remedy 
had outlived its usefulness because of the decline in incidences of voting-related discrimination. Id. 
at 173, 178, 180. 
The city also brought claims under the First, Fifth, Ninth, and Tenth Amendments, all of which 
the Court rejected in a single paragraph. Id. at 182-83. The Court did not reach the merits of a claim 
brought under the Guarantee Clause of Article IV, Section 4 of the Constitution. Id. at 183 n.17.  
 83. Id. at 177; see also id. at 173-76 (discussing the Katzenbach standard and holding that 
“prior decisions of this Court foreclose any argument that Congress may not . . . outlaw voting 
practices that are discriminatory in effect”). 
 84. Id. at 178-81. 
 85. Id. at 180-82. 
 86. Id. at 182.  
 87. Id. The Court then proceeded to uphold the district court’s findings that the voting 
changes at issue were not entitled to preclearance. See id. at 183-87. 
In City of Rome, Justices Blackmun, id. at 187, and Stevens, id. at 190, wrote concurrences and 
Justices Powell, id. at 193, and Rehnquist (joined by Justice Stewart), id. at 206, penned dissents. Of 
these separate opinions, Justice Rehnquist’s dissent deserves some discussion because it presages 
some of the issues raised in the recent cases in which the Court has been more restrictive of Con-
gress’s enforcement power. 
Justice Rehnquist began his dissent by recognizing that the City itself had been found not to 
have engaged in discriminatory practices for the previous seventeen years and that the changes 
involved in the case were found only to have a discriminatory effect. Id. at 209 (Rehnquist, J., dis-
senting). He then explained the three theories of congressional enforcement power relevant to the 
case: 
First, it is clear that if the proposed changes would violate the Constitution, Congress 
could certainly prohibit their implementation. It has never been seriously maintained, 
however, that Congress can do no more than the judiciary to enforce the Amendments’ 
commands. Thus, if the electoral changes in issue do not violate the Constitution, as judi-
cially interpreted, it must be determined whether Congress could nevertheless appropri-
ately prohibit these changes under the other two theories of congressional power. Under 
the second theory, Congress can act remedially to enforce the judicially established sub-
stantive prohibitions of the Amendments. If not properly remedial, the exercise of this 
power could be sustained only if this Court accepts the premise of the third theory that 
Congress has the authority under its enforcement powers to determine, without more, that 
electoral changes with a disparate impact on race violate the Constitution, in which case 
Congress by legislative Act could effectively amend the Constitution. 
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With the decisions in Katzenbach and City of Rome, it appeared that 
the Court would apply the relatively relaxed rational basis test to any 
exercise of congressional enforcement power so long as the federal stat-
ute did not restrict, abrogate, or dilute the guarantees found in the Four-
teenth and Fifteenth Amendments.88 But that has changed in recent years. 
With William Rehnquist’s ascension to Chief Justice, the Supreme Court 
has consistently reduced federal power over state governments.89 In City 
of Boerne v. Flores, the Rehnquist Court continued on this course by 
redefining Congress’s ability to pass legislation under its enforcement 
power, applying much stricter limits to congressional authority than were 
extant when Section 5 was previously upheld. 
Boerne created a new test for reviewing the constitutionality of 
Congress’s exercise of its enforcement power: the congruence and pro-
portionality test. In creating this test, the Court conceded that Congress 
has some enforcement power broader than the scope of the Constitution 
itself, allowing Congress to deter constitutional violations by prohibiting 
“conduct which is not itself unconstitutional”90 and allowing Congress to 
intrude into “‘legislative spheres of autonomy previously reserved to the 
States.’”91 However, the Court’s concessions to congressional power 
  
Id. at 210 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
Justice Rehnquist thought it one thing for Congress to exercise its enforcement power to force 
a locality to submit its changes for review and bear the burden of proving a lack of discrimination, 
but that it was quite another for Congress to deny a locality the opportunity to implement changes 
that had been proven to lack a discriminatory purpose. Id. at 209-14 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). He 
characterized the majority’s decision as a blanket ban on particular dilutive practices even if such 
practices were adopted without a discriminatory purpose. Id. at 215 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
Justice Rehnquist said no basis existed in the Court’s precedents to have a blanket ban on dilutive 
practices that have a discriminatory effect because, unlike a literacy test, there was no extensive 
history of jurisdictions using dilutive practices for a discriminatory purpose. Id. at 215-18 
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Thus, in his opinion, Congress had not exercised its powers in a remedial 
manner, but had instead changed the nature of the substantive constitutional right to vote. Id. at 219-
20 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
 88. See Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 651 n.10 (1966); see also David S. Day, New 
Dimensions of the Section 5 Enforcement Power, 47 S.D. L. REV. 366, 368-70 (2002) (discussing 
Morgan and its holding that Congress’s exercise of its enforcement power would be reviewed under 
the rational basis standard); Stephen L. Carter, The Morgan ‘Power’ and the Forced Reconsideration 
of Constitutional Decisions, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 819, 827-28 (1986) (discussing the limits of con-
gressional enforcement power under Morgan).  
 89. See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997) (finding a portion of the Brady 
Act to be an unconstitutional exercise of federal power over state officials); Seminole Tribe v. Flor-
ida, 517 U.S. 44, 54 (1996) (finding a portion of the Indian Gaming Act to be an unconstitutional 
attempt by Congress to abrogate states’ sovereign immunity); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 
551 (1995) (finding the Gun-Free School Zones Act to be an unconstitutional exercise of Congress’s 
Commerce Clause power); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 177 (1992) (finding a portion 
of the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act to be an unconstitutional exercise of 
federal power over the states). 
 90. Boerne, 521 U.S. at 518. 
 91. Id. (quoting Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 455 (1976)). As examples of Congress’s 
power to deter constitutional violations, the Court cited to several provisions of the Voting Rights 
Act, including Section 5. Id. at 517-20. The Court also noted its upholding of the Voting Rights 
Act’s ban on literacy tests despite the facial constitutionality of such tests. Id. at 518. Compare 
Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 117-18 (1970) (upholding a nationwide ban on literacy tests), with 
Lassiter v. Northampton County Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45, 53-54 (1959) (finding literacy tests to 
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stopped there, and the Court then expounded on the limits of the en-
forcement power.92 The Court held that Congress lacks power to “decree 
the substance” or “alter[] the meaning” of a constitutional right, and that 
legislation altering the meaning of a constitutional right could not be 
considered merely as legislation that enforced the right.93 The Court then 
set forth the test for determining whether Congress has exceeded its en-
forcement powers: 
While the line between measures that remedy or prevent unconstitu-
tional actions and measures that make a substantive change in the 
governing law is not easy to discern, and Congress must have wide 
latitude in determining where it lies, the distinction exists and must 
be observed. There must be a congruence and proportionality be-
tween the injury to be prevented or remedied and the means adopted 
to that end. Lacking such a connection, legislation may become sub-
stantive in operation and effect.94 
  
be facially constitutional). The significance of Boerne’s references to the Voting Rights Act is dis-
cussed in Part IV of this Article. 
 92. Boerne, 521 U.S. at 518 (noting that “‘[a]s broad as the congressional enforcement power 
is, it is not unlimited’” (quoting Mitchell, 400 U.S. at 128)). 
 93. Id. at 519 (“[Congress] has been given the power ‘to enforce,’ not the power to determine 
what constitutes a constitutional violation.”). 
 94. Id. at 519-20 (emphasis added).  
To justify this new test, the Court provided an extended discussion of the history surrounding 
the adoption of Congress’s enforcement power and the Court’s previous decisions interpreting that 
power. Id. at 520 (citing “history” for confirmation that Congress’s enforcement power is “remedial, 
rather than substantive”). Historical support for the Court’s position came from Congress’s rejection 
of the initial draft of the Fourteenth Amendment because it “gave Congress too much legislative 
power at the expense of the existing constitutional structure.” Id. According to the Court, the revised 
and adopted amendment changed Congress’s enforcement power from a “plenary” power to one 
which was “remedial.” Id. at 522. But see Michael W. McConnell, Institutions and Interpretation: A 
Critique of City of Boerne v. Flores, 111 HARV. L. REV. 153, 174-81 (1997) (criticizing the Boerne 
Court’s use of history to support its interpretation of Congress’s enforcement power); Ruth Colker, 
The Supreme Court’s Historical Errors in City of Boerne v. Flores, 43 B.C. L. REV. 783, 784 (2002) 
(arguing that the Court misread the historical record in giving a narrow scope to Congress’s en-
forcement powers). As for precedent, the Court noted that its earliest cases deciding the limits of the 
enforcement power served to confirm Congress’s power as remedial, and its more recent decisions, 
all of which dealt with voting rights, served as additional support for finding Congress’s power to be 
remedial in nature. Boerne, 521 U.S. at 524-27. 
The opinion acknowledged, however, that the Court’s decision in Katzenbach v. Morgan, 
“could be interpreted as acknowledging a power in Congress to enact legislation that expands the 
rights contained in” the Constitution. Id. at 527-28; see also supra note 88 (discussing this 
interpretation of Congress’s enforcement power as outlined in Morgan). Morgan involved a 
challenge to Section 4(e) of the Voting Rights Act which was passed with the purpose of eliminating 
New York’s literacy test as it applied to Spanish-speaking citizens educated in Puerto Rico. Morgan, 
384 U.S. at 645 n.3. In upholding Section 4(e), the Court implied that Congress had unlimited 
authority to expand constitutional rights using the enforcement power. Id. at 651 n.10. 
However, in Boerne, the Court determined that Morgan could be interpreted as upholding 
Congress’s attempt to “remedy” unconstitutional discrimination, not expand substantive constitu-
tional rights. Boerne, 521 U.S. at 528-29. Moreover, reading Morgan more broadly would be incor-
rect because it would render the Constitution on par with “ordinary legislative acts, and like other 
acts, . . . alterable when the legislature shall please to alter it.” Id. (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 
U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803)). 
Professor Laurence Tribe described this explanation, authored by Justice Anthony Kennedy, of 
Morgan as “rather brief and a bit cryptic.” TRIBE, supra note 15, at 952. Professor Tribe posits that 
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After establishing this new standard,95 the Court placed the Reli-
gious Freedom Restoration Act, a statute intended to prevent religious 
discrimination, under the congruence and proportionality microscope, 
and concluded that the statute could not meet that test. The Court al-
lowed that preventive rules could sometimes be appropriate remedial 
measures, but that “[s]trong measures appropriate to address one harm 
may be an unwarranted response to another, lesser one.”96 The Court 
found that the congressional record lacked sufficient evidence of reli-
gious discrimination.97 Moreover, even apart from the legislative re-
cord’s paucity of evidence, the Court found the statute to be clearly dis-
proportionate to the supposed problem of unconstitutional religious dis-
crimination.98 The Court thought the sweeping scope of the statute would 
likely nullify a significant number of constitutional state laws.99 The stat-
ute also exacted a “heavy litigation burden,” resulted in a “curtailing [of 
states’] traditional general regulatory power,”100 failed to include any 
limits such as a termination date or a geographic restriction, and was not 
passed because of an egregious history of constitutional violations.101 
Thus, the first statute subjected to the Court’s new test failed to survive 
that test. 
B. The Court’s Post-Boerne Rejections of Federal Remedies Using the 
Congruence and Proportionality Test 
Boerne altered and limited the scope of Congress’s enforcement 
power. Instead of Congress having broad leeway, legislation enacted 
under the auspices of the enforcement power must sail through the nar-
rower passage of the congruence and proportionality test.102 After decid-
  
this discussion interprets Congress’s action in Morgan as remedial because Congress had made a 
correct factual determination that New York’s literacy test was perhaps enacted with a discrimina-
tory purpose. Id. Professor Tribe’s theory seems to be the correct one. In dissent in a subsequent 
congruence and proportionality case, Justice Kennedy explained how Morgan was criticized as an 
incorrect factual determination that New York’s literacy test involved unconstitutional behavior by 
the state. Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 123 S. Ct. 1972, 1993-94 (2003) (Kennedy, J., dis-
senting) (discussing Justice Harlan’s Morgan dissent). 
 95. Akhil Reed Amar, Foreward: The Document and the Doctrine, 114 HARV. L. REV. 26, 
117 (2000) (arguing that Boerne represented a “new rule of doctrine”).  
 96. Boerne, 521 U.S. at 530. 
 97. Id. at 530-31 (describing the congressional record as containing “anecdotal evidence” 
about “laws of general applicability which place incidental burdens on religion”). 
 98. Id. at 532 (“Regardless of the state of the legislative record, RFRA cannot be considered 
remedial, preventive legislation, if those terms are to have any meaning.”). 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. at 534. 
 101. Id. at 532-33. 
 102. See Day, supra note 88, at 367 (describing how the Rehnquist Court’s decisions have set 
“high and rigorous standards” for the exercise of congressional enforcement power); Geoffrey 
Landward, Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama v. Garrett and the Equal Education 
Opportunity Act: Another Act Bites the Dust, 2002 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 313, 318 (noting how prior to 
the 1990s, it appeared Congress had “seemingly limitless” enforcement power); Evan H. Caminker, 
“Appropriate” Means-Ends Constraints on Section 5 Powers, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1127, 1134-58 
(2001) (describing the Court’s shift from rational basis scrutiny of legislation passed under the 
enforcement power to “rigorous scrutiny”); Katz, supra note 4, at 1202 (noting that Boerne and 
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ing Boerne, the Court proceeded to reject four additional federal statutes 
subjected to the congruence and proportionality test while honing the 
parameters of the analysis by expounding on the three-part framework 
for evaluating laws passed under Congress’s enforcement power.103 
In the initial step of the analysis, the Court precisely defines the 
scope of the constitutional right being violated by states and being reme-
died by the federal statute.104 To understand how this step works, take for 
example the application of the congruence and proportionality test to the 
Age Discrimination in Employment Act. In that instance, the Court first 
decided what sort of state acts would be considered unconstitutional age 
discrimination.105 The Court did so by undertaking a canvass of its 
precedent and ended up determining that, in the context of age discrimi-
nation, a state can discriminate on the basis of age if the discrimination 
rationally relates to a legitimate state interest.106 
After finding the contours of the right at issue, the Court turns to the 
second step of congruence and proportionality—undertaking a review of 
the scope of the problem of unconstitutional activity that the statute was 
intended to remedy.107 To determine the scope of the problem, the Court 
primarily looks to the congressional record108 and, to a lesser extent, to 
  
subsequent cases represent “increasingly stringent parameters” on congressional enforcement 
power); Dean, supra note 16, at 728 (describing how Boerne and its progeny moved the Court’s 
review of legislation passed pursuant to the enforcement power from “the traditional rational rela-
tionship test . . . to a stricter congruence and proportionality test”); Jack M. Beermann, The Unhappy 
History of Civil Rights Legislation, Fifty Years Later, 34 CONN. L. REV. 981, 1030 (2002) (describ-
ing the Court’s recent narrowing of the congressional enforcement power). But see Marci A. Hamil-
ton & David Schoenbrod, The Reaffirmation of Proportionality Analysis Under Section 5 of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 469, 473 (1999) (arguing that “the proportionality 
requirement has been a staple” of the Court’s review of Congress’s enforcement power while ac-
knowledging that the Court had previously “applied it with varying degrees of vigor”). 
 103. See Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 360 (2001) (holding that 
Congress could not subject states to suits under Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act); 
United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 627 (2000) (holding that Congress could not subject private 
individuals to suits under the Violence Against Women Act); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 
62, 67 (2000) (holding that Congress could not subject states to suits under the Age Discrimination 
in Employment Act); Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 
627, 630 (1999) (holding that Congress could not subject states to suits for patent infringement). 
 104. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 365 (requiring courts, as the first step, to “identify with some preci-
sion the scope of the constitutional right at issue”); see also Florida Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 640 (identi-
fying the constitutional right at issue). 
 105. Kimel, 528 U.S. at 83-86. 
 106. Id. at 83 (“States may discriminate on the basis of age without offending the Fourteenth 
Amendment if the age classification in question is rationally related to a legitimate state interest.”). 
 107. Garrett, 531 U.S at 368 (“Once we have determined the metes and bounds of the constitu-
tional right in question, we examine whether Congress identified a history and pattern of unconstitu-
tional . . . discrimination by the States . . . .”). 
 108. Kimel, 528 U.S. at 88 (declaring that examination of the legislative record is necessary to 
determine if a prophylactic measure is required); see also Florida Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 639 (noting 
that for Congress to exercise its enforcement power it must “identify conduct transgressing” a sub-
stantive provision of the Constitution); Boerne, 521 U.S. at 525, 530-32 (noting that “‘[t]he constitu-
tional propriety of [legislation adopted under the Enforcement Clause] must be judged with refer-
ence to the historical experience . . . it reflects’” (quoting Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 308)). 
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judicial decisions.109 The Court focuses on the number of constitutional 
violations by the states that Congress has identified,110 whether the viola-
tions were identified in all or only a few of the fifty states,111 and whether 
the violations identified occurred contemporaneous with the passage of 
the statute.112 Basically, the Court uses this review of the record to de-
termine if a “‘widespread and persisting deprivation of constitutional 
rights’” 113 has occurred to support the enactment of the federal rem-
edy.114  
Finally, after reviewing the evidence of the problem’s scope, the 
Court undertakes step three by considering whether the breadth of the 
remedy adopted by Congress is congruent and proportional to the prob-
lem.115 At this step of the analysis, some of the factors considered by the 
Court are: (1) whether the legislation is geographically targeted to those 
areas that have the greatest number of problems;116 (2) whether the legis-
lation impacts a broad number of state laws or only a discrete class of 
state laws;117 (3) whether the legislation includes opportunities for states 
  
 109. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 375-76 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (remarking on the lack of “confirm-
ing judicial documentation” to show a history of widespread unconstitutional activity by the states). 
 110. Id. at 369 (remarking on the number of incidents of discrimination by states included in 
the congressional record); Florida Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 640 (faulting Congress for only finding two 
examples of unconstitutional action by the states). 
 111. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 626-27 (noting that the scope of the federal remedy was dispropor-
tionate to the problem of discrimination against victims of gender-related crimes because little evi-
dence appeared in the congressional record to show the problem “exist[s] in all States, or even most 
States”); Kimel, 528 U.S. at 90 (noting that the congressional record did not contain evidence that 
unconstitutional age discrimination was “a problem of national import”). 
 112. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 369 n.6 (acknowledging that evidence existed of discrimination by 
states against individuals with disabilities, notably through forced sterilization of those with heredi-
tary mental disease in the early part of the twentieth century, but that there was “no indication that 
any State had persisted in requiring such harsh measures as of 1990 when the ADA was adopted”); 
see also Hartley, supra note 18, at 51-52 (noting that the congruence and proportionality test re-
quires Congress to be aware of a “contemporaneous pattern of unconstitutional conduct” at the time 
it passes the remedial statute); John Alan Doran & Christopher Michael Mason, Disproportionate 
Incongruity: State Sovereign Immunity and the Future of Federal Employment Discrimination Law, 
2003 DETROIT COLL. L. MICH. ST. U. L. REV. 1, 44-45 (noting that the congressional record “must 
demonstrate that unlawful discrimination by the States, or the effect of such discrimination, existed 
at the time the legislative enactments are extended to the states”). 
 113. Florida Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 645 (quoting Boerne, 521 U.S. at 526). 
 114. In Boerne, the Court implied that the state of the congressional record would not be the be 
all and end all in its review of the scope of the problem. Boerne, 521 U.S. at 531 (noting that 
“[j]udicial deference, in most cases, is based not on the state of the legislative record”); see also 
Florida Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 646 (allowing that “lack of support in the legislative record is not 
determinative” in proving that a problem requiring a remedy does not exist). As a practical matter, in 
subsequent cases, the Court has looked primarily to the congressional record. 
 115. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 372-73 (discussing the scope of the remedies the ADA provided to 
plaintiffs against states); Florida Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 639 (holding that for Congress to exercise its 
enforcement power it “must tailor its legislative scheme to remedying or preventing [unconstitu-
tional] conduct”). 
 116. Boerne, 521 U.S. at 532-33 (noting provisions of the Voting Rights Act previously upheld 
as proper use of enforcement power were “confined to those regions of the country where voting 
discrimination had been most flagrant”); see also Florida Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 647 (noting that when 
Congress passed the Patent Act it failed to limit its application to only those “States with question-
able remedies or a high incidence of infringement”). 
 117. Boerne, 521 U.S. at 532-33 (noting provisions of the Voting Rights Act previously upheld 
as proper use of enforcement power only impacted “a discrete class of state laws, i.e., state voting 
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to earn their way out of any remedy;118 (4) whether the legislation has a 
termination date;119 (5) whether the remedy covers a broad amount of 
constitutional behavior120 or whether it is reasonable to believe many of 
the laws affected by the remedy have a significant likelihood of being 
unconstitutional;121 (6) whether the power to enforce the remedy is held 
in the hands of many or few persons;122 (7) whether the legislation carries 
a heavy litigation burden for the state and whether any judicial remedy is 
easily applied;123 and (8) the number of levels of local government the 
remedy implicates.124 
After Boerne and the first four subsequent applications of the con-
gruence and proportionality test, it appeared that meeting the test would 
be difficult, if not impossible. Justice Stevens, dissenting in one case, 
expressed the view that the test threatened any ability of Congress to pass 
prophylactic legislation using its enforcement power.125 In fact, some 
commentators thought the congruence and proportionality test akin to 
strict scrutiny in that, once invoked, it appeared to be fatal126 to the con-
stitutionality of the statute.127 However, in a more recent application  
  
laws”); see also Florida Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 646-47 (noting that when Congress passed the Patent 
Act it failed to limit “the remedy to certain types of infringement”). 
 118. Boerne, 521 U.S. at 533 (noting provisions of the Voting Rights Act previously upheld as 
proper use of enforcement power “permitted a covered jurisdiction to avoid preclearance require-
ments under certain conditions”). 
 119. Id. at 533 (noting provisions of the Voting Rights Act previously upheld as proper use of 
enforcement power “lapsed in seven years”). 
 120. Kimel, 528 U.S. at 86 (finding the Age Discrimination in Employment Act unconstitu-
tional because it “prohibits substantially more state employment decisions and practices than would 
likely be held unconstitutional under the applicable” constitutional standard); Florida Prepaid, 527 
U.S. at 646 (noting that when Congress passed the Patent Act it “did nothing to limit the coverage . . 
. to cases involving arguable constitutional violations”). 
 121. Boerne, 521 U.S. at 534 (faulting the RFRA for not being “designed to identify and coun-
teract state laws likely to be unconstitutional” (emphasis added)). 
 122. Id. at 532 (noting that “[a]ny law is subject to challenge at any time by any individual” 
(emphasis added)). 
 123. Id. at 534. 
 124. Id. at 532. 
 125. Florida Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 660 (Stevens, J., dissenting). This position was also the view 
of Justice Stephen Breyer who wrote that the Court’s actions in striking down legislation passed 
under the auspices of the enforcement power seemed to have rendered as a hollow promise the 
principal that Congress could prevent some constitutional activity through use of a prophylactic 
remedy. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 387 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Court’s declarations that 
Congress may legislate to provide broader protections than those available in the Constitution 
“sounds the word of promise to the ear but breaks it to the hope” (citations omitted)); see also Ruth 
Colker & James J. Brudney, Dissing Congress, 100 MICH. L. REV. 80, 131 (2001) (speculating that 
the effect of the congruence and proportionality test was to limit Congress to “banning conduct that 
the courts would otherwise declare unconstitutional”). 
 126. Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 519 (1980) (Marshall, J., concurring) (describing 
strict scrutiny as “strict in theory, but fatal in fact”). 
 127. See TRIBE, supra note 15, at 959 (noting that the Boerne line of cases subjects Congress’s 
exercise of its enforcement power to “something between intermediate and strict scrutiny, effectuat-
ing what can only be understood as a substantial, albeit not conclusive, presumption of unconstitu-
tionality”); Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegal, Equal Protection by Law: Federal Antidiscrimination 
Legislation After Morrison and Kimel, 110 YALE L.J. 441, 477 (2000) (comparing the congruence 
and proportionality test to “the narrow tailoring required by strict scrutiny”). 
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of the test, the Court proved it possible for a federal remedy to survive 
congruence and proportionality. 
C. Nevada Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs: A Wholesale Retreat or a 
Brief Respite from Using the Congruence and Proportionality Test to 
Nullify Congressional Remedies? 
Nevada Department of Human Resources v. Hibbs128 marked the 
first occasion in which a federal statute survived application of the con-
gruence and proportionality test. The case involved a provision of the 
Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) that allows a state employee to 
sue for money damages if the state interferes with the employee’s right to 
take up to twelve weeks of unpaid leave to care for a spouse, parent, or 
child with a serious health condition.129 In Hibbs, the Court continued to 
apply its tripartite congruence and proportionality analysis, but put some 
new gloss on it. 
The most important contribution Hibbs made to the congruence and 
proportionality body of jurisprudence is that the Court somewhat less-
ened Congress’s burden to prove a widespread pattern of recent constitu-
tional violations to justify a prophylactic remedy. Three things are evi-
dent in this regard. First, the greater the constitutional scrutiny provided 
by the Court to the right the federal remedy intends to secure, the more 
deferential the Court will be to Congress.130 Second, the Court will be 
more deferential to Congress when the right being secured involves dis-
crimination that is difficult to ferret out on a case-by-case basis.131 Third, 
the Court will relax its requirement of recent discrimination contempora-
neous with passage of the statute when a long history of discrimination 
exists.132 
  
 128. 123 S. Ct. 1972 (2003). 
 129. Hibbs, 123 S. Ct. at 1976. 
 130. The Court viewed the FMLA as an attempt to remedy “gender-based discrimination in the 
workplace.” Id. at 1978. Thus, the Court recited its standard for protection from gender discrimina-
tion, noting its extension of heightened scrutiny to gender distinctions and its requirement that such 
distinctions “serv[e] important governmental objectives” and “must not rely on overbroad generali-
zations about the different talents, capacities, or preferences of males and females.” Id. (internal 
citations omitted). The Court then used this higher level of scrutiny to lessen Congress’s burden of 
identifying a pattern of constitutional violations. Id. at 1982 (“Because the standard for demonstrat-
ing the constitutionality of a gender-based classification is more difficult to meet than our rational-
basis test . . . it was easier for Congress to show a pattern of state constitutional violations.”).  
 131. Id. at 1982 (asserting that it was reasonable for Congress to think that gender stereotyping 
could “lead to subtle discrimination that may be difficult to detect on a case-by-case basis”). 
 132. In Hibbs, the Court provided a brief canvass of the history of both its and Congress’s 
attempts to protect citizens from gender discrimination. The Court chastised itself for sanctioning 
gender-based discrimination for many years and for failing to reverse this course until 1971. Id. at 
1978 (“Until our decision in Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971) . . . it remained the prevailing doctrine 
that government, both federal and state, could withhold from women opportunities accorded men so 
long as any basis in reason . . . could be conceived for the discrimination.” (internal quotes omitted)). 
The Court also remarked on how Congress attempted to remedy gender discrimination through 
passage of Title VII. Id. However, despite these efforts by both federal branches, the Court found 
that “state gender discrimination did not cease.” Id. 
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The second lesson of Hibbs is that just because a prophylactic rem-
edy is justified, Congress cannot enact any remedy it desires.133 The 
Court’s first consideration now seems to be whether any prophylactic 
remedy can be enacted and the second consideration has become the 
burden the enacted remedy places on the states.134 In previous cases, 
these two considerations seemed to work in concert. To put it another 
way, the lack of evidence in the congressional record and the lack of 
proportionality of the remedy previously seemed to merge and blur. Now 
the Court has more distinctly parsed these two steps of the analysis. 
So where does this surprising135 recent case leave congruence and 
proportionality and the Court’s federalist bent? Does the upholding of the 
FMLA represent a wholesale retreat or merely a brief respite from the 
Court’s recent, nearly wholesale disregard for congressional power over 
the states?136 Hibbs most likely represents a small retreat from federalist 
principles, one that should not be over-read by those who pine for a re-
turn to the days of Katzenbach with a seemingly unfettered congressional 
power, but one that provides hope for core civil rights remedies like the 
Voting Rights Act.137 
Finally, the schizophrenia of the congruence and proportionality test 
leaves a large amount of uncertainty. Hibbs fails to mention a host of 
factors, such as sunset provisions and geographical restrictions, that 
seemed to be important to previous congruence and proportionality out-
  
After examining this backdrop, the Court turned to a review of the evidence before Congress 
when it passed the FMLA, finding this evidence demonstrated the “persistence of such unconstitu-
tional discrimination by the States” that passage of prophylactic legislation by Congress was justi-
fied. Id. at 1979. In this discussion, the Court cited evidence from: (1) Bureau of Labor Statistics 
studies that found disparities between the provision of maternity and paternity leave in the private 
sector; (2) studies showing that states provided inequitable policies for maternity and paternity leave; 
and (3) testimony arguing that, even where equitable policies were in place, these policies were 
applied in discriminatory ways. Id. at 1979-80. 
 133. Hibbs held that an “across-the-board, routine employment benefit for all eligible employ-
ees” was allowable to solve the “‘difficult and intractable proble[m]’” of gender discrimination since 
previous federal remedies, such as Title VII, had failed. Id. at 1982 (quoting Kimel, 528 U.S. at 88). 
The Court described the remedy as “narrowly targeted at the fault line between work and family” 
unlike other federal statutes that had been found to fail the congruence and proportionality test 
because they “applied broadly to every aspect of [the] state employers’ operations.” Id. at 1983. The 
Court also stressed other limitations in the remedy, including its requirement that only unpaid leave 
be provided; its exceptions for recently hired, part-time, and high-level employees; its burden upon 
employees to request leave in advance and provide certification from a health-care provider; and its 
limitations on recovery in federal court litigation. Id. at 1983-84. 
 134. The Court found: “In sum, the States’ record of unconstitutional participation in, and 
fostering of, gender-based discrimination in the administration of leave benefits is weighty enough to 
justify enactment of prophylactic . . . legislation.” Id. at 1981. 
 135. See Michael Kinsley, Rehnquist’s Surprise, WASH. POST, May 30, 2002, at A23 (describ-
ing how the Court’s decision to uphold the FMLA “surprised everybody”). 
 136. See Anne Gearan, States Must Grant Family-Leave Rights, DESERET NEWS, May 28, 
2003, at A2 (describing Hibbs as “a surprising departure from the conservative-leaning court’s usual 
stance on states’ rights cases”). 
 137. See Linda Greenhouse, Justices, 6-3, Rule Workers Can Sue States Over Leave, N.Y. 
TIMES, May 28, 2003, at A1 (describing how Hibbs “was widely seen as a potential watershed be-
cause it moved the debate about congressional authority close to the core of traditional civil rights 
concerns”). 
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comes (though it seems likely these factors have not been rendered ir-
relevant but will lie dormant until erupting at a later date). Thus, Hibbs 
leaves a “muddle” that “underlines the absence of recognizable princi-
ples in the court’s [sic] decisions governing the balance of power be-
tween states and the federal government.”138 In reality, congruence and 
proportionality may represent little more than “the Court’s view of 
whether the statute was necessary.”139 
III. AN UNAMENDED EXTENSION OF SECTION 5 WILL LIKELY FAIL THE 
CONGRUENCE AND PROPORTIONALITY TEST 
It is this muddled mess of a congruence and proportionality test that 
Congress will need to evaluate while considering the extension of Sec-
tion 5. So how might Section 5 fare under the test? If extended in its en-
tirety and without revision, Section 5 seems likely to fail. Congress will 
be passing the statute under constitutional provisions that protect the 
right of citizens to vote without purposeful discrimination on the part of 
government officials. This right, which the Court protects with strict 
scrutiny, combined with the long history of purposeful discrimination in 
voting and with more recent voting-related problems, will provide 
enough evidence for Congress to demonstrate a pattern of discrimination 
that justifies a prophylactic remedy. However, because the level of pur-
poseful discrimination in voting has by all accounts diminished, the 
Court, especially one with a generally conservative federalist bent, seems 
unlikely to find the same unique and stringent Section 5 remedy initially 
passed in 1965 to be congruent and proportional to the modern-day di-
lemma of voting discrimination. 
  
 138. State’s Rights Muddle, WASH. POST, May 28, 2003, at A18. 
 139. Douglas Laycock, Conceptual Gulfs in City of Boerne v. Flores, 39 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 743, 770 (1998) (describing his view of how the Court uses the congruence and proportionality 
test); see also Day, supra note 88, at 373 (describing the congruence and proportionality test as 
requiring Congress to produce “some undefined quantum” of evidence of unconstitutional conduct 
on the part of states).  
As this Article went to press, the Rehnquist Court released yet another decision involving its 
congruence and proportionality doctrine—a decision that upheld Congress’s passage of Title II of 
the Americans with Disabilities Act. Tennessee v. Lane 124 S. Ct. 1978 (2004). This decision ap-
pears to further anchor the idea that first took shape in Hibbs, in that the Court seems to be placing a 
lower requirement on Congress to provide a well-documented record of proof of constitutional 
violations by state governments when Congress acts to protect constitutional rights to which the 
Court itself would grant greater protection and when a longstanding history of discrimination exists. 
Lane, 124 S. Ct. at 1988-92 (discussing historical evidence of disability discrimination in light of the 
fact that Title II seeks to protect basic constitutional rights “which are subject to more searching 
judicial review”). Thus, Lane, like Hibbs, provides great hope for core civil rights remedies. 
This hope, however, should not be overstated. Lane has its limits. First, the Lane Court only 
endorsed Title II in one particular context—as applied to access to the Courts. Id. at 1993 (holding 
that “Title II, as it applies to the class of cases implicating the fundamental right of access to the 
courts, constitutes a valid exercise of Congress’ . . . authority to enforce the guarantees of the Four-
teenth Amendment”). Second, even in the limited context of access to the courts, Lane, like Hibbs, 
highlights the discrete nature of the remedy provided by Congress. Id. (“The remedy Congress chose 
is nevertheless a limited one.”); supra note 133 (describing how Hibbs stressed the limitations of the 
FMLA). 
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A. Applying Step One of the Congruence and Proportionality Test to 
Section 5: Protecting the Right to Vote Found in the Fourteenth and 
Fifteenth Amendments 
The starting point for analyzing whether an extension of Section 5 
will meet the congruence and proportionality test is determining the 
scope of the constitutional right at issue. The Court has held that the 
Constitution guarantees protection from purposeful discrimination in 
voting. The Fifteenth Amendment prohibits “purposefully discriminatory 
denial or abridgment by government of the freedom to vote . . . .”140 In 
other words, the Fifteenth Amendment protects against rules that deny 
access to the ballot through, for example, discrimination in registration 
procedures or in the location of polling places.141 The Fourteenth 
Amendment prohibits voting systems “‘conceived or operated as [a] pur-
poseful devic[e] to further racial . . . discrimination.’”142 Thus, as it re-
lates to voting, the Fourteenth Amendment protects against vote dilu-
tion—the practice of limiting the ability of minority groups to “convert 
their voting strength into control of, or at least influence with, elected 
public officials”143 that most commonly occurs when a cohesive bloc of 
minority voters are submerged into a similarly cohesive but larger bloc 
of non-minority voters.144 These standards will then serve as the launch-
ing pad for the Court’s congruence and proportionality analysis.145 
  
 140. City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 65 (1980) (plurality opinion); see also Myers v. 
Anderson, 238 U.S. 368, 379 (1915) (holding that invidious motivation is necessary to a Fifteenth 
Amendment claim); Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S. 347, 363-65 (1915) (same). 
 141. Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874, 922 (1994) (Thomas, J., concurring) (describing types of 
voting laws that implicate ballot access, including registration requirements, polling place locations, 
and methods of casting ballots). 
 142. Mobile, 446 U.S. at 66 (quoting Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 149 (1971)). 
 143. Richard L. Engstrom, Racial Vote Dilution: The Concept and the Court, in THE VOTING 
RIGHTS ACT: CONSEQUENCES AND IMPLICATIONS 13, 14 (Lorn S. Foster ed., 1985). 
 144. See Derfner, supra note 30, at 4 (defining vote dilution). 
Examples of voting changes that could result in vote dilution are: adoptions of at-large meth-
ods of election, staggered terms, majority-vote requirements, numbered posts, redistrictings, annexa-
tions, and switches from elected to appointed governing bodies. See City of Lockhart v. United 
States, 460 U.S. 125, 135 (1983) (noting the dilutive impact of staggered terms); City of Port Arthur 
v. United States, 459 U.S. 159, 167 (1982) (majority vote); Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613, 627 
(1982) (numbered posts); City of Richmond v. United States, 422 U.S. 358, 370 (1975) (annexa-
tions); Whitcomb, 403 U.S. at 142-44 (at-large elections); Busbee v. Smith, 549 F. Supp. 494, 517 
(D.D.C. 1982) (fragmented districts). 
 145. It bears mentioning that this determination of the substantive nature of the constitutional 
right to vote could aptly be criticized as overly simplistic. After all, especially in the context of vote 
dilution, there are subtleties and intricacies to proving purposeful discrimination. For example, 
unconstitutional vote dilution seemingly can be proved without evidence of a racial motivation on 
the part of government officials. See Rogers, 458 U.S. at 647 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (criticizing the 
majority opinion for finding purposeful discrimination in maintenance of dilutive method of election 
when “the persons who allegedly harbored an improper intent are never identified or mentioned”). 
Yet the Court appears generally unwilling to examine such subtleties of the contours of constitu-
tional rights in the application of the congruence and proportionality test. Rather, the Court’s prac-
tice has been to summarily dictate the constitutional right at issue without providing much gloss on 
the standard. See Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 123 S. Ct. 1972, 1978 (2003) (using only one 
paragraph to describe the nature of the constitutional right at issue); see also Vikram David Amar & 
Samuel Estreicher, Conduct Unbecoming A Coordinate Branch, 4 GREEN BAG 2d 351, 353 (2001) 
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B. Applying Step Two of the Congruence and Proportionality Test to 
Section 5: Assessing the Scope of the Problem of Unconstitutional 
Voting Discrimination 
After delimiting the scope of the right, the Court will review the re-
cord Congress compiles to determine the extent to which states and local 
governments have engaged in purposeful voting discrimination.146 The 
Court will decide whether Congress has compiled enough evidence of 
arguably147 unconstitutional behavior by the states to identify a “wide-
spread and persisting” pattern of unconstitutional activity in the voting 
arena.148 Obviously, Congress has yet to compile that record. However, it 
is reasonable to assume that, while Congress will certainly be able to 
gather evidence of a great many instances of arguably unconstitutional 
voting discrimination, it will be unable to marshal the same amount of 
stark, widespread, and indisputable evidence of recent purposeful voting 
discrimination that it compiled when it first imposed the stringent Sec-
tion 5 scheme. 
The congressional record will likely contain a broad mix of evi-
dence related to arguably unconstitutional behavior that can be placed 
into three general categories: (1) instances of unconstitutional denial of 
access to the ballot; (2) instances of unconstitutional vote dilution; and 
(3) evidence of racially polarized voting. The next three subsections ex-
plain how the Court will likely assess this evidence in determining the 
scope of the problem of unconstitutional voting discrimination. Yet be-
fore moving on, it is important to stress that this canvass of the potential 
congressional record does not purport to capture every possible example 
or instance of arguably unconstitutional racial discrimination in voting 
that has ever occurred. The point and purpose of this discussion is to 
delimit the contours of the arguments and evidence Congress likely will 
proffer to support the extension of Section 5 and the Court’s likely re-
sponse to this evidence. 
  
(criticizing the Court’s application of the congruence and proportionality test for failing to “make 
sense of the complexity and entirety” of the constitutional right involved). 
 146. It is not entirely clear whether the Court will only accept evidence of state violations or 
whether evidence of local government violations can also lend support to Congress’s determination 
of the scope of the problem of unconstitutional voting discrimination. In one congruence and propor-
tionality case, the Court refused to extend its inquiry as to unconstitutional activity beyond the states 
themselves. Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 368-69 (2001). 
In a later congruence and proportionality test, the Court seemed to reverse itself. See Lane, 124 
S. Ct. at 1991 n.16 (noting that evidence of constitutional violations of non-state governmental 
actions is relevant to a congruence and proportionality inquiry). This Article assumes that in consid-
ering Congress’s evidence of unconstitutional voting discrimination, the Court likely will accept 
evidence of problems at the local level as well as the state level. 
 147. The term “arguably” is used because the Court’s congruence and proportionality test 
appears to give this sort of deference to Congress’s judgment. See Garrett, 531 U.S. at 370 (consid-
ering evidence of disability discrimination even though the unconstitutionality of such discrimina-
tion was “debatable”). 
 148. See supra notes 107-14 and accompanying text. 
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This discussion proceeds along two different tracks in its assess-
ment of how the Court will handle the congressional record. First, it 
undertakes a “strict, skeptical review”149 of the potential evidence—the 
same type of stringent review the Court took in its first five applications 
of the congruence and proportionality test.150 Second, it briefly under-
takes a more relaxed review of the potential evidence—similar to the 
review applied in Hibbs. Either way, the point of this discussion is that a 
long history of voting discrimination combined with evidence of recent 
problems will serve as an adequate justification for Congress to pass 
some sort of prophylactic remedy. However, the more recent history of 
discrimination is of a different and less widespread quality than the re-
cent history demonstrated when Section 5 was initially enacted and was 
subsequently extended. 
1. A Strict, Skeptical Review of the Congressional Record 
a. Evidence of unconstitutional vote denial 
Congress will likely encounter the most difficulty in creating a sub-
stantial record of continuing widespread, purposeful, and unconstitu-
tional discrimination in the area of minority voters’ access to the ballot. 
Gone are the days when state voter registration laws and local registrars 
frequently and severely limited and denied minority voters’ access to the 
ballot. As Professor Samuel Issacharoff observed in the early 1990s, “A 
quarter century of federal policing of the electoral processes has mark-
edly transformed the political landscape. Gone are the poll taxes, the 
literacy tests, and the other overt barriers to voter registration.”151 
In fact, with the advent of laws such as the National Voter Registra-
tion Act (NVRA),152 which allows for voter registration by mail and 
makes voter registration widely available at places such as state depart-
ment of motor vehicles agencies and public assistance agencies,153 
minority voters seemingly enjoy widespread registration opportunities,  
and, once on the voting rolls, minority voters can no longer be easily 
  
 149. Landward, supra note 102, at 327; see also Colker & Brudney, supra note 125, at 123 
(describing how the Rehnquist Court has subjected congressional fact-finding and support for anti-
discrimination law to “searching, skeptical review”). 
 150. For example, in Garrett, a broad array of evidence of disability discrimination was pre-
sented to the Court. See Garrett, 531 U.S. at 366-74 (analyzing the respondent’s evidence of disabil-
ity discrimination as well as discussing the Court’s decisions on prior cases involving evidence of 
disability discrimination). Yet the Court picked apart this evidence in such a way as to render most 
of it irrelevant. Id.; see also Pamela Brandwein, Constitutional Doctrine as Paring Tool: The Strug-
gle for “Relevant” Evidence in University of Alabama v. Garrett, 35 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 37, 43-
65 (2002) (discussing how the Court used constitutional doctrine as a “paring tool” to limit evidence 
of unconstitutional activity). 
 151. Samuel Issacharoff, Polarized Voting and the Political Process: The Transformation of 
Voting Rights Jurisprudence, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1833, 1833-34 (1992). 
 152. National Voter Registration Act of 1993, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973gg to 1973gg-10 (2000). 
 153. Id. §§ 1973gg-2 to 1973gg-5. 
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purged.154 Also mostly, but not entirely, gone are the days when polling 
places were intentionally placed in environments known to be unwel-
come to minority voters, such as all-white social clubs.155 And many 
states, including a number subject to Section 5, have continued to open 
up additional avenues to access, through the adoption of pre-election day 
voting,156 easier absentee voting,157 and even elections conducted by 
mail.158 
The Department of Justice’s recent enforcement of Section 5 con-
firms that minority voters’ problems have largely not been related to 
ballot access. For the six-year period from January 1, 1997, to December 
31, 2002, the Department of Justice received submissions of about 
29,500 changes that could potentially be dilutive of minority voting 
strength and about 48,100 changes that could potentially restrict minority 
voters’ access to the ballot.159 During the same time period, the Depart-
ment prevented implementation of forty-two changes, thirty-six of which 
dealt with changes that would have a dilutive impact on minority votes 
while only six dealt with changes that would have negatively impacted 
minority voters’ ballot access.160 What these statistics show is that only 
fifteen percent of the Department’s recent objections have been to 
changes that have the potential for vote denial, even though about two-
thirds of the recent changes reviewed by the Department have been to 
vote denial-type changes.161 
  
 154. See id. § 1973gg-6. 
 155. See U.S. Comm’n on Civil Rights, Report on the Voting Rights Act: Ten Years After, 
104-07 (1975) (discussing the placement of polling places in environments hostile to minority vot-
ers); see also U.S. Comm’n on Civil Rights, Report on The Voting Rights Act: Unfulfilled Goals, 
29-31 (1981) (same). 
 156. E.g., TEX. ELEC. CODE ANN. § 85.001 (Vernon 2003) (allowing so-called “early voting” 
that lets voters cast ballots up to seventeen days before an election). 
 157. E.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163-226 (2002) (allowing no-excuse absentee voting). 
 158. E.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-409 (West 2003) (allowing for the conduct of “mail 
ballot” elections by certain jurisdictions). 
 159. See U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Civil Rights Division, Voting Section, Section 5 Changes by 
Type and Year, at http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/voting/sec_5/changes_00s.htm (last visited Jan. 31, 
2004) [hereinafter Section 5 Changes 2000s]; see also U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Civil Rights Division, 
Voting Section, Section 5 Changes by Type and Year, at http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/vot-
ing/sec_5/changes_90s.htm (last revised Jan. 31, 2004) [hereinafter Section 5 Changes 1990s]. For 
the purposes of this tally, the following change types were considered as having the potential for 
vote dilution: redistricting, annexation, incorporation, method of election, form of government, and 
consolidation or division of political units. Id. The following change types were considered as hav-
ing the potential for vote denial: polling places, precincts, registration or voter purge, bilingual 
procedures, special elections, voting methods, and candidate qualifications. Id. 
 160. See generally See U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Civil Rights Division, Voting Section, About 
Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, at http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/voting/sec_5/obj_activ.htm (last 
revised Jan. 31, 2004) (listing documents that identify the Attorney General’s changes relating to 
voting). 
 161. In addition to the above listed changes that clearly fall into one category or another, the 
Department of Justice has also precleared about 16,100 changes it describes as “miscellaneous.” See 
Section 5 Changes 2000s, supra note 159. Most of these changes would probably be included in the 
vote denial category. 
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The states do, however, have a long history of purposeful denial of 
minority voters’ access to the ballot.162 But, the congruence and propor-
tionality test may require more recent evidence of widespread purposeful 
discrimination in this area.163 True, there have most certainly been in-
stances in the past couple of decades of state officials’ purposeful dis-
criminatory denial of minority voters’ access to the ballot.164 Yet, despite 
  
 162. See supra Part I.A. 
 163. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 530 (1997) (searching the congressional 
record for “modern instances” of unconstitutional state action). 
 164. For example, the State of Mississippi operated a very burdensome voter registration 
system until the late 1980s. See generally Mississippi State Chapter, Operation PUSH, Inc. v. Ma-
bus, 932 F.2d 400, 402-04 (5th Cir. 1991) (discussing Mississippi’s past purposeful, discriminatory 
efforts of impeding black citizens’ participation in voting). The State of Mississippi used a “dual 
registration” system requiring a citizen to register with the county to vote in federal, state, and 
county elections, and to register with the city to vote in municipal elections, while also severely 
limiting county registrars from conducting registration outside of the registrar’s office. Mabus, 932 
F.2d at 402. This system was challenged under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, and the Four-
teenth and Fifteenth Amendments, and was ultimately found to violate Section 2. See id. at 404 n.3. 
The mere existence of felon disenfranchisement laws may provide a modern-day example of 
arguably unconstitutional race discrimination, with the basic argument being that felon disenfran-
chisement laws constitute racial discrimination because they disproportionately impact African-
American voters and are often adopted with discrimination in mind. See Alice E. Harvey, Ex-Felon 
Disenfranchisement and Its Influence on the Black Vote: The Need for a Second Look, 142 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1145, 1160-69 (1994) (discussing constitutional arguments against felon disenfranchisement); 
see also Tanya Dugree-Pearson, Disenfranchisement—A Race Neutral Punishment for Felony Of-
fenders or a Way to Diminish the Minority Vote?, 23 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL’Y 359, 391-95 
(2002) (arguing that felon disenfranchisement violates the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments). 
In addition, the manner in which these laws are implemented could provide evidence of arguably 
unconstitutional behavior. See Laura Parker, Panel Scrutinizes Mistake-Riddled ‘Cleansing’ of Voter 
Rolls, USA TODAY, Jan. 15, 2001, at 4A (describing Florida officials’ bungled attempt to purge 
felons from the registration books); see also Robert E. Pierre, Botched Name Purge Denied Some the 
Right to Vote, WASH. POST, May 31, 2001, at A01 (describing how Florida’s felon purge procedures 
disproportionately affect African-Americans); John Lantigua, How the GOP Gamed the System in 
Florida, THE NATION, Apr. 30, 2001, at 11 (describing Florida’s felon purge as “a very old, tradi-
tional form of racism”). 
However, the courts have generally looked unfavorably on challenges alleging that felon disen-
franchisement laws violate either the Constitution or the Voting Rights Act. See, e.g., Richardson v. 
Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 53-54 (1974) (refusing to apply strict scrutiny to a felon disenfranchisement 
law); McDonald v. Bd. of Election Comm’rs, 394 U.S. 802, 810-11 (1969) (holding that pretrial 
detainees have no Equal Protection right to an absentee ballot); see also Wesley v. Collins, 605 F. 
Supp. 802, 814 (M.D. Tenn. 1985) (holding that the Tennessee felon disenfranchisement law does 
not violate the Constitution or the Voting Rights Act). But see Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222, 
233 (1985) (finding a felon disenfranchisement law unconstitutional because it was adopted with a 
discriminatory purpose). 
While overt barriers to access have greatly receded, more subtle barriers may still exist, such as 
through programs to intimidate or harass minority voters. See, e.g., Sherry A. Swirsky, Minority 
Voter Intimidation: The Problem That Won’t Go Away, 11 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 359, 
360-67 (2002) (describing anecdotal evidence of minority voter intimidation and harassment). How-
ever, while some intimidation and harassment undoubtedly occurs, it is not clear this activity is 
recent and widespread. See id. at 381 (acknowledging “a surprising dearth of serious news reporting 
on minority voter intimidation in recent years”). Moreover, some of this activity could be character-
ized as politically, rather than racially motivated; that is, of course, unless minority voters are the 
only voters targeted. See id. at 383 (noting that “in close races in which Democrats regard the turn-
out of their traditional minority base as critical to victory, Republicans can be expected to respond 
with attempts to suppress that turnout”). Finally, much of this action is perpetrated by private indi-
viduals or political parties, not state or local government actors, and thus, will likely not qualify as 
evidence to support the need to extend Section 5. See Garrett, 531 U.S. at 368 (noting that Con-
gress’s enforcement power “is appropriately exercised only in response to state transgressions”). 
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this recent evidence, the Court will likely view it as much more limited 
than the recent evidence of vote denial surrounding passage of Section 5 
in 1965 and its subsequent extensions in 1970, 1975, and 1982.165 
b. Evidence of unconstitutional vote dilution 
Congress could encounter some difficulty proving recent instances 
of unconstitutional discrimination in the area of vote dilution. There will 
likely be few clear examples and court findings of purposeful, unconsti-
tutional adoption or maintenance of discriminatory methods of election 
or districting plans.166 Yes, Congress can cull a number of examples of 
grossly outrageous purposeful discrimination, such as when Georgia had 
a legislator who was found by a federal court to be a “racist” as chair of 
one of its redistricting committees.167 However, a substantial amount of 
  
There have also been cases involving arguably unconstitutional behavior in the hiring of poll 
workers and in the hostile actions of poll workers toward minority voters. See, e.g., United States v. 
Berks County, 250 F. Supp. 2d 525, 527 (E.D. Pa. 2003) (describing poll workers’ hostile treatment 
of Latino voters); United States v. Charleston County, C.A. No. 2:01-0155-23 (D.S.C. Mar. 6, 2003) 
(describing hostile actions of poll workers toward African-American voters), at http://www.scd. 
uscourts.gov/Judges/P_Duffy.asp (last visited Jan. 31, 2004); Harris v. Graddick, 615 F. Supp. 239, 
242 (M.D. Ala. 1985) (confirming a settlement in a class action suit against the State of Alabama 
which alleged discrimination in the appointment of poll workers). But, again, these problems seem 
unlikely to be pervasive enough to satisfy a conservative, skeptical court. 
 165. A compelling case might be made that ballot access still presents a major problem for 
language-minorities because of the use of English-only elections. For example, the registration rate 
for Latinos lags far behind whites and African-Americans. However, this may result from factors 
apart from purposeful discrimination. See Lisa Handley et al., Electing Minority-Preferred Candi-
dates to Legislative Office: The Relationship Between Minority Percentages in Districts and the 
Election of Minority-Preferred Candidates, in RACE AND REDISTRICTING IN THE 1990S, at 13, 25-26 
(Bernard Grofman ed., 1998) (noting that there is “a greater proportion of non-voters among the 
Hispanic population. This is largely a product of the lower citizenship rates among the Hispanic 
population.”); see also Steve Bickerstaff, Effects of the Voting Rights Act on Reapportionment and 
Hispanic Voting Strength in Texas, 6 TEX. HISP. J.L. & POL’Y 99, 112 (2001) (noting that in Texas 
“[a] significant percentage of Hispanic residents remain non-citizens and cannot register to vote”). 
Nevertheless, other provisions of the Voting Rights Act specifically guarantee language-
minorities access to the ballot. Section 4(e) of the Act protects the rights of Puerto Rican citizens. 42 
U.S.C. § 1973b(e); see also Puerto Rican Org. for Political Action v. Kusper, 490 F.2d 575, 580 (7th 
Cir. 1973) (holding that failure to provide Spanish-language materials and assistance violates Sec-
tion 4(e)); Torres v. Sachs, 381 F. Supp. 309, 311-12 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (same); Arroyo v. Tucker, 
372 F. Supp. 764, 767-68 (E.D. Pa. 1974) (same). Language minorities may also bring ballot-access 
cases under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. See Hernandez v. Woodard, 714 F. Supp. 963, 972-
73 (N.D. Ill. 1989) (applying Section 2 to the failure to appoint Spanish-speaking registrars). Finally, 
and most significantly, Section 203 of the Act requires certain covered jurisdictions to provide 
materials and assistance to language-minorities, including Asians and Native Americans. 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1973aa-1a; 28 C.F.R. §§ 55.1 to 55.24 (West 2003) (outlining the requirements of Section 203); 
see also United States v. Metropolitan Dade County, 815 F. Supp. 1475, 1478-79 (S.D. Fla. 1993) 
(requiring the provision of Spanish-language election materials pursuant to Section 203). 
 166. This is evident from the types of cases the Supreme Court has decided in recent years. The 
Court has not issued an opinion regarding unconstitutional vote dilution since 1982. See Rogers, 458 
U.S. at 616 (finding an invidious purpose in the dilution of voting strength). 
 167. Busbee, 549 F. Supp. at 500 (noting that the Chairman of the Georgia House Permanent 
Standing Committee on Legislative and Congressional Reapportionment after the 1980 Census 
frequently used a highly offensive, pejorative term to refer to African-Americans). Another example 
of blatant racism was one Pennsylvania state legislators’ reaction upon learning the minority per-
centage in his district would be increased. See Ken Gormley, Racial Mind-Games and Reapportion-
ment: When Can Race Be Considered (Legitimately) in Redistricting? 4 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 735, 
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counter-evidence might be presented to demonstrate that a great number 
of systems that prevented minority voters from electing candidates of 
choice have been changed, and that a vastly greater number of minority 
candidates have been elected to government at all levels. After all, in 
1965 there were fewer than 200 African-American elected officials na-
tionwide,168 whereas in 2000, there were 9,040 such officials, with large 
gains in the number of African-American officials in Section 5 covered 
states such as Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, South Carolina, and 
Texas.169 
Despite these facts, Congress should have a relatively easy time 
compiling a record of recent arguably unconstitutional behavior in the 
vote dilution area. This is because, since 1982, many cases have been 
successfully brought under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act challeng-
ing dilutive practices, especially the practice of using at-large elec-
tions.170 While these challenges do not necessarily amount to constitu-
tional violations, the standard under the Section 2 “results test” seems to 
closely, if not precisely, mirror the standard for proving vote dilution 
under the Fourteenth Amendment.171 
  
750 (2002) (“Look, I’m a white mother-f--er from Philadelphia. And I don’t want no more blacks or 
Spics in my district.” (internal quotations omitted)). 
 168. See U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, POLITICAL PARTICIPATION 15 (1968). In 1968, there 
were 1,469 African-American elected officials. DAVID A. BOSITIS, JOINT CENTER FOR POLITICAL 
AND ECONOMIC STUDIES, BLACK ELECTED OFFICIALS: A STATISTICAL SUMMARY 2000, at 5 (2002).  
 169. BOSITIS, supra note 168, at 5. The number of Latino elected officials has also increased. 
In 1981, there were six Latinos in Congress and in 1995 there were seventeen Latinos. See Bicker-
staff, supra note 165, at 105 tbl.1. In Texas, there were twenty-one Latinos in the legislature in 1981 
and thirty-five Latinos in the legislature in 1999. Id. at 106 tbl.2. 
 170. Section 2 bars the use of election procedures that have a discriminatory result. 42 U.S.C. § 
1973(a) (barring the imposition of any voting practice that “results in a denial or abridgement of the 
right of any citizen of the United States to vote on account of race or color [or membership in a 
minority language group]”). Most commonly, Section 2 has been used to attack at-large methods of 
election. See, e.g., Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 42 (1986); see also Davidson & Grofman, 
supra note 44, at 383-86 (describing the “numerous suits attacking . . . at-large elections” since 
passage of the 1982 amendment to Section 2); Pamela S. Karlan, The Rights to Vote: Some Pessi-
mism About Formalism, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1705, 1707 (1993) (describing how the 1982 amendment to 
Section 2 left the courts to confront with “literally thousands of challenges to election schemes that 
did not fairly reflect the voting strength of minority communities”). And it is this type of voting 
rights litigation that has greatly contributed to the increases in the number of minority officials. 
 171. See James U. Blacksher & Larry T. Menefee, From Reynolds v. Sims to City of Mobile v. 
Bolden: Have the White Suburbs Commandeered the Fifteenth Amendment?, 34 HASTINGS L.J. 1, 32 
(1982) (“It is difficult, however, to distinguish the Rogers ‘intent’ test from the ‘results’ test of the 
Voting Rights Act.”). This position, however, runs against conventional wisdom of many commenta-
tors and a short history lesson is necessary to justify this position. 
In the early 1970s, it appeared that minority plaintiffs would not have to prove a discriminatory 
purpose to successfully challenge dilutive election systems as violative of the constitution. See, e.g., 
White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 765-66 (1973). However, this standard appeared to markedly shift 
when the Supreme Court decided City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. at 66-67, with a plurality of the 
Court holding that a discriminatory purpose was necessary to successfully bring a vote dilution 
challenge under the Fourteenth Amendment. 
The City of Mobile decision sparked severe outrage and criticism. See Note, Making the Viola-
tion Fit the Remedy: The Intent Standard and Equal Protection Law, 92 YALE L.J. 328, 347 (1982) 
(describing the criticism of Bolden). In response, Congress amended Section 2 to revert to the stan-
dard prior to the plurality opinion in City of Mobile. See Kathryn Abrams, ‘Raising Politics Up’: 
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Nevertheless, in many respects, the Voting Rights Act, and particu-
larly Section 5, has created the lack of evidence of recent widespread and 
persisting purposeful, unconstitutional voting-related discrimination. 
Section 5 has prevented such purposeful discrimination in two ways: by 
preventing the implementation of purposefully discriminatory voting 
changes through denial of preclearance by federal authorities and, most 
importantly, by deterring the adoption of these practices in the first place 
  
Minority Political Participation and Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, 63 N.Y.U. L. REV. 449, 458 
(1988) (describing how Congress amended Section 2 to remove the Bolden intent requirement). 
Most commentators focus on this history when describing the difference between the Section 2 
results test and the constitutional standard for proving vote dilution while ignoring an important 
case, Rogers v. Lodge, regarding the constitutional standard that was issued shortly after amended 
Section 2 became law. See generally Andrew P. Miller & Mark A. Packman, Amended Section 2 of 
the Voting Rights Act: What Is the Intent of the Results Test?, 36 EMORY L.J. 1 (1987) (engaging in 
an extended discussion of vote dilution jurisprudence while virtually ignoring Rogers). Rogers, 
however, represented a retreat from the Court’s position in City of Mobile, which, after all, was a 
mere plurality opinion.  
In Rogers, the Court reviewed the standard of proof necessary to win a case challenging an at-
large election system as being maintained with a discriminatory purpose under the Fourteenth 
Amendment. See Rogers, 458 U.S. at 617. The Court noted that “discriminatory intent need not be 
proved by direct evidence” and “may often be inferred from the totality of the relevant facts.” Id. at 
618. The Court then expounded on the type of relevant facts involved in this analysis, which in-
cluded: (1) the registration level of minority citizens; (2) evidence of racial bloc voting; (3) the 
electoral success (or lack thereof) of minority candidates; (4) evidence of past discrimination in the 
political process; (5) evidence of past discrimination in education and employment; (6) evidence that 
officials were unresponsive and insensitive to minority residents; (7) evidence of the minority com-
munity’s depressed socio-economic status; (8) the size of the area encompassed by the at-large 
district; (9) the legitimate state interest in using at-large elections; and (10) whether devices such as 
numbered posts and a majority vote requirement were used. Id. at 623-27. 
In Thornburg v. Gingles, the Court held that a violation of Section 2 could be proved by a 
totality of the circumstances and listed the following factors as relevant to this totality analysis: (1) 
the minority group must be sufficiently large and geographically compact to form a majority in a 
single-member district; (2) the minority group must be politically cohesive; (3) a majority group 
votes sufficiently as a bloc to enable it to usually defeat the minority group’s candidate of choice in 
an election; (4) the history of voting-related discrimination; (5) the extent to which devices such as 
numbered posts, unusually large election districts, or a majority vote requirement have been used; 
(6) whether minority residents were excluded from any candidate slating process; (7) evidence of 
past discrimination in such areas as education and employment; (8) the use of racial appeals in 
campaigns; (9) the extent to which minority persons have been elected to office; (10) the extent to 
which elected officials have been responsive to the particularized needs of the minority community; 
and (11) the policy underlying the use of at-large elections. See Gingles, 478 U.S. at 44-51. 
The biggest difference between Rogers and Gingles would appear to be the emphasis the latter 
places on certain factors. Gingles seems to place primary importance on establishing the ability of 
the minority group to form a majority in a single-member district and in proving racial bloc voting—
the so-called Gingles preconditions. See id. at 48-49 (stating “the use of multimember districts 
generally will not impede the ability of minority voters to elect representatives of their choice. 
[Unless a bloc voting majority is usually able] to defeat candidates supported by a politically cohe-
sive, geographically insular minority group”); see also Teague v. Attala County, 92 F.3d 283, 293 
(5th Cir. 1996) (noting that “[I]t will be only the very unusual case in which the plaintiffs can estab-
lish the existence of the three [Gingles] factors but still have failed to establish a violation of § 2 
under the totality of the circumstances” (quoting Clark v. Calhoun County, 21 F.3d 92, 97 (5th Cir. 
1994)); Harvell v. Blytheville Sch. Dist. No. 5, 71 F.3d 1382, 1390 (8th Cir. 1995) (en banc) (noting 
that “[s]atisfaction of the necessary [Gingles] preconditions carries a plaintiff a long way towards 
showing a Section 2 violation”). 
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because state and local lawmakers know the federal government will be 
reviewing any changes to prevent voting-related discrimination.172 
The refusal of preclearance under Section 5, while perhaps not pro-
viding definitive examples of unconstitutional voting-related discrimina-
tion, provides examples of arguably unconstitutional voting-related dis-
crimination. One need not look very far to find recent examples where 
federal authorities have blocked implementation of retrogressive voting 
changes that would have diluted minority voting strength. In the post-
2000 redistricting cycle, federal authorities refused preclearance to 
statewide redistricting plans in Arizona, Louisiana, Texas, Florida, and 
Georgia.173 Additionally, preclearance has also been refused to redistrict-
ing plans submitted by a number of counties, cities, and school dis-
tricts.174 
  
 172. Section 5 also provides the intangible benefit of encouraging a continuing dialogue be-
tween minority and majority communities, at least as it relates to voting. Local governments know 
they need federal approval, and community involvement in the adoption of the change is considered 
in the Department of Justice’s preclearance review, so local governments often confer with minority 
residents before enacting changes. See 28 C.F.R. § 51.57 (West 2003) (noting that among the factors 
relevant to the Attorney General’s preclearance review is the extent to which the jurisdiction allowed 
minorities to participate in the decision to make the change and the extent to which the jurisdiction 
took minority citizens’ concerns into account). This dialogue both prevents the adoption of discrimi-
natory changes and also increases understanding between majority and minority community resi-
dents. 
 173. See Georgia v. Ashcroft, 195 F. Supp. 2d 25, 29 (D.D.C. 2002), vacated by 123 S. Ct. 
2498 (2003); Letter from Ralph F. Boyd, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, Civil Rights Division, U.S. 
Dep’t of Justice, to The Honorable John M. McKay, President, Florida Senate & Tom Feeney, 
Speaker, Florida House of Representatives (July 1, 2002) (objecting to a redistricting plan for the 
Florida House), at http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/voting/sec_5/ltr/l_070102.htm (last visited Feb. 1, 
2004); Letter from Ralph F. Boyd, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, Civil Rights Division, U.S. Dep’t 
of Justice, to Lisa T. Hauser, Esq., Gammage & Burnham & José de Jesús Rivera, Esq., Haralson, 
Miller, Pitt & McAnally (May 20, 2002) (objecting to the redistricting plan for the Arizona legisla-
ture), at http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/voting/sec_5/ltr/l_052002.htm (last visited Feb. 1, 2004); Letter 
from Ralph F. Boyd, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, Civil Rights Division, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to 
The Honorable Geoffrey Connor, Acting Secretary of State (Nov. 16, 2001), at http://www.usdoj. 
gov/crt/voting/sec_5/ltr/l_111601.htm (last visited Feb. 1, 2004) (objecting to the redistricting plan 
for the Texas House). 
The State of Louisiana case necessitates a bit of extra explanation. The state sought preclear-
ance of its plan for the State House in a declaratory judgment action in the United States District 
Court for the District of Columbia. See Louisiana House of Representatives v. Ashcroft, C.A. No. 
02-0062 (D.D.C.) (ordering dismissal with prejudice), at http://www.naacpldf.org/whatsnew/pdfs/ 
OrderDimissingCase.pdf (last visited Feb. 1, 2004). The Department of Justice opposed preclearance 
and, after discovery, the case was settled when the state amended its plan to eliminate those aspects 
that were objectionable to the Department of Justice. See Feds Approve State House Redistricting 
Plan; Black Lawmakers Remain Opposed to New Districts, THE TIMES-PICAYUNE, May 21, 2003, at 
5 (describing the Department of Justice’s rejection of the initial redistricting plan); see also Laura 
Maggi, Remap Needs Federal Approval; Senate Backs Plan, But Opponents Will Sue, THE TIMES-
PICAYUNE, May 8, 2003, at 1 (describing the passage of a plan to settle the litigation in the United 
States District Court for the District of Columbia). 
 174. See, e.g., Letter from Andrew E. Lelling, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Civil Rights 
Division, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to Walter C. Lee, Superintendent, Parish School Board & B.D. 
Mitchell, President, Parish Police Jury (Dec. 31, 2002) (objecting to the redistricting plan for the 
DeSoto Parish School District, Louisiana), at http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/voting/sec_5/ltr/l_123102. 
html (last visited Feb. 1, 2004); Letter from J. Michael Wiggins, Acting Assistant Attorney General, 
Civil Rights Division, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to Al Grieshaber, Esq., City Attorney (Sept. 23, 2002) 
(objecting to the redistricting plan for the City of Albany, Georgia Board of Commissioners), at 
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The deterrence factor, though, represents Section 5's greatest influ-
ence in the prevention of unconstitutional voting-related discrimina-
tion.175 Jurisdictions covered by Section 5 are acutely aware of the need 
to garner federal approval. For example, in the context of redistricting, 
discussion and debate at the state and local level often focuses on how 
the Department of Justice will view the changes made.176 So, while Sec-
tion 5 covers a wide range of constitutional activity, it arguably covers a 
wide-range of activity that has the likelihood of being unconstitutional 
but for the existence of Section 5.177 In other words, the deterrent impact 
of Section 5 has led to far fewer instances of unconstitutional voting dis-
crimination because state and local officials know they need federal ap-
proval of voting changes. Thus, faulting Section 5 for a lack of examples 
of recent purposeful discrimination may essentially make the statute a 
victim of its own success. 
While the Court may certainly recognize this deterrence factor as 
contributing to the lack of a record of recent unconstitutional behavior, a 
Court generally inclined toward limiting federal power seems unlikely to 
give great weight to this argument. For starters, the deterrence factor will 
probably be hard for Congress to quantify.178 The Court might also look 
skeptically upon the deterrence factor because it has the potential to ren-
der as impotent the Court’s congruence and proportionality test. The test 
has touted remedies that are temporary and have an expiration date.179 
But, to allow continuation of such remedies based on a theory that the 
remedy has caused the lack of unconstitutional behavior would seem-
  
http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/voting/sec_5/ltr/l_092302.htm (last visited Feb. 1, 2004); Letter from 
Ralph F. Boyd, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, Civil Rights Division, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to 
Darvin Satterwhite, Esq., County Attorney (July 9, 2002) (objecting to the redistricting plan for the 
Cumberland County, Virginia Board of Supervisors), at http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/voting/sec_5/ltr/ 
l_070902.htm (last visited Feb. 1, 2004). 
 175. See Mark A. Posner, Post-1990 Redistrictings and the Preclearance Requirement of 
Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, in RACE AND REDISTRICTING IN THE 1990S, at 80, 94-96 (Bernard 
Grofman ed., 1998) (describing the “strong deterrent effect” of Section 5 in part because of state and 
local officials’ knowledge that changes would be scrutinized for discrimination); see also Steven A. 
Light, Too (Color)Blind to See: The Voting Rights Act of 1965 and the Rehnquist Court, 8 GEO. 
MASON U. CIV. RTS. L.J. 1, 15 n.95 (1997/1998) (noting Section 5’s deterrent effect); McDonald, 
supra note 2, at 1285 (same). 
Victor Andres Rodriguez argues that Section 5 is constitutional, in part, because the large 
number of changes submitted to the Department of Justice show the continued “opportunities for 
mischief” on the part of state and local officials. Rodriguez, supra note 20, at 804. This seems to be 
just another way of making a deterrence argument. In other words, Mr. Rodriguez seems to be as-
serting that, given the opportunity to make changes without a preclearance mechanism, state and 
local officials would engage in much more unconstitutional voting discrimination. 
 176. See, e.g., Johnson v. Miller, 864 F. Supp. 1354, 1378 (S.D. Ga. 1994) (describing how the 
Georgia General Assembly’s “only interest” in drafting a redistricting plan was to satisfy the De-
partment of Justice’s preclearance requirements). 
 177. See Boerne, 521 U.S. at 534 (faulting RFRA for not being “designed to identify and 
counteract state laws likely to be unconstitutional” (emphasis added)). 
 178. Congress might try to develop this record by inviting a large group of minority elected 
officials to testify on the deterrent effect of having a federal watchdog over the redistricting process. 
It is, however, less likely such a vast amount of testimony could be developed to show how Section 
5 has deterred the adoption of changes that would deny minority voters’ access to the ballot. 
 179. See supra note 119 and accompanying text. 
File: Pitts Macro Created on: 4/19/2004 2:16 PM Last Printed: 8/11/2004 4:00 PM 
260 DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81:2 
ingly leave a major hole in the Court’s congruence and proportionality 
analysis. Finally, even if a deterrence factor gets recognized by the 
Court, a skeptical Court seems unlikely to find that the current landscape 
of voting discrimination, absent deterrence, would roughly compare to 
the “exceptional conditions”180 the Court has found to be extant or re-
cently extant when Congress previously enacted and extended Section 5. 
c. Evidence of racially polarized voting 
Congress may also try to build a record of arguable instances of un-
constitutional voting discrimination by focusing on the prevalence of 
racially polarized voting. Simply defined, racially polarized voting, or 
racial bloc voting, occurs when non-minority voters strongly support one 
candidate while minority voters support a different candidate.181 While 
recent history shows a few minority candidates have won in electorates 
that are not majority-minority, most minority candidates get elected from 
majority-minority constituencies;182 a phenomenon that has been largely 
attributed to the presence of racially polarized voting patterns.183 As Pro-
fessor Lani Guinier has written, “As a general rule whites do not vote for 
blacks. Numerous court decisions, anecdotal reports, surveys, and schol-
arly studies have confirmed the existence of racial bloc voting. Based on 
this overwhelming evidence [one can conclude] that whites still harbor 
racial prejudice.”184 So, armed with such evidence, Congress may be able 
to marshal an abundance of examples of arguably unconstitutional voting 
discrimination to justify extension of Section 5.185 
Yet a conservative, skeptical Court would likely criticize and reject 
this evidence on two grounds. First, it is not entirely settled that racially 
polarized voting equals racial discrimination in voting.186 The traditional 
statistical analysis used to prove racially polarized voting in Voting 
Rights Act cases does not account for the multiplicity of reasons why 
  
 180. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 334 (1966). 
 181. See, e.g., Issacharoff, supra note 151, at 1854-56 (discussing racial bloc voting); Gingles, 
478 U.S. at 53 n.21, 57 (describing racially polarized voting as being a prominent feature of “Ameri-
can politics”). 
 182. See Richard H. Pildes, Principled Limitations on Racial and Partisan Redistricting, 106 
YALE L.J. 2505, 2512 n.23 (1997). For example, after the 1992 congressional elections there were 
thirty-nine African-American representatives, thirty-one of whom were elected from majority-
African-American districts, and there were nineteen Latino representatives, sixteen of whom were 
elected from majority-Latino districts. Stephen Wolf, Race Ipsa: Vote Dilution, Racial Gerryman-
dering, and the Presumption of Racial Discrimination, 11 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 
225, 229-30 (1997). 
 183. Pildes, supra note 182, at 2512 n.23 (pinpointing racially polarized voting as the reason 
“only one percent of white-majority jurisdictions elect black candidates”). 
 184. Lani Guinier, The Triumph of Tokenism: The Voting Rights Act and the Theory of Black 
Electoral Success, 89 MICH. L. REV. 1077, 1112-13 (1991). 
 185. Professor Pamela Karlan essentially made this case when she argued that Section 5 re-
mained a viable exercise of Congress’s enforcement power even after the Court created the congru-
ence and proportionality doctrine. See Karlan, supra note 20, at 738-41. 
 186. See Pildes, supra note 182, at 2512 n.23. 
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voters cast their ballots in a particular manner.187 To put it a different 
way, those with conservative viewpoints often stress that other factors 
aside from racial discrimination, such as partisan politics, might explain 
the voting patterns.188  
More importantly, for the purpose of justifying Section 5 as a con-
stitutional exercise of Congress’s enforcement power, assuming the 
Court allows racially polarized voting to equate with racially discrimina-
tory voting, such conduct is private action. This is significant because in 
one congruence and proportionality case, the Court strongly hinted that 
Congress must only use its enforcement power to attack discrimination 
by government officials, not discrimination by private actors.189 In other 
words, Congress cannot make discrimination by private actors the object 
of its remedy.190 
Perhaps, however, the Court will find evidence of racially polarized 
voting relevant to its calculus of the scope of the problem of unconstitu-
tional voting discrimination because of the “distinctive blend of state 
action and private choice involved in the electoral process . . . .”191 Under 
such a theory, the act of voting amounts to state action because the pur-
pose of the vote is to choose representatives, and the vote itself is given 
its effect by the machinery of government.192 This makes casting a ballot 
state action akin to conduct of an all-white party primary,193 or the use of 
a peremptory challenge in a racially discriminatory manner by a private, 
civil litigant194—two contexts in which the Court has recognized what 
appears to be purely private action as state action. 
  
 187. See id. 
 188. See Charleston County, C.A. No. 2:01-0155-23 (describing the county’s argument that 
“the ‘cause’ of voting polarization in Charleston County is partisan differences rather than racial 
ones”); see also Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234, 242 (2001) (describing North Carolina as a place 
where “race and political affiliation are highly correlated”). 
 189. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 625-26 (2000) (faulting the Violence 
Against Women Act for targeting private discrimination instead of discrimination by state officials); 
see also James v. Bowman, 190 U.S. 127, 139 (1903) (stating that “a statute which purports to 
punish purely individual action cannot be sustained as an appropriate exercise of the power con-
ferred by the 15th Amendment upon Congress to prevent action by the state through some one or 
more of its official representatives”). 
 190. See Samuel Estreicher & Margaret H. Lemos, The Section 5 Mystique, Morrison, and the 
Future of Federal Antidiscrimination Law, 2000 SUP. CT. REV. 109, 143-51 (2000) (arguing that 
Morrison stands for the principle that Congress cannot make private discrimination the object of its 
remedy); see also Hartley, supra note 18, at 51 (noting that congruence and proportionality requires 
that the aim of the legislation be “deterring or remedying conduct the judiciary would find is [consti-
tutionally] prohibited”). 
 191. Pamela S. Karlan & Daryl J. Levinson, Why Voting Is Different, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1201, 
1227-31 (1996); see also Anderson v. Martin, 375 U.S. 399, 400-04 (1964) (finding unconstitutional 
a Louisiana law requiring the race of the candidate to be printed on the ballot because the state was 
contributing to the likelihood that voters would cast ballots along racial lines). 
 192. See Rubin, supra note 11, at 66. 
 193. See Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 664-65 (1944). 
 194. See Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 616 (1991). 
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It seems unlikely, however, that this Court, which has revived the 
state action doctrine, would find that a private individual’s electoral 
choice constitutes state action.195 Moreover, congruence and proportion-
ality requires a showing of a constitutional violation.196 The maintenance 
or adoption of a voting system in the face of polarized voting does not 
make for a constitutional violation of the Fourteenth or Fifteenth Amend-
ment.197 To have a constitutional violation, one needs to prove other fac-
tors in addition to racially polarized voting. 
In the final analysis, the debate over whether racial bloc voting can 
serve as evidence of unconstitutional activity may be largely an academic 
exercise. Racial bloc voting serves as a primary requirement for proving 
a violation of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, and, presumably, much 
of the evidence of racial bloc voting will come from findings and settle-
ments in Section 2 vote dilution cases. Therefore, if the Court accepts 
Section 2 violations as evidence of arguably unconstitutional behavior 
then the Court will likely have already accepted much of the evidence of 
racial bloc voting.198 
Summing up how the Court will dismantle the hypothetical con-
gressional record if it chooses to engage in a strict skeptical review of the 
record, as it initially performed in its first five applications of the con-
gruence and proportionality test, it seems likely the Court will: (1) deem 
evidence of arguably unconstitutional behavior in vote denial to be weak; 
(2) find evidence of arguably unconstitutional behavior in vote dilution 
to be more significant; and (3) discount or find as duplicative the evi-
dence of racially polarized voting.199 However, this strict, skeptical re-
  
 195. The right to cast a ballot, even for illegitimate, hateful reasons, would seemingly be 
among the most purely private and protected aspects of democracy. See Rogers, 458 U.S. at 647 n.30 
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (characterizing the act of voting as lacking state action). While the state 
action doctrine might well extend to the attempted enforcement of discriminatory laws passed by 
referendum or to the systematic locking out of candidates from access to the ballot, the Court would 
probably refuse to extend state action to the act of choosing one’s representative. The government’s 
provision of a framework for citizens to express their preference as to whom will represent them 
likely will not be considered state action so long as all preferences can be expressed and all citizens 
can have access to the framework—absent some evidence of purposeful discrimination. See, e.g., 
Delgado v. Smith, 861 F.2d 1489, 1495-98 (11th Cir. 1988) (refusing to find the circulation and 
certification of a referenda petition to be state action). 
 196. See supra note 107 and accompanying text. 
 197. See supra note 171 and accompanying text. 
 198. It seems highly unlikely that the opposite would be true. In other words, it seems unlikely 
that the Court would reject Section 2 violations as evidence of unconstitutional voting discrimination 
yet accept evidence of racially polarized voting. This is because a Section 2 violation involves a 
searching inquiry into a number of additional factors that hint at purposeful discrimination. 
 199. It might be cleverly argued that factual support for extending Section 5 could be grounded 
on the unconstitutional racial gerrymandering of state and local electoral districts that occurred 
during the 1990s round of redistricting. See, e.g., Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899, 902 (1996) (invalidat-
ing North Carolina’s congressional redistricting plan); see also Clark v. Putnam County, 293 F.3d 
1261, 1278-79 (11th Cir. 2002) (finding a county redistricting plan to be an unconstitutional racial 
gerrymander). However, it would be incongruous for the Court to find support for a remedy that 
requires states and local governments to give particular consideration to the negative impact of 
changes on minority voters in cases in which the Court expressed dismay at states giving too much 
consideration to minority voting strength. 
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view may never occur. Instead, if the Court’s more recent review of the 
record underlying the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) is used, 
the Court will more easily find a record justifying a prophylactic remedy 
to prevent voting discrimination. 
2. Considering the Evidence from a More Lenient, Hibbsian Per-
spective 
A more lenient review of the evidence will start with the nature of 
the right at issue. Racial classifications, like gender classifications, are 
subjected to heightened scrutiny. In fact, racial classifications receive the 
Court’s highest level of scrutiny.200 This heightened level of scrutiny puts 
less of an onus on Congress to identify specific instances of unconstitu-
tional behavior. A more lenient review will also put a major emphasis on 
the long history of voting discrimination, highlighting the despicable 
history of voting discrimination from passage of the Fifteenth Amend-
ment to beyond the enactment of the Voting Rights Act.201 A more leni-
ent review would also note how racial discrimination in voting did not 
come under sharp attack from the Courts and Congress until the 1950s 
and 1960s.202 In this way, voting discrimination may be akin to the gen-
der discrimination that Congress and the courts failed to tackle until the 
1960s and 1970s.  
In the end, the Court, whether skeptical and stringent or agreeable 
and deferential, will find enough evidence, both recent and historical, to 
justify some kind of prophylactic remedy. However, it will also likely 
recognize the overall evidence of recent unconstitutional activity to be 
far less than the level of discrimination that occurred prior to, and soon 
after, passage of the Voting Rights Act that served as the egregious 
precedent to warrant the initial implementation of the stringent Section 5 
remedy and its extensions in 1970, 1975, and 1982.203 With such a re-
cord, the Court will then turn to the last factor: whether the Section 5 
remedy remains congruent and proportional to the current problem of 
voting discrimination. 
  
 200. Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 657 (1993) (instructing the lower court to apply strict scru-
tiny to a redistricting plan that segregated voters on the basis of race); see also James F. Blumstein, 
Defining and Proving Race Discrimination: Perspectives on the Purpose vs. Results Approach from 
the Voting Rights Act, 69 VA. L. REV. 633, 640 (1983) (“A government can make rational classifica-
tions in the voting context, on the basis of age for example, but distinctions drawn on the basis of 
race are inherently suspect and subject to an almost insuperable burden of justification.”). 
 201. See supra Part I.A. 
 202. See Shaw, 509 U.S. at 639 (“‘The right to vote freely for the candidate of one’s choice is 
of the essence of a democratic society . . . .’ For much of our Nation’s history, that right sadly has 
been denied to many because of race.” (quoting Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 555 (1964))). 
 203. As one commentator has noted, the Voting Rights Act’s “voluminous congressional 
record” is “unique among modern legislation” passed under Congress’s enforcement powers. Lay-
cock, supra note 139, at 748. 
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C. Applying Step Three of the Congruence and Proportionality Test to 
Section 5: Is Section 5 Proportional to the Modern-Day Problem of 
Unconstitutional Voting Discrimination? 
While the Court should be willing to allow Congress to enact some 
type of prophylactic remedy to protect minority voting rights, the Court 
likely will be unwilling to once again embrace the unique and stringent 
remedy encompassed in Section 5. A Court concerned with federalism 
seems apt to focus on the fact that Section 5 greatly intrudes into the tra-
ditional governing process of the states and covers a vast swath of consti-
tutional activity. Moreover, the Court will probably express concern 
about retaining the same coverage formula as a proxy for those places 
where racial discrimination in voting still presents a problem. It may also 
express anxiety about the difficulty jurisdictions have had in escaping the 
grip of Section 5 coverage. 
There is no doubt that Section 5 covers a large amount of clearly 
constitutional government action, evidence of which the Court will find 
in the fact that most of the laws subjected to the preclearance require-
ment have, in fact, been precleared. The Department of Justice, which 
reviews the vast majority of these changes, denies preclearance to about 
one percent of the changes submitted.204 Indeed, even those changes that 
have not received preclearance may have only a constitutional discrimi-
natory effect and may not have been adopted with an unconstitutional 
discriminatory purpose. True, Section 5 could be congruent and propor-
tional because it only nullifies a small number of laws while merely de-
laying implementation of a greater number of laws. In this way, Section 
5 may be distinguishable from other remedies rejected under the congru-
ence and proportionality test because, in the final analysis, it actually 
blocks enforcement of very few laws.205 Yet a Court concerned with the 
sovereignty of state and local government seems unlikely to split such 
fine hairs between laws that are temporarily prevented from being en-
forced and laws that are first temporarily and then permanently prevented 
from being enforced. 
  
 204. See McDonald, supra note 2, at 1285 (noting that during the first seven years of the 
Reagan administration, the Department of Justice objected to 1.02 percent of its submissions); see 
also supra notes 159-61 and accompanying text (describing more recent Department of Justice 
statistics). 
 205. See Boerne, 521 U.S. at 532 (finding that the RFRA failed the congruence and propor-
tionality test because a large number of laws may be invalidated). To put this idea another way, the 
Court may view the requirement to submit changes is not so great a burden on federalism, but rather 
that the burden on federalism comes mostly through application of the substantive preclearance 
requirements (i.e., the retrogression test). See Katz, supra note 4, at 1210-11 (positing that the Court 
believes the federalism costs are “incurred disproportionately” during the substantive preclearance 
review process rather than through the necessity of obtaining preclearance at all). Since the Court 
has recently diminished the reach of the substantive requirement, the Court could consider the bur-
den on federalism to be minimal. See, e.g., Reno v. Bossier Parish Sch. Bd., 528 U.S. 320, 329 
(2000) (Bossier II) (limiting the ability of the federal government to deny preclearance); Reno v. 
Bossier Parish Sch. Bd., 520 U.S. 471, 483 (1997) (Bossier I) (same). 
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There is also no doubt that Section 5 imposes a substantial and seri-
ous burden on the federalist constitutional structure;206 a burden both 
liberal207 and conservative208 judges have recognized. As Justice Hugo 
Black famously described it, Section 5 requires state and local govern-
ments to “beg” federal officials in Washington for every little voting 
change they enact.209 Section 5 also implicates numerous laws at all lev-
els of government, thus adding to its intrusive impact on state and local 
affairs. 
In reviewing the remedy, the Court will likely recognize that Sec-
tion 5 contains a number of the limiting aspects the Court has approved 
of in the past as means by which Congress may make a remedy congru-
ent and proportional to the problem the remedy addresses. Section 5: (1) 
is limited in geographic scope and has been aimed at those areas where 
voting discrimination is likely to have previously occurred; (2) only im-
pacts a discrete class of laws—those that affect voting; and (3) includes a 
termination date and an opportunity to evade coverage through bailout. 
However, the Court may view the coverage formula as outdated. 
The literacy test, and other such devices, will likely be found to have 
been used too far back in time to serve as a proxy for those areas where 
voting-related discrimination has occurred more recently. It has been a 
long time since any jurisdiction employed a literacy test or other device 
to intentionally depress minority registration, as the Voting Rights Act 
has placed a blanket ban on such practices for many years.210 In addition, 
depressed registration and turnout rates due to voting-related discrimina-
tion have significantly lessened.211 Registration rates, especially for mi-
  
 206. See Bossier II, 528 U.S. at 336 (describing the “substantial” federalism costs exacted by 
the preclearance procedure); Bossier I, 520 U.S. at 480 (describing the “serious federalism costs 
implicated” by Section 5); see also James F. Blumstein, Federalism and Civil Rights: Complemen-
tary and Competing Paradigms, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1251, 1263 (1994) (“From a federalism perspec-
tive, the preclearance mechanism is surely stiff medicine.”). 
 207. See United States v. Bd. of Comm’rs, 435 U.S. 110, 141 (1978) (Stevens, J., dissenting) 
(describing Section 5’s encroachment on state sovereignty as being “significant and undeniable”). 
 208. See Lopez v. Monterey County, 525 U.S. 266, 294 (1999) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“The 
section’s interference with state sovereignty is quite drastic—covered States and political subdivi-
sions may not give effect to their policy choices affecting voting without first obtaining the Federal 
Government’s approval.”); see also City of Rome, 446 U.S. at 209 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) 
(“[R]equiring localities to submit to preclearance is a significant intrusion on local autonomy . . . .” 
(italics omitted)); Georgia v. United States, 411 U.S. 526, 545 (1973) (Powell, J., dissenting) (“It is 
indeed a serious intrusion, incompatible with the basic structure of our system, for federal authorities 
to compel a State to submit its legislation for advance review.”). 
 209. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 358 (Black, J., concurring and dissenting) (“Section 5, by provid-
ing that some of the States cannot pass state laws or adopt state constitutional amendments without 
first being compelled to beg federal authorities to approve their policies, so distorts our constitu-
tional structure of government as to render any distinction drawn in the Constitution between state 
and federal power almost meaningless.”). 
 210. 42 U.S.C. § 1973aa. 
 211. See Bullock & Dunn, supra note 30, at 1252 (noting that the “historic disparity in black 
and white registration and turnout . . . has waned”). In 1964, the State of Georgia had a white regis-
tration rate of 57.2% and a non-white registration rate of 25.0%; the State of Louisiana had a white 
registration rate of 76.6% and a non-white registration rate of 30.5%; and the State of South Carolina 
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nority citizens, are much higher than in the past, and while turnout rates 
have generally declined among all voters,212 those decreases appear to 
reflect factors other than purposeful discrimination against any particular 
group of citizens.213 
And while Section 5 only covers a discrete class of laws, those that 
relate to voting, it covers all of those laws. The Court may view such 
broad coverage as failing to account for the fact that the problem of vot-
ing discrimination now mostly lies in the area of vote dilution rather than 
ballot access.214 Thus, the overbroad coverage of the type of changes 
requiring preclearance seems disproportionate to the scope of the mod-
ern-day problem. 
Finally, the current bailout provision has been little-used.215 Only a 
few jurisdictions have successfully escaped coverage under the bailout 
  
had a white registration rate of 69.5% and a non-white registration rate of 34.3%. House Hearings, 
supra note 21, at 32. 
Comparing voting age population data from the 2000 Census and recent voter registration data 
from these same states, it is evident that the registration gap has nearly been closed. In Georgia, the 
white registration rate is 67.8% and the African-American registration rate is 62.4%; in Louisiana, 
the white registration rate is 84.1% and the African American registration rate is 82.4%; and in 
South Carolina, the white registration rate is 71.5% and the non-white registration rate is 69.1%. See 
generally U.S. Census Bureau, American FactFinder (providing voting age population data from 
2000 Census), at http://factfinder.census.gov (last visited Feb. 2, 2004) [hereinafter American Fact-
Finder]; Cathy Cox, Georgia Secretary of State, Georgia Voter Registration Statistics (providing 
registration data by race for Georgia as of Sept. 1, 2003), at http://www.sos.state.ga.us/elec-
tions/county.htm (last visited Feb. 2, 2004); GCR & Associates, Inc., Louisiana Voter Registration 
(providing registration data by race as of Oct. 4, 2003), at http://www.gcr1.com/elections (last 
visited Feb. 2, 2004); South Carolina Voter Registration Demographics (providing registration data 
by race as of Jan. 5, 2003), at http://www.state.sc.us/cgi-bin/scsec/96vr?countkey=all&demo=RACE 
(last visited Feb. 2, 2004). 
 212. In the November 2000 Presidential election, 51.3% of the voting age population turned 
out. See Federal Election Comm’n, Voter Registration and Turnout 2000, at http://www.fec.gov/ 
pages/2000turnout/reg&to00.htm (last visited Feb. 2, 2004). In the November 1960 Presidential 
election, 63.06% of the voting age population turned out. See Federal Election Comm’n, National 
Voter Turnout in Federal Elections: 1960-1996, at http://www.fec.gov/pages/htmlto5.htm (last 
visited Feb. 2, 2004). 
 213. See Kimberly C. Delk, What Will It Take to Produce Greater American Voter Participa-
tion? Does Anyone Really Know?, 2 LOY. J. PUB. INT. L. 133, 134-35, 176 (2001) (discussing possi-
ble reasons for low voter turnout including voter apathy and lack of convenient mechanisms for 
casting ballots). 
Lower minority voter turnout may reflect the legacy of discrimination against minority voters. 
See Uno v. City of Holyoke, 72 F.3d 973, 986-87 (1st Cir. 1995). But see Theana Evangelis, The 
Constitutionality of Compensating for Low Minority Voter Turnout in Districting, 77 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 796, 823-25 (2002) (arguing that low minority voter turnout may not necessarily reflect the 
remnants of discrimination and noting that some political scientists suggest that “differences in 
turnout rates may be explained best by reference to political factors such as mobilization and compe-
tition in politics”). 
 214. See discussion supra Parts III.B.1–2. 
 215. For an excellent history of the genesis of the bailout provision, see generally Paul F. 
Hancock & Lora L. Tredway, The Bailout Standard of the Voting Rights Act: An Incentive to End 
Discrimination, 17 URB. LAW. 379 (1985). The original bailout provisions were considered to be 
very difficult to achieve. Id. at 416 (noting that “the old bailout standard offered no realistic oppor-
tunity for bailout” because, for most jurisdictions, “[t]he only possibility for bailout would arise at 
the end of the defined calendar period, but each time that date approached . . . Congress acted to 
enlarge the required eligibility period”); see also O’Rourke, supra note 39, at 774-75 (noting that 
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standards adopted in 1982.216 Thus, the Court may well view the current 
bailout provision to be, for most jurisdictions, a fiction.217 And, if the 
bailout provision is considered to be one in name only, it is unlikely to 
provide much aid in finding an extension of Section 5 to be congruent 
and proportional to the scope of the problem. Moreover, the bailout pro-
vision usually does not allow individual local entities, such as cities and 
school districts, to evade coverage.218 
  
only seventeen bailout suits were filed prior to enactment of the 1982 standards and only nine of 
these actions resulted in a jurisdiction being released from coverage). 
The current bailout standard adopted in 1982 was, however, expected to generate a large num-
ber of bailouts. See Hancock & Tredway, supra, at 411; see also S. REP. NO. 97-417, at 59 (1982), 
reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 177, 237 (noting that implementation of the 1982 bailout standards 
would be delayed for a couple of years to allow the Department of Justice “to prepare for such a 
heavy load of litigation under the new standards”). But see H.R. REP. NO. 97-227, at 64 (1981) 
(dissenting opinion of Honorable M. Caldwell Butler who believed the 1982 bailout standards 
“would establish requirements impossible to achieve”). 
 216. See U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Civil Rights Division, Voting Section, About Section 5 of the 
Voting Rights Act (noting that the City of Fairfax, and Frederick and Shenandoah Counties, Virginia, 
have bailed out under the 1982 standards), at http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/voting/sec_5/types.htm (last 
revised Feb. 2, 2004). 
 217. In 1981, as Congress debated extension of Section 5, a few legislators noted that an overly 
stringent bailout mechanism could call into question the constitutionality of the statute: 
[T]he Act’s constitutionality was upheld in the 1966 decision of Katzenbach v. South 
Carolina, and last year in City of Rome, Georgia v. United States, on the presence of cer-
tain unique factors. One was the belief that the 1965 departure from historical tenets of 
federalism was only “temporary”, but necessary based on pre-1965 conduct in the cov-
ered jurisdictions. A great many things have changed in the South since 1965, as our 
hearings demonstrated, and new, more progressive racial attitudes have begun to replace 
the cultural bias of the past. This change is, as [we] have said, far from complete. It is 
sufficient, though, to effectively dilute the force of the showing before the court in 1966. 
Moreover, the language [we] have discussed, together with other limitations on 
bailout incorporated into the amendment adopted by the Committee would make its avail-
ability highly unlikely, as a practical matter, thereby changing the temporary status of the 
Act to a more constitutionally suspect permanent condition. In [our] judgment, such a 
change can only survive constitutional scrutiny if the method of escape is reasonably 
achievable. 
H.R. REP. NO. 97-227, at 57-58 (1981) (supplemental views of Reps. Hyde and Lungren). 
 218. See City of Rome, 446 U.S. at 168-69. Cities can only bail out if they are separately cov-
ered jurisdictions, but generally, cities are not separately covered. See supra note 40 and accompany-
ing text. 
Victor Andres Rodriguez views the lack of bailout actions as evidence that “there have been 
ongoing violations and thus a continued need for Section 5.” Rodriguez, supra note 20, at 805. 
Basically he seems to view the inaction of jurisdictions as a tacit admission of discrimination. But 
Mr. Rodriguez fails to explain why jurisdictions who are apparently bent on discriminating against 
minority voters would not, at the very least, try to escape the grip of Section 5 coverage and, thus, 
make it even easier to carry out their discriminatory policies. It seems a more likely assumption that 
the bailout standards are too difficult to meet, and Mr. Rodriguez seems to admit as much as he 
appears to have arrived at his conclusions about the future of Section 5 based on the assumption that 
Congress will revise the bailout standard to make it easier. Id. at 814. 
Paul Winke recognizes the problem a strict bailout provision poses to the constitutionality of 
Section 5. See Winke, supra note 20, at 111-12. However, he suggests that it is not constitutionally 
suspect, in part, because each of the elements of the bailout formula relates to “a court’s finding of 
discrimination, or to a jurisdiction’s willingness to abandon a challenged voting practice before a 
judicial determination of whether the practice is discriminatory.” Id. at 112. Yet the failure to submit 
non-discriminatory voting changes for preclearance is a bar to bailout that involves no finding of 
discrimination. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(a)(1)(D).  
Mr. Winke focuses his concern on the affirmative steps necessary to bailout (e.g., the obliga-
tions to eliminate intimidation, harassment, and barriers to participation) as the primary potential 
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In sum, the Court seems likely to allow Congress to enact a prophy-
lactic remedy to protect minority voting rights. The long history of dis-
crimination combined with the more recent problems will justify some 
action on the part of Congress. However, because the problem of voting 
discrimination has been reduced and because Section 5 amounts to such 
a unique and stringent intrusion into the governing process of state and 
local governments, an extension of Section 5 will face trouble. Another 
way of putting this is as follows: on a scale of one to ten, with ten being 
the highest, voting discrimination in 1965 was a ten, and in 1965 Con-
gress chose a remedy that was a ten; however, in 2007, on that same 
scale, voting discrimination is more like a five, so Congress has to 
choose a remedy that is more like a five. Thus, the Court will likely re-
ject Section 5 unless the congruence and proportionality test does not 
even apply to the Voting Rights Act, or unless Congress revises Section 
5 to comply with the test. 
IV. A GLIMMER OF HOPE FOR SECTION 5: IS THERE AN IMPLICIT OR 
WILL THERE BE AN EXPLICIT VOTING RIGHTS EXCEPTION TO THE 
CONGRUENCE AND PROPORTIONALITY TEST? 
While an extension of Section 5 seems likely to fail the congruence 
and proportionality test, it may never come to that. The congruence and 
proportionality test may actually not be applicable to the statute as there 
is a chance that a voting rights exception to the test, either implicit or 
explicit, will be carved out by the Court. The implicit exception is evi-
dent from the Court’s language in most of the congruence and propor-
tionality cases in which it touts the Voting Rights Act generally, and 
Section 5 specifically, as the paradigm of a remedy properly calibrated to 
the scope of a problem. Indeed, in one opinion issued after development 
of the congruence and proportionality test in which Section 5’s constitu-
tionality played a minor role, the Court did not even bother to apply the 
test.219 An explicit exception to the test could be found in the fact that all 
of the recent cases rejecting Congress’s exercise of its enforcement 
power have been decided under Congress’s Fourteenth Amendment 
power while previous cases involving Section 5 have always been re-
solved under Congress’s Fifteenth Amendment power, perhaps indicat-
  
problem for Section 5’s constitutionality. But, in his view, the reason more bailouts have not been 
achieved stems from jurisdictions’ “lack of political will to remedy the discrimination that gives the 
act its continuing relevance and constitutional validity.” Winke, supra note 20, at 116. Mr. Winke 
then cites evidence of discrimination from the 1982 congressional record as support for these af-
firmative obligations. Id. at 83. 
Mr. Winke’s arguments make sense inasmuch as they serve to justify the current extension of 
Section 5 and the bailout provision. And that appears to be all Mr. Winke is trying to prove. This 
argument, however, seems unlikely to add much to the case for extension beyond 2007. It seems 
doubtful that evidence from the 1982 hearings will be enough to justify another extension of a strin-
gent bailout provision and Mr. Winke admits that evidence of intentional discrimination will be 
“increasingly hard to find” because there is less of it and jurisdictions have become more clever at 
hiding it. Id. at 118-19. 
 219. See Lopez v. Monterey County, 525 U.S. 266 (1999) (Lopez II). 
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ing a broader mandate for congressional remedies designed to enforce 
the latter amendment.220 
A. Will There Be An Implicit Voting Rights Exception? 
Despite the fact that most federal statutes the Court has subjected to 
the congruence and proportionality test have failed to pass the test, al-
most all these cases provide hope for the Voting Rights Act. In its dis-
cussion of the scope of congressional enforcement power in City of 
Boerne v. Flores, the Court expended a considerable amount of language 
on the appropriateness of the Voting Rights Act, specifically Section 5, 
as a remedy, approvingly commenting upon its previous endorsement of 
“new, unprecedented remedies” and “strong remedial and preventive 
measures to respond to the widespread and persisting deprivation of con-
stitutional [voting] rights . . . .”221 In addition, when subjecting the Reli-
gious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) to the congruence and propor-
tionality test, the Court’s comparison between RFRA and the Voting 
Rights Act implied the Court’s continued approval of the remedies en-
compassed in the latter statute.222 Moreover, these favorable sentiments 
toward the Voting Rights Act have been echoed in nearly every subse-
quent case applying the congruence and proportionality test.223 
  
 220. The congruence and proportionality test may not be the sole basis for a constitutional 
challenge to the extension of Section 5. Presumably, it would be possible for the Court to find that 
the extension of Section 5 amounts to a racial classification subject to strict scrutiny. See Michelle E. 
O’Connor-Ratcliff, Colorblind Redistricting: Racial Proxies as a Solution to the Court’s Voting 
Rights Act Quandary, 29 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 61, 71-74 (2001) (arguing that Section 5 would 
flunk strict scrutiny). However, Section 5 is probably not the traditional type of race-based remedy 
to which strict scrutiny has generally been applied. 
That said, it seems difficult to determine where the Court will draw the line between congres-
sional acts subject to strict scrutiny and congressional acts subject to the congruence and proportion-
ality test, as Congress will often be forced to make racial distinctions to remedy racial discrimina-
tion. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 230-31 (1995) (recognizing, but not 
resolving, the tension between strict scrutiny and Congress’s enforcement power); see also Ruth 
Colker, The Section Five Quagmire, 47 UCLA L. REV. 653, 680 (2000) (recognizing that legislation 
designed to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment could collide with Equal Protection rights). 
Should the Court be forced to draw a line between when to apply the congruence and propor-
tionality test and when to apply strict scrutiny, the Court may well end up distinguishing between 
congressional acts providing a judicial or quasi-judicial remedy to prevent prospective racial dis-
crimination (which would be subjected to the congruence and proportionality test) and congressional 
acts conferring non-judicial benefits on particular minority groups as a remedy for past discrimina-
tion. Though, arguably, the boundaries of such a test would be inherently malleable and could per-
haps properly be characterized as a distinction without a difference. 
 221. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 526 (1997). Boerne appeared to reiterate the 
continued precedential value of previous decisions upholding the constitutionality of Section 5. See 
id. at 526-27. 
 222. See id. at 530-33. In Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. College Sav. Bank, 
527 U.S. 627, 647 (1999), the Court made its favorable view of the Voting Rights Act even more 
explicit, remarking on how “City of Boerne discussed with approval the various limits that Congress 
imposed in its voting rights measures . . . .” 
 223. See, e.g., Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 123 S. Ct. 1972, 1982-83 (2003) (compar-
ing favorably the record of voting discrimination and the remedy chosen by Congress to solve voting 
discrimination with the record of gender discrimination and the remedy chosen by Congress in the 
Family and Medical Leave Act); Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 373-74 
(2001) (looking unfavorably upon the record of unconstitutional behavior by the states as related to 
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The Court provided even more direct support for Section 5 in Lopez 
v. Monterey County (Lopez II)224 by reiterating its view of the current 
extension of Section 5 as an appropriate exercise of Congress’s enforce-
ment power.225 In Lopez II, the Court considered whether voting changes 
mandated in legislation enacted by the State of California, a jurisdiction 
not covered by Section 5, needed preclearance when the legislation 
caused a voting change to occur in Monterey County, a jurisdiction cov-
ered by Section 5.226 The Court held that California’s legislation required 
preclearance.227 In pressing for a different result, though, California made 
several arguments, one of which was that if the preclearance requirement 
applied in this context, Section 5 would be an unconstitutional exercise 
of Congress’s enforcement power.228 This, according to the state, was 
because Congress’s enforcement power could not “tread on rights consti-
tutionally reserved to the States” when Congress had not directly “desig-
nated [California] as historical wrongdoers in the voting rights 
sphere.”229 
But the Court gave short shrift to California’s argument by relying 
heavily on precedent; namely, its previous decisions in South Carolina v. 
Katzenbach and City of Rome v. United States in which it had found Sec-
  
disability discrimination in comparison to the record of voting-related discrimination); United States 
v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 625-27 (2000) (looking unfavorably upon the remedies encompassed in 
the Violence Against Women Act as opposed to those in the Voting Rights Act). Of the Court’s first 
six applications of the congruence and proportionality test, only Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 
U.S. 62 (2000), contains no substantial comparison to the Voting Rights Act. 
 224. 525 U.S. 266 (1999). 
 225. Lopez II, 525 U.S. at 282-83. 
 226. Id. at 278. Lopez II involved quite a complicated fact pattern and this was the case’s 
second trip to the Supreme Court. See Lopez v. Monterey County, 519 U.S. 9 (1996) (Lopez I). 
Lopez II involved numerous changes to Monterey County’s trial court system and its method of 
electing judges. Lopez II, 525 U.S. at 271. The changes were put into place both by ordinances 
adopted at the county level and by statutes adopted at the state level, and almost none of the changes 
were submitted for preclearance. See id. at 271-74. 
Latino voters brought a Section 5 enforcement action and the district court ruled in their favor, 
concluding that the changes were unenforceable until precleared. Id. at 274. The County then deter-
mined that the changes could not be proven to lack a discriminatory purpose or effect, so the County 
and the Latino plaintiffs tried to devise a mutually agreeable plan to submit for preclearance. Id. 
However, the State of California intervened and opposed the remedial electoral schemes proffered 
by the County and the Latino plaintiffs. Id. 
With this stalemate, the district court devised and implemented an interim electoral plan. Id. at 
275. But soon after the interim plan’s implementation, the district court became concerned that it had 
ordered an unconstitutional plan. Id. The district court then ordered new elections under the unpre-
cleared scheme initially challenged by the Latino plaintiffs. Id. This order became the subject of the 
Supreme Court’s first opinion, where it held that the district court erred in implementing an unpre-
cleared plan. See Lopez I, 519 U.S. at 20-25. 
On remand, the district court held that the changes involved in the case were the product of ac-
tion by the State of California and that a non-covered entity such as the state had no responsibility to 
preclear its voting changes. Lopez II, 525 U.S. at 276-77. The district court held that the county was 
not required to submit the changes because it “had no choice but to implement” the state legislation. 
Id. at 277. 
 227. Lopez II, 525 U.S. at 269. 
 228. Id. at 282. 
 229. Id. 
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tion 5 to be a constitutional exercise of Congress’s enforcement power.230 
Thus, the Court initially remarked on its previous upholding of “the con-
stitutionality of § 5 of the Act against a challenge that this provision 
usurps the powers reserved to the States.”231 Indeed, the power of prece-
dent was so strong, the Court’s Lopez II opinion did not even bother to 
mention the words “congruence and proportionality,” much less to apply 
the test.232 In rejecting California’s contention, the Court reiterated its 
view that Congress’s enforcement power “contemplate[d] some intrusion 
into areas traditionally reserved to the States,”233 while only citing City of 
Boerne v. Flores for the proposition that “‘[l]egislation which deters or 
remedies constitutional violations can fall within the sweep of Congress’ 
enforcement power even if in the process it prohibits conduct which is 
not itself unconstitutional and intrudes into legislative spheres of auton-
omy previously reserved to the States.’”234 
Using this framework, the Court found “no merit in the claim that 
Congress lacks Fifteenth Amendment authority to require federal ap-
proval before the implementation of a state law . . . in a covered 
county.”235 The Court concluded that the state was burdened only to the 
extent that its laws affected voting in a properly covered jurisdiction.236 
Moreover, the Court gave little weight to California’s inability to bail out 
of Section 5, finding that this inability resulted in a minimal increase in 
the burden on state law because Monterey County itself could bail out.237 
As the Court summarized: “In short, the Voting Rights Act, by its nature, 
intrudes on state sovereignty. The Fifteenth Amendment permits this 
intrusion, however, and our holding today adds nothing of constitutional 
moment to the burdens that the Act imposes.”238 Thus, amazingly, just a 
couple of years after developing the congruence and proportionality test, 
the Court failed to apply the test in deciding whether Section 5, one of 
the most stringent remedies ever adopted by Congress, remained a valid 
exercise of Congress’s enforcement power.239 
  
 230. See generally John Matthew Guard, “Impotent Figureheads”? State Sovereignty, 
Federalism, and the Constitutionality of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act After Lopez v. Monterey 
County and City of Boerne v. Flores, 74 TUL. L. REV. 329, 356-57 (1999) (discussing the impor-
tance of stare decisis to the Lopez II decision). 
 231. Lopez II, 525 U.S. at 283. 
 232. See Guard, supra note 230, at 350 (noting that the Lopez II Court did not conduct a con-
gruence and proportionality analysis); see also Katz, supra note 4, at 1179, 1202 (noting how Lopez 
II “easily upholds the constitutionality” of Section 5 while “pay[ing] little attention to the factors that 
have become increasingly important to establishing congruence and proportionality”). 
 233. Lopez II, 525 U.S. at 282. 
 234. Id. at 282-83 (quoting Boerne, 521 U.S. at 518). 
 235. Id. at 283-84. 
 236. Id. at 284.  
 237. Id.  
 238. Id. at 284-85.  
 239. Justice Thomas dissented; he primarily objected to the majority’s analysis of the statutory 
language. See id. at 289 (Thomas, J., dissenting). More interestingly, without using the words “con-
gruence and proportionality,” Justice Thomas sketched the outlines of the test in a discussion that 
implied the majority’s statutory interpretation rendered Section 5 an unconstitutional exercise of 
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With this failure to apply the congruence and proportionality test, 
Lopez II might be read along with the Court’s other praiseworthy state-
ments in the congruence and proportionality line of cases, as providing 
an implicit exception to the test for voting rights remedies based on well-
established precedent. Thus, if faced with an extension of Section 5, one 
could envision the Court relying heavily on its previous precedents with-
out truly delving into a full-blown congruence and proportionality analy-
sis. In this way, Section 5 and perhaps other core civil rights statutes may 
have been grandfathered in under the congruence and proportionality 
doctrine.240 
Yet some reasons remain to doubt whether an extension of the cur-
rent Section 5 will receive the same platitudes that the previous enact-
ments have received in the Court’s applications of the congruence and 
proportionality test. In some respects, an extension of Section 5 may 
wipe the slate clean for constitutional challenges using the congruence 
and proportionality test, freeing the Court from its previous precedents 
upholding Section 5. A review of the standards of the congruence and 
proportionality test itself shows how the Court might come to such a 
conclusion. In its application of the test, the Court has looked approv-
ingly on temporary remedies that include a sunset provision.241 But, for 
this aspect of the congruence and proportionality test to have any mean-
ing, the Court cannot simply allow unfettered extensions of statutes pre-
viously upheld. Moreover, despite Lopez II, the Court’s decisions regard-
ing the scope of congressional enforcement power prior to development 
of the congruence and proportionality test may have little future applica-
bility.242  
  
Congress’s enforcement power. See id. at 289, 297-98 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (arguing that the 
majority’s interpretation of Section 5 raised “grave constitutional concerns”). 
In seeming to apply the test, Justice Thomas noted Section 5 exacted significant federalism 
costs, but recognized it had twice been upheld as a constitutional exercise of Congress’s enforcement 
power. Id. at 293-94 (Thomas, J., dissenting). However, citing Boerne, he noted that the Court had 
“taken great care to emphasize that Congress’s enforcement power is remedial in nature.” Id. at 294 
(Thomas, J., dissenting). He then chided the majority for overlooking “our warning in City of Boerne 
that ‘[t]he appropriateness of remedial measures must be considered in light of the evil presented.’” 
Id. at 295 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting Boerne, 521 U.S. at 530). Justice Thomas found that 
there was paltry evidence of intentional discrimination by the State of California with respect to 
voting and he saw little reason to presume California would adopt unconstitutional laws in the fu-
ture. Id. at 296 (Thomas, J., dissenting). He noted that the majority’s interpretation of the statute 
raised the federalism costs associated with Section 5 because the state might be unable to develop a 
uniform statewide voting policy and because the state would need to rely on its covered jurisdictions 
to defend its interests before the federal government. Id. 
 240. Laycock, supra note 139, at 749 (noting a previous decision upholding voting rights 
remedies may have been reaffirmed “under an implicit grandfather clause” and that the congruence 
and proportionality test “is, in practice, prospective only”). Another potential reason to uphold 
Section 5’s extension would be the uniqueness of the Court finding a statute unconstitutional after it 
had clearly upheld its constitutionality on a number of previous occasions. 
 241. See supra note 119 and accompanying text. 
 242. As Professor Michael Gottesman has remarked: “[I]t is surely doubtful that the Court as 
presently constituted would have upheld the statutes in Katzenbach v. Morgan or City of Rome . . . . 
One may wonder whether the Court is paying lip service to the earlier opinions while, as a practical 
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The upholding of Section 5 as a constitutional exercise of Con-
gress’s enforcement power in Lopez II may well be best understood as a 
tacit adherence to the doctrine of stare decisis243 and little else. The 
Court’s primary justification for denying California’s challenge in Lopez 
II seems to be its prior precedents. Thus, one might surmise that, armed 
with the knowledge that the most recent extension of Section 5 had been 
implemented for seventeen years and would expire in only a few more, 
the Court decided to look the other way in the interest of preserving its 
institutional integrity.244 There are also other lesser reasons to put a re-
duced value on the outcome of Lopez II. The case mostly involved an 
issue of statutory interpretation with the constitutional issue acting as a 
mere sidelight.245 In addition, and perhaps most simply, the State of Cali-
fornia failed to argue for application of the congruence and proportional-
ity test in its brief to the Court.246 For these reasons, Lopez II probably 
should not provide unmitigated comfort to those who think the Court will 
easily uphold the constitutionality of another extension of Section 5. 
B. Will There Be An Explicit Voting Rights Exception? 
Lopez II might, however, provide some additional comfort to Sec-
tion 5’s proponents as the case hints at the outline of a framework for 
doctrinally synthesizing the Court’s previous upholdings of Section 5 
and its more recent congruence and proportionality cases. This frame-
work would be based on the fact that in the more recent cases the Court 
has rejected use of Congress’s enforcement power in the Fourteenth 
Amendment247 context while in all of its reviews of Section 5 the Court 
has upheld use of Congress’s enforcement power in the Fifteenth 
Amendment248 context. So perhaps the Court will make an explicit  
  
matter, relegating them to the junk pile.” Michael H. Gottesman, Disability, Federalism, and a Court 
With an Eccentric Mission, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 31, 60 (2001); see also Ana Maria Merico-Stephens, 
United States v. Morrison and the Emperor’s New Clothes, 27 J.C. & U.L. 735, 736, 742-43 (2001) 
(criticizing the Rehnquist Court’s federalism decisions for failing to be candid in acknowledging that 
previous precedents have basically been discarded). 
 243. For a discussion of the doctrine of stare decisis and the reasons the Court might choose to 
abandon prior precedent, see Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854-55 (1992). 
 244. See Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827 (1991) (describing how stare decisis contrib-
utes to “actual and perceived integrity of the judicial power”). 
 245. The Court framed the question presented as a statutory one: “whether a covered jurisdic-
tion ‘seeks to administer’ a voting change when, without exercising any independent discretion, the 
jurisdiction implements a change required by the superior law of a noncovered State.” Lopez II, 525 
U.S. at 278. 
 246. See Brief for Appellee at 31-34, Lopez v. Monterey County, 525 U.S. 266 (1999) (No. 97-
1396). 
 247. See supra note 14 and accompanying text (listing cases decided under the Fourteenth 
Amendment using the congruence and proportionality test). 
 248. See Lopez II, 525 U.S. at 284-85; City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 180 
(1980); Georgia v. United States, 411 U.S. 526, 535 (1973); South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 
301, 324 (1966). 
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distinction between the two enforcement powers, allowing Congress 
broader powers in the Fifteenth Amendment context.249 
If the Court chooses to give Congress broader powers under the Fif-
teenth Amendment, such a standard could be rationalized in several 
ways. First, the Court could reasonably carve out different levels of en-
forcement power because voting is such “a fundamental matter in a free 
and democratic society.”250 Thus, Congress should have broader power 
to eradicate voting discrimination than, say, employment discrimination. 
Second, the Court might be more willing to give Congress greater leeway 
under the Fifteenth Amendment because that amendment has a much 
more limited scope than the Fourteenth Amendment.251 To put it another 
way, the Court will grant more power to Congress because the Fifteenth 
  
 249. Professor Peter Rubin has made a case for broader congressional enforcement power in 
the districting context. He argues that, in passing voting rights remedies to prevent dilution of minor-
ity votes, Congress appropriately used its enforcement power because: (1) Congress judged dilutive 
election systems to almost always be adopted with a dilutive intent; (2) politicians at the state and 
local level will generally have the sophistication to hide dilutive intent; (3) divisiveness could be 
created by requiring an inquiry into dilutive intent; and (4) dilution reflects discriminatory intent on 
the part of the voters through racial bloc voting. See Rubin, supra note 11, at 132-34. For these 
reasons, Professor Rubin concludes that voting rights remedies will meet the congruence and propor-
tionality test as: 
Congress’s judgment in the exercise of its power under the Fifteenth Amendment is due 
great deference. And indeed, its authority to prohibit discriminatory effects in the exer-
cise of its power under section 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment has been consistently up-
held. Whatever the limits of congressional power to address discrimination under the 
Civil War Amendments, where the exercise of that power raises only the relatively few 
concerns presented in the districting context, Congress’s judgment of what is appropriate 
should be given effect. 
Id. at 135 (footnotes omitted). 
Professor Rubin’s arguments make sense if the Court gives greater deference to Congress’s 
power under the Fifteenth Amendment. However, these arguments will likely carry little weight in a 
strict congruence and proportionality analysis. After all, most of these same arguments could have 
been made about the Religious Freedom Restoration Act which also represented Congress’s judg-
ment about a type of discrimination engaged in by local governments that could create divisiveness. 
And, as previously discussed, racially polarized voting will likely be minimized as evidence of 
unconstitutional activity when the Court conducts a congruence and proportionality analysis. See 
supra Part III.B.1.c. Finally, Professor Rubin only applies this analysis to vote dilution and not ballot 
access. 
 250. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 561-62 (1964); see also Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 
428, 433 (1992) (“It is beyond cavil that voting is of the most fundamental significance under our 
constitutional structure.” (internal quotes omitted)); Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 15, 395 
U.S. 621, 626 (1969) (holding that “any alleged infringement of the right of citizens to vote must be 
carefully and meticulously scrutinized. . . . because statutes distributing the franchise constitute the 
foundation of our representative society”); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886) (“[T]he 
political franchise of voting is . . . a fundamental political right, because [it is] preservative of all 
rights.”); see also Ex Parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371, 382 (1879) (describing Congress’s power to 
regulate federal elections as “a most important power . . . of a fundamental character. . . . [and] 
necessary to the stability of our frame of government”); Caminker, supra note 102, at 1156 (specu-
lating that Congress’s enforcement power may be greater depending on the nature of the constitu-
tional right being protected). 
 251. See Day, supra note 88, at 368; see also D. Grier Stephenson, Jr., The Supreme Court, the 
Franchise, and the Fifteenth Amendment: The First Sixty Years, 57 UMKC L. REV. 47, 49 (1988) 
(“By comparison with the single objectives of the thirteenth and fifteenth amendments, the four-
teenth is actually five amendments rolled into one.”). 
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Amendment only implicates voting while the Fourteenth Amendment 
implicates a vast number of constitutional norms. 
While Lopez II and the congruence and proportionality line of cases 
hint at a potential distinction between the Fourteenth and Fifteenth 
Amendment enforcement power, it bears noting that the Court recently 
characterized Congress’s enforcement power under the Fourteenth 
Amendment as no different from its enforcement power under the Fif-
teenth Amendment—seemingly indicating that the Court would grant 
Congress no greater leeway under the latter amendment. The Court has, 
on several recent occasions, noted that Congress’s enforcement power 
under the Fourteenth Amendment is “virtually identical”252 and “paral-
lel”253 to the power Congress may wield under the Fifteenth Amend-
ment.254 Moreover, the enforcement clauses in the Fourteenth and Fif-
teenth Amendments contain nearly identical language,255 though the 
  
 252. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 373 n.8. 
 253. See Boerne, 521 U.S. at 518. 
 254. For other statements of the coextensive nature of Congress’s Fourteenth and Fifteenth 
Amendment enforcement powers, see Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 651 (1966) (describing 
Congress’s power under Section 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment as “similar” to the power under 
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment); see also Lopez II, 525 U.S. at 294 n.6 (Thomas, J., dissent-
ing) (noting that the Court has “always treated the nature of the enforcement powers conferred by the 
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments as coextensive”); Mixon v. Ohio, 193 F.3d 389, 398-99 (6th 
Cir. 1999) (“Section 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment mirrors Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment 
. . . .”); Caminker, supra note 102, at 1191 (equating the standard for use of Congress’s enforcement 
power under the Fifteenth Amendment with that of the Fourteenth Amendment); Gottesman, supra 
note 242, at 47 n.82 (same). 
 255. See supra note 6. See generally Akhil Reed Amar, Intratextualism, 112 HARV. L. REV. 
747, 818-27 (1999) (describing a theory in which the meaning of a constitutional provision should be 
read in light of other constitutional provisions containing similar language and applying it to the 
enforcement clauses of the Civil War Amendments). 
Despite the similarity of language used in the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendment enforce-
ment clauses, perhaps a case could be made that the subtle difference in language provides a basis 
for reading Congress’s enforcement power under the two amendments to be different. Such a case 
would begin by examining the language of the enforcement clauses of all three Civil War Amend-
ments. The Thirteenth Amendment, which outlawed slavery, enforcement clause reads: “Congress 
shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.” U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 2. 
The Fourteenth Amendment enforcement clause reads: “The Congress shall have power to enforce, 
by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article.” U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5. The Fif-
teenth Amendment enforcement clause reads: “The Congress shall have power to enforce this article 
by appropriate legislation.” U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 2. 
As can be seen, the ordering of the words in the Fifteenth Amendment more closely mirrors 
that of the Thirteenth Amendment. In fact, the language would be identical but for the placement of 
“The” at the beginning of the Fifteenth Amendment clause. So perhaps the Thirteenth and Fifteenth 
Amendment enforcement clauses deserve the same reading—one different from the Fourteenth. And 
since the Court has seemingly given Congress expansive authority in the Thirteenth Amendment 
context, so should the Court give Congress the same expansive authority in the Fifteenth Amend-
ment context. See Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer, Co., 392 U.S. 409, 439 (1968) (allowing Congress to 
outlaw a private citizens’ racially discriminatory refusal to sell property because Congress has broad 
Thirteenth Amendment authority enforcement power to eliminate “all badges and incidents of slav-
ery”). 
However, this assumes the legislative history would support such an interpretation and that the 
Rehnquist Court would be willing to show an uncharacteristic fondness for Supreme Court precedent 
from the 1960s. Moreover, even though the order of the words in the Thirteenth and Fifteenth 
Amendments differs from the Fourteenth, the same words are used—so perhaps all three enforce-
ment clauses were intended to have the same meaning. See generally Amar, supra, at 822-26 (argu-
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Court has yet to explicitly hold that the scope of the Fourteenth and Fif-
teenth Amendment enforcement powers are identical. 
Even if Congress has greater enforcement power under the Fifteenth 
Amendment than under the Fourteenth Amendment, it is uncertain how 
much voting-related activity falls under the umbrella of the Fifteenth 
Amendment. Here, the vote dilution/vote denial dichotomy becomes 
important because the Court has never definitively indicated where these 
apparently two distinct rights should be placed in the constitutional 
framework. The Court has clearly held that the Fourteenth Amendment 
encompasses instances of vote dilution256 and that the Fifteenth Amend-
ment encompasses instances of the denial of access to the ballot.257 Yet 
the Court has provided profoundly mixed signals as to whether there is a 
Fifteenth Amendment constitutional right to not have a vote diluted.258 
If the Fifteenth Amendment does not encompass vote dilution, 
greater enforcement power under the Fifteenth Amendment may provide 
little aid to upholding an extension of Section 5. However, even if this is 
the case, the Fifteenth Amendment enforcement power could be inter-
preted to allow Congress greater leeway to determine the types of 
changes that are subject to Section 5 preclearance. In other words, even if 
the Fifteenth Amendment itself does not cover vote dilution, Congress 
may be able to use its enforcement power to expand the Amendment to 
cover dilutive changes.259 
While it seems possible that the Court will give an extension of Sec-
tion 5 an implicit or explicit exemption from the rigors of the congruence 
and proportionality test, such an exemption is not inevitable.260 If Section 
  
ing that the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendment enforcement clauses should be given the same 
interpretation). 
 256. See, e.g., White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 767 (1973) (applying the Fourteenth Amend-
ment to a claim of vote dilution).  
 257. See, e.g., Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 651-52, 663-64 (1944) (applying the Fifteenth 
Amendment to denial of primary ballot to an African-American citizen).  
 258. See Voinovich v. Quilter, 507 U.S. 146, 159 (1993) (noting that the Court has yet to 
decide if the Fifteenth Amendment applies to vote dilution claims); City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 
U.S. 55, 65, 66 (1980) (plurality opinion) (implying that vote dilution is not encompassed in the 
Fifteenth Amendment); Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 342, 345 (1960) (implying that vote 
dilution is encompassed in the Fifteenth Amendment). Compare Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268, 275 
(1939) (holding that the Fifteenth Amendment “nullifies sophisticated as well as simple-minded 
modes of discrimination. . . . hit[ting] onerous procedural requirements which effectively handicap 
exercise of the franchise by the colored race although the abstract right to vote may remain unre-
stricted as to race”), with Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874, 920 n.20 (1994) (Thomas, J., concurring) 
(arguing that the Fifteenth Amendment only implicates access to the ballot (citing Mobile, 446 U.S. 
at 84 n.3 (Stevens, J., concurring))). 
 259. See Terry Smith, Reinventing Black Politics: Senate Districts, Minority Vote Dilution and 
the Preservation of the Second Reconstruction, 25 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 277, 299 (1998); see also 
Lopez II, 525 U.S. at 287 (upholding the constitutionality of Section 5 in a case involving changes 
with the potential for vote dilution); City of Rome, 446 U.S. at 187 (same). 
 260. It is interesting to consider the role Justice O’Connor, the Court’s most prominent “swing” 
vote, might play in deciding whether or not there is an exception to the congruence and proportional-
ity test for voting rights remedies. See David S. Broder, O’Connor’s Special Role, WASH. POST, Oct. 
1, 2003, at A23 (describing how Justice O’Connor holds the “swing vote” on the current Court). It is 
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5 receives a free pass, no problem, but, if subjected to a genuine applica-
tion of the congruence and proportionality test, an unamended extension 
of Section 5 will likely encounter trouble. Thus, Congress may want to 
consider amending Section 5 to ensure its conformance to Court doc-
trine. 
V. AMENDING SECTION 5 TO CONFORM TO THE CONGRUENCE AND 
PROPORTIONALITY TEST 
In the event the Court declines to adopt a voting rights exception to 
the congruence and proportionality test, Section 5 could be amended so 
as to meet the test while still providing an adequate prophylactic mecha-
nism to preserve the gains achieved by minority voters since passage of 
the Voting Rights Act. The lengthy history of voting-related discrimina-
tion, the more recent voting problems, and the deterrent effect of Section 
5, provide enough justification for some federal scrutiny of state and 
local election laws.261 Moreover, many of the gains made in the elimina-
tion of practices that dilute minority votes have occurred more recently 
and, in these places, a much greater likelihood exists for voting changes 
to be made with the unconstitutional, intentional purpose of reverting to 
previous systems known to dilute minority votes. 
  
noteworthy that she has written the only congruence and proportionality majority opinion that makes 
no reference or comparison with the Voting Rights Act. See Kimel, 528 U.S. at 66-92. Justice 
O’Connor was also the author of Lopez II. Thus, she may be signaling that there is room to argue 
that Congress has different and greater enforcement powers when it comes to voting rights. 
Maybe, though, the focus should not be on Justice O’Connor but on Justice Scalia. In the 
Court’s most recent congruence and proportionality decision, Justice Scalia revoked his support for 
the doctrine. See Tennessee v. Lane, 124 S. Ct. 1978, 2007-09 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (de-
scribing his initial support for congruence and proportionality doctrine but then proposing a different 
test for future cases). Justice Scalia stated that he will apply a relaxed rational basis standard when-
ever Congress enacts provisions that are “designed to remedy racial discrimination by the States.” 
Lane, 124 S. Ct. at 2011 (Scalia, J., dissenting). However, this “relaxed” standard comes with some 
significant baggage because Justice Scalia will only allow Congress to use its enforcement power 
when it enacts a remedy that: (1) is imposed “only upon those particular States in which there has 
been an identified history of relevant constitutional violations;” (2) is “directed against the States or 
state actors rather than the public at large;” and (3) does not “violate other provisions of the Consti-
tution.” Id. at 2012-13 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
My suspicion is that Section 5 would run into trouble even under Justice Scalia’s “relaxed” 
standard. First, it seems likely that Justice Scalia would come to the conclusion that Section 5 so 
upsets the federal/state balance that it violates another provision of the Constitution—the Tenth 
Amendment. Even apart from that, one has to wonder how strict Justice Scalia will interpret his 
requirement that the remedy apply only to states with an identified history of relevant constitutional 
violations. This standard raises numerous questions: How many violations are needed? How recent 
does the “history” of violations need to be? And how strict is the determination about what amounts 
to a constitutional violation—is it “arguable” violations, anything Congress self-identifies as a viola-
tion, or only those violations found by the courts? Suffice it to say that Justice Scalia’s “relaxed” 
standard seems likely to be much tighter than the “relaxed” standard previously used to uphold a 
number of voting rights remedies—cases which Justice Scalia cites as forming a major part of the 
reasoning for his new test. Id. at 2012 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (describing the implications of previous 
Court decisions concerning voting rights). After all, Justice Scalia, in explicating the parameters of 
his new test, approvingly cites a dissent from one of those cases. Id. (citing Katzenbach v. Morgan, 
384 U.S. 641, 666-67, 669, 670-71 (1966) (Harlan, J., dissenting)). 
 261. See discussion supra Part III.B.  
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A need still exists for Section 5, just, perhaps, in a more limited, 
modern, and fine-tuned form because of changes to the landscape in 
terms of the more recent problems with voting discrimination and in 
terms of the Court’s development of congruence and proportionality doc-
trine. By revising the coverage formula to apply to those areas where 
voting-related problems have more recently been at issue, by limiting the 
types of voting changes covered by Section 5, and by easing the restric-
tions for covered jurisdictions to bail out of Section 5, a revised, modern 
preclearance mechanism would pass the congruence and proportionality 
test. Moreover, a carefully revised Section 5 would still enable capture 
and prevention of most changes harmful to minority voting strength, and 
perhaps even result in a more effective, targeted tool in preventing vot-
ing-related discrimination. 
A. Change the Coverage Formula 
The first step in revising Section 5 to comport to the congruence 
and proportionality test would be a revision of the coverage formula to 
redefine those areas with a history of voting-related discrimination that 
merit continuing closer scrutiny of their election laws. The current cov-
erage formula targets those jurisdictions that used a literacy test or other 
device to limit access to the franchise and where the effect of these de-
vices was reflected in unusually low voter registration and turnout levels 
in the 1960s and 1970s.262 But, as previously discussed, this coverage 
formula needs an update. 
A revised coverage formula might look to more recent history to de-
termine which areas should be the target of increased federal scrutiny. 
The best way to do so would be to cover jurisdictions where violations of 
the Fourteenth Amendment, Fifteenth Amendment, and certain provi-
sions of the Voting Rights Act have occurred since 1982. Basically, this 
would cover any states or counties which, since the 1982 extension of 
Section 5, have been found: (1) in violation of the Fifteenth Amendment 
or Fourteenth Amendment as they relate to racial discrimination in vot-
ing;263 (2) in violation of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act; (3) in viola-
tion of the obligation to gain preclearance of voting changes prior to im-
plementation;264 (4) to have had implementation of a voting change pre-
vented by a federal authority—either by an objection interposed by the 
  
 262. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.  
 263. Coverage, however, would not be triggered by the mere failure of a jurisdiction to meet 
the one person, one vote requirement of Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962), Gray v. Sanders, 372 
U.S. 368 (1963), and Reynold v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964), because such a constitutional violation 
does not necessarily equate with racial discrimination. See generally Barbara Y. Phillips, Reconsid-
ering Reynolds v. Sims: The Relevance of Its Basic Standard of Equality to Other Vote Dilution 
Claims, 38 HOW. L.J. 561 (1995) (criticizing the one person, one vote standard for its failure to 
account for the prospect of minority vote dilution).  
 264. In other words, jurisdictions that have lost Section 5 enforcement actions. Thus, this 
formula would not cover jurisdictions that merely failed to submit a change for preclearance.  
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Department of Justice265 or by the denial of a declaratory judgment by 
the United States District Court for the District of Columbia; (5) in viola-
tion of the minority-language provisions of Section 203; or (6) to need 
monitoring by federal officials of their elections under Section 8266 of the 
Voting Rights Act.267 In addition, federal courts could continue to have 
discretion to subject jurisdictions to preclearance upon finding a constitu-
tional violation of the right to vote—an authority currently found in Sec-
tion 3(c) of the Voting Rights Act.268 
  
 265. When the Department of Justice interposes an objection, the Attorney General can recon-
sider the decision to object, and occasionally, in light of changes in fact or law, the Department of 
Justice has withdrawn an objection. See 28 C.F.R. § 51.46 (West 2003) (allowing for reconsideration 
of an objection where “there appears to have been a substantial change in operative fact or relevant 
law”); see also Letter from Bill Lann Lee, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Civil Rights Division, 
U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to The Honorable Alberto R. Gonzales, Texas Secretary of State (Oct. 21, 
1998) (reconsidering and withdrawing a Section 5 objection), at http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/vot-
ing/sec_5/ltr/l_102198.htm (last visited Feb. 5, 2004). In such an instance, coverage could not be 
triggered if the Department of Justice initially objected but then withdrew the objection when pre-
sented with new circumstances that indicated the objection was wrongly interposed. 
 266. 42 U.S.C. § 1973f. This section reads, in part: 
[T]he Director of the Office of Personnel Management may assign, at the request of the 
Attorney General, one or more persons, who may be officers of the United States, (1) to 
enter and attend at any place for holding an election in such subdivision for the purpose 
of observing whether persons who are entitled to vote are being permitted to vote, and (2) 
to enter and attend at any place for tabulating the votes cast at any election held in such 
subdivision for the purpose of observing whether votes cast by persons entitled to vote 
are being properly tabulated. 
Id. 
During the November 2002 election, federal authorities monitored activity in twenty-six coun-
ties. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Federal Observers and Justice Department Personnel 
to Monitor General Election in States Across The Nation (Nov. 4, 2002), at http://www.usdoj.gov/ 
opa/pr/2002/November/02_crt_640.htm (last visited Feb. 5, 2004). For a discussion on how the 
federal government chooses which elections to monitor, see generally Barry H. Weinberg & Lyn 
Utrecht, Problems in America’s Polling Places: How They Can Be Stopped, 11 TEMP. POL. & CIV. 
RTS. L. REV. 401, 416-18 (2002).  
 267. Many of the cases brought pursuant to Voting Rights Act Sections 2, 5, and 203 have been 
resolved by consent agreement. See THERNSTROM, supra note 12, at 9 (noting that “[f]ew voting 
cases actually reach the courts” as most are “settled without litigation”); see also McCrary, supra 
note 37, at 699 (describing how many Section 2 defendants “settled before trial”). Thus, the Section 
5 coverage formula could be triggered by any consent agreement or court finding of a violation of 
Section 2; any consent agreement or court finding pursuant to a Section 5 enforcement action; any 
consent agreement or court denial of preclearance in a Section 5 declaratory judgment action in the 
United States District Court for the District of Columbia; or any consent decree or court finding of a 
violation of Section 203.  
 268. 42 U.S.C. § 1973a. Section 3(c) provides: 
If in any proceeding instituted by the Attorney General or an aggrieved person under any 
statute to enforce the voting guarantees of the fourteenth or fifteenth amendment in any 
State or political subdivision the court finds that violations of the fourteenth or fifteenth 
amendment justifying equitable relief have occurred within the territory of such State or 
political subdivision, the court, in addition to such relief as it may grant, shall retain ju-
risdiction for such period as it may deem appropriate and during such period no voting 
qualification or prerequisite to voting or standard, practice, or procedure with respect to 
voting different from that in force or effect at the time the proceeding was commenced 
shall be enforced unless and until the court finds that such qualification, prerequisite, 
standard, practice, or procedure does not have the purpose and will not have the effect of 
denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or color, or in contravention of 
the voting guarantees set forth in section 1973b(f)(2) of this title: Provided, That such 
qualification, prerequisite, standard, practice, or procedure has been submitted by the 
chief legal officer or other appropriate official of such State or subdivision to the Attor-
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The coverage formula should also avoid “automatic” coverage of all 
political subdivisions of a covered entity by adopting a two-tier level of 
coverage. Initially, one would look to states that would fall within these 
categories. These states would then have any enactments of statewide 
application subject to the preclearance requirement of Section 5, but “lo-
cal legislation” targeted at particular counties or governing bodies would 
be exempted. Then coverage would be examined at the level of govern-
ment at which voter registration takes place—in most states at the county 
level. Any county that falls into any one of the six previously mentioned 
categories or any county that contains a political subdivision that falls 
into one of these categories would become covered. Legislation adopted 
at the state level that is aimed at these counties and their subjurisdictions 
(“local legislation”) would also need to be submitted for preclearance. 
Such a coverage formula is not flawless and still might not pass a 
strict interpretation of the congruence and proportionality test. The most 
obvious problem being that most jurisdictions will become covered be-
cause of violations of Sections 2 and 5 and such violations are generally 
not premised on purposeful, unconstitutional voting-related discrimina-
tion—both appear to merely prohibit voting practices that have a dis-
criminatory effect.269 Another problem could be the Department of Jus-
tice’s past administration of Section 5 that was later found to be errone-
ous by the Supreme Court.270 Finally, a very small number of jurisdic-
  
ney General and the Attorney General has not interposed an objection within sixty days 
after such submission, except that neither the court’s finding nor the Attorney General’s 
failure to object shall bar a subsequent action to enjoin enforcement of such qualification, 
prerequisite, standard, practice, or procedure.  
Id. § 1973a(c). For an example of a court ordering coverage under Section 3(c), see Jeffers v. Clin-
ton, 740 F. Supp. 585, 586 (E.D. Ark. 1990) (ordering the State of Arkansas to submit practices 
related to majority vote requirements for preclearance) (three-judge panel). Such coverage, however, 
is relatively rare. See Jeffers, 740 F. Supp. at 600 (noting the lack of cases discussing standards for 
imposing the Section 3(c) preclearance requirement). 
There may be one pragmatic problem with my proposed coverage formula. Namely, who 
would be responsible for determining which jurisdictions fall into one of the categories for cover-
age? It would probably make most sense for the Chief of the Voting Section of the Department of 
Justice to make these determinations because: (1) the Voting Section probably has the most compre-
hensive records regarding voting rights enforcement and (2) this would leave the decision in the 
hands of a non-political, career government official, thus eliminating any potential “gaming” of the 
decisions by Democratic or Republican political appointees. 
 269. A Section 5 enforcement action involves no finding of discriminatory conduct; it merely 
indicates noncompliance with the obligation to seek preclearance. See United States v. Louisiana, 
952 F. Supp. 1151, 1158 (W.D. La. 1997) (holding that the only issues for the court to determine in a 
Section 5 enforcement action are “‘(i) whether a change was covered by § 5, (ii) if the change was 
covered, whether § 5’s approval requirements were satisfied, and (iii) if the requirements were not 
satisfied, what remedy [is] appropriate’” (quoting City of Lockhart v. United States, 460 U.S. 125, 
129 n.3 (1983))). 
 270. For many years the Department of Justice denied preclearance to nonretrogressive 
changes that were determined to have been adopted with a discriminatory, but nonretrogressive 
purpose. See Reno v. Bossier Parish Sch. Bd., 528 U.S. 320, 342 (2000) (Bossier II) (Souter, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (discussing the longstanding Department of Justice practice 
of refusing preclearance to changes made with an unconstitutional discriminatory purpose). The 
Department also used to object to changes that resulted in a “clear” violation of Section 2 of the Act. 
See 28 C.F.R. § 51.55(b) (1996). The Supreme Court foreclosed these aspects of Section 5 enforce-
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tions may have entered consent agreements in Section 2 and Section 5 
cases to avoid the expense of litigation.271 What all these potential prob-
lems with such a revised coverage formula address is the possibility of 
overbreadth in the coverage of jurisdictions. 
Yet most of these problems of overbreadth could be easily resolved 
through revision to other portions of the statute. As will later be sug-
gested in further detail, jurisdictions could be offered a streamlined proc-
ess to bail out of Section 5 coverage. As part of the bailout process, ju-
risdictions could be allowed to present evidence to prove “wrongful” 
coverage—either because spurious claims were settled to avoid litigation 
costs or because the Department of Justice interposed an erroneous ob-
jection.272 As for the failure of a violation of Section 2 or 5 to equate to 
purposeful discrimination, the standards for proving such violations, es-
pecially in the case of Section 2, approximate those necessary for finding 
a constitutional violation of the right to vote.273 
In addition to helping meet the congruence and proportionality test, 
the proposed coverage formula would allow for better enforcement of 
  
ment by the Department of Justice in Reno v. Bossier Parish Sch. Bd., 520 U.S. 471, 490 (1997) 
(Bossier I), and Bossier II. In addition, the Department’s administration of Section 5 was criticized 
by the Supreme Court during the 1990s round of redistricting. See Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 
924-27 (1995) (describing the Department of Justice’s “policy of maximizing majority-black dis-
tricts”); see also Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899, 913 (1996) (same).  
 271. Voting rights litigation can be very expensive. See McDonald, supra note 2, at 1279 n.173 
(listing plaintiffs’ litigation expenses in several voting rights cases); see also Michael E. Solimine, 
The Three-Judge District Court in Voting Rights Litigation, 30 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 79, 93 (1996) 
(remarking that modern voting rights cases are characterized by “growing sophistication” involving 
lots of expert witness testimony and “intricate computer models to construct proposed districts”).  
 272. This would not be the only factor to consider in a bailout hearing, and a jurisdiction would 
not be allowed an automatic bailout just because the Department of Justice may have wrongfully 
interposed an objection. Rather, it would be only one part of a totality of the circumstances test for 
bailout. See discussion infra Part V.C.  
 273. For a discussion of how Section 2 closely approximates the constitutional standard, see 
supra note 171 and accompanying text. While the Section 5 non-retrogression standard does not 
require a discriminatory purpose, non-retrogression would seemingly be a major factor in any analy-
sis of the constitutionality of a change in election law. In Bossier II, Justice Scalia described how the 
term “abridged” is used in both Section 5 and in the Fifteenth Amendment, that the term “necessarily 
entails a comparison,” and that “[i]t makes no sense to suggest that a voting practice ‘abridges’ the 
right to vote without some baseline with which to compare the practice.” Bossier II, 528 U.S. at 333-
34. See generally John C. Jeffries, Jr. & Daryl J. Levinson, The Non-Retrogression Principle in 
Constitutional Law, 86 CAL. L. REV. 1211, 1215-23 (1998) (describing how non-retrogression plays 
a primary role in the Court’s approach to constitutional law, especially in the race cases). But see 
Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130, 149-50 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (arguing that the retro-
gression standard has no constitutional basis). 
The Court’s most recent fine-tuning of the retrogression test seems to move it even closer to 
the constitutional standard for voting discrimination. See Georgia v. Ashcroft, 123 S. Ct. 2498, 2511 
(2003). Prior to Georgia, the retrogression test seemed to be a “pure” effects test. In other words, if 
minority voters were worse off under the change then federal preclearance had to be withheld. Geor-
gia replaced this “pure” effects test with a totality of circumstances approach. See Georgia, 123 S. 
Ct. at 2511. This approach requires “an examination of all the relevant circumstances, such as the 
ability of minority voters to elect their candidate of choice, the extent of the minority group’s oppor-
tunity to participate in the political process, and the feasability of creating a nonretrogressive plan.” 
Id. In this way, Section 5’s retrogression test seems to be moving toward Section 2’s results test; the 
latter of which is relatively close to the constitutional standard for vote dilution. See supra note 171 
and accompanying text. 
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Section 5. It would target places where recent problems have occurred 
and these places would seemingly be more likely to have future prob-
lems. It would also significantly reduce the number of covered jurisdic-
tions where there is little chance of a change being implemented that 
violates the nonretrogression principle of Section 5. For example, Geor-
gia and Virginia are currently covered in their entirety, but both states 
contain a number of counties with very low percentages of minority 
population.274 Yet these counties, and any cities, school districts, or other 
governing bodies that conduct elections within these counties, must sub-
mit every single voting change enacted when, as a practical matter, fed-
eral authorities will likely never prevent implementation of a change 
because it is impossible to retrogress minority voting strength when mi-
nority residents have very little, if any, voting strength to begin with.275 
Conversely, there are also a number of counties where minority residents 
constitute such a great proportion of the population, it is almost equally 
impossible to retrogress minority voting strength.276 Thus, removing 
these places from Section 5 coverage would allow the Department of 
Justice to concentrate its Section 5 resources on those areas where viola-
tions more likely will occur. 
B. Reduce the Number of Voting Changes Subject to Section 5 Coverage 
Aside from changing the coverage formula, to further make Section 
5 comply with the congruence and proportionality test, a reduction could 
be made in the types of voting changes subjected to the preclearance 
process. Currently, Section 5 applies to all facets of the election process, 
no matter how minor,277 although many of these innocuous changes have 
little chance to retrogress minority voting strength.278 As previously 
  
 274. For example, in northwest Georgia, the 2000 Census shows that Catoosa County has 
53,282 residents, of whom only 669 are black; Dade County has 15,154 residents, of whom 96 are 
black; and Fannin County has 19,798 residents, of whom 34 are black. See generally American 
FactFinder, supra note 211. In southwest Virginia, Buchanan County has 26,978 residents, of whom 
708 are black; Dickenson County has 16,395 residents, of whom 58 are black; and Scott County has 
23,403 residents, of whom 139 are black. Id. 
 275. See John J. Roman, Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act: The Formation of an Extraordi-
nary Federal Remedy, 22 AM. U. L. REV. 111, 132 (1972) (discussing how “the reasonable expec-
tancy of fifteenth amendment violations is very slight where the minority group constitutes such a 
small percentage of the total population”). A lack of minority population also makes it unlikely that 
local officials would enact changes with a retrogressive purpose. 
 276. A number of examples of this can be found in counties near the Texas-Mexico border. For 
example, the 2000 Census shows Brooks County with a population of 7,976, of whom 7,304 are 
Hispanic; Starr County has a population of 53,597, of whom 52,278 are Hispanic; and Zavala 
County has 11,600 persons, of whom 10,582 are Hispanic. See generally American FactFinder, 
supra note 211. 
 277. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.  
 278. See, e.g., Letter from Joseph R. Rich, Chief, Voting Section, Civil Rights Division, U.S. 
Dep’t of Justice, to Gary O. Bartlett, Executive Director, North Carolina State Board of Elections 
(April 17, 2002) (preclearing a state law that “requires state and county election boards to notify 
candidates for elective office of laws and rules prohibiting display of nonofficial signage on any 
state traffic device or highway signage or electric power company structures”) (on file with the 
author).  
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noted, the modern-day problem for minority voters tends to involve vote 
dilution rather than vote denial. 
For this reason, Section 5 could be extended to apply only to 
changes with the opportunity to retrogress minority voting strength in 
terms of vote dilution, not to changes that have the potential to retrogress 
minority voters’ access to the ballot.279 Thus, changes in forms of gov-
ernment, methods of election, redistrictings, and annexations could not 
be implemented without federal approval. But, changes in precinct lines, 
polling places, methods of voting, and other aspects of the electoral 
process that involve access to the ballot could be implemented without 
federal approval.280 
Such a change would help Section 5 comply with the congruence 
and proportionality test and also better focus enforcement on the types of 
changes most likely to violate Section 5. By eliminating many generally 
non-problematic changes from the preclearance requirement, Section 5 
coverage would sweep up less constitutional activity than it does cur-
rently—thus lessening the argument of overbreadth of coverage that Sec-
tion 5 will face in application of the congruence and proportionality test. 
The burden on federalism would also be reduced as state and local gov-
ernments would need to submit far fewer changes for preclearance. 
Moreover, the Department of Justice would no longer have to approve 
every single voting change, but rather would be able to focus on those 
changes that have proved the most likely to be objectionable. Impor-
tantly, such a scheme would not leave minority voters without a remedy 
  
 279. Admittedly, this is not a particularly novel idea as it was floated when Section 5 last came 
up for extension in 1982. See Drew S. Days, III & Lani Guinier, Enforcement of Section 5 of the 
Voting Rights Act, in MINORITY VOTE DILUTION 167, 173 (Chandler Davidson ed., 1984) (describ-
ing a Reagan administration proposal to limit “the preclearance requirement to the types of changes 
that had elicited the most objections from the Justice Department”). 
During the 1982 extension debate, the Reagan administration also proposed a “mandatory no-
tice” provision under which jurisdictions would have to provide notice to the Department of Justice 
about a voting change, but the Department would then have the burden of seeking a court injunction 
to prevent implementation of the change. Id. at 173-74. This Article does not advocate such a revi-
sion because it would be a tremendous strain on the Department of Justice’s resources, more time-
consuming, and too unprotective of minority voting rights as compared with the current sixty-day 
preclearance process. 
 280. The November 2000 Presidential election provides evidence that aspects of the electoral 
process such as voting machines may still have the potential to discriminate. See U.S. Comm’n Civil 
Rights, Allan J. Lichtman, Report on the Racial Impact of the Rejection of Ballots Cast in the 2000 
Presidential Election in the State of Florida (June 2001) (attributing at least some of the disparity in 
ballot rejection between African-Americans and whites to differences in voting methods used), at 
http://www.usccr.gov./pubs/vote2000/report/appendix/lichtman/ltrpt.htm (last visited Nov. 19, 
2003); Report of the Minority Staff, Special Investigations Div., Comm. on Gov’t Reform, U.S. 
House of Representatives, Income and Racial Disparities in the Undercount in the 2000 Presidential 
Election (2001) (same), at http://www.house.gov/roybal-allard/undercountreport.pdf (last visited 
Feb. 6, 2004). But the problem with methods of voting in the 2000 Presidential election was out-
dated equipment that had not been changed and Section 5 does nothing to impact the status quo. 
Moreover, the recent adoption of the Help America Vote Act should alleviate problems with voting 
machines. See Help America Vote Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-252, 116 Stat. 1666, 1666-1730 
(codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.) (establishing a commission to disburse funds to the 
states to replace antiquated voting equipment). 
File: Pitts Macro Created on: 4/19/2004 2:16 PM Last Printed: 8/11/2004 4:00 PM 
284 DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81:2 
to challenge discriminatory rules that limit ballot access, as Section 2 of 
the Voting Rights Act281 would still provide a remedy to address such 
problems.282 
Finally, a prophylactic remedy in the vote dilution context makes 
the most sense, and thus is more congruent and proportional, because of 
the difficulty of proving discriminatory intent in such changes.283 In the 
redistricting context, for example, proving an unconstitutional racial pur-
pose can be very onerous because race and ethnicity almost always plays 
a part in the redistricting calculus.284 And, if race is always a factor, it 
becomes difficult to separate illicit racial motives from licit ones. Thus, 
because of the recent history of problems in the vote dilution context and 
the fact that race almost always plays a role in redistricting, which is 
perhaps the most important vote dilution change reviewed under the pre-
clearance requirement and the most likely to result in unconstitutional 
discrimination, it remains congruent and proportional to require preclear-
ance of changes with the potential for vote dilution. 
C. Make “Bailout” Less Onerous 
Section 5 currently allows states and counties to bail out of cover-
age.285 But, bailout remains difficult for a number of reasons. First, when 
a state or county attempts to bail out, it also must bail out on behalf of all 
  
 281. This Article presumes the constitutionality of Section 2. See Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 
990-92 (1996) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (urging states to assume the constitutionality of Section 2 
as lower federal courts have “unanimously affirmed its constitutionality”). 
 282. See, e.g., Smith v. Salt River Project Agric. Improvement & Power Dist., 109 F.3d 586, 
588 (9th Cir. 1997) (applying Section 2 to a special district’s landownership requirement); Ortiz v. 
City of Philadelphia, 28 F.3d 306, 308 (3d Cir. 1994) (applying Section 2 to voter purge procedures); 
Lowe v. Kansas City Bd. of Election Comm’rs, 752 F. Supp. 897, 900 (W.D. Mo. 1990) (applying 
Section 2 to the use of term limits for city council positions); Roberts v. Wamser, 679 F. Supp. 1513, 
1516-17 (E.D. Mo. 1987) (applying Section 2 to use of certain types of voting machines), rev’d on 
other grounds, 883 F.2d 617 (8th Cir. 1989); Brown v. Dean, 555 F. Supp. 502, 503 (D.R.I. 1982) 
(applying Section 2 to the location of a polling place). 
For an interesting theory on using Section 2 against practices that deny minority voters access 
to the ballot, see generally Stephen B. Pershing, The Voting Rights Act in the Internet Age: An Equal 
Access Theory for Interesting Times, 34 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1171, 1188-99 (2001) (arguing that 
courts generally find voting practices to violate Section 2 when the policy justifying the practice is 
tenuous, and advocating that “[t]he more severe the racial disparity of voting access that results from 
a challenged practice, the more tenuous the justification should be seen to be, even if that justifica-
tion is asserted to have nothing to do with race”). 
 283. See Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 123 S. Ct. 1972, 1982 (2003) (holding that the 
FMLA meets the congruence and proportionality test in part because gender discrimination is “sub-
tle” and “may be difficult to detect on a case-by-case basis”); see also Blumstein, supra note 200, at 
648 (“Proof of discriminatory intent . . . may be difficult to uncover.”). 
 284. See Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 916 (1995) (“Redistricting legislatures will, for 
example, almost always be aware of racial demographics . . . , [and] [t]he distinction between being 
aware of racial considerations and being motivated by them may be difficult to make.”); see also 
United Jewish Orgs. of Williamsburg, Inc. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144, 176 n.4 (1977) (Brennan, J., 
concurring) (“It would be naive to suppose that racial considerations do not enter into apportionment 
decisions.”); Karlan & Levinson, supra note 191, at 1203 (arguing that legislators “always intend the 
racial compositions of the districts they draw”). 
 285. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973b.  
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its subjurisdictions (e.g., cities, school districts, water districts, etc.).286 
Second, to bail out, states and counties need to demonstrate compliance 
with Section 5 for the past ten years.287 To do so, these entities must 
show that every voting change, no matter how small or insignificant, has 
been precleared.288 Third, to bail out, jurisdictions need to secure a de-
claratory judgment from the United States District Court for the District 
of Columbia.289 
These requirements are difficult and burdensome to meet and do not 
allow many subjurisdictions to even attempt a bailout. For example, a 
county cannot bail out if one of its municipalities has adopted an annexa-
tion that has not been precleared, even if the annexation does not have a 
negative impact on minority voting strength; and a municipality cannot 
bail out, even if it has strictly complied with the provisions of Section 5, 
unless its county decides to bail out and can meet the eligibility require-
ments as well.290 Further, to undertake a bailout, a county must undergo 
the expense of litigation in the United States District Court for the Dis-
trict of Columbia.291 It is no wonder then that bailouts have been few and 
far between.292 
A revised Section 5 could broaden the number of jurisdictions eligi-
ble to bail out and streamline the bailout process. Every jurisdiction 
would be eligible to bail out on its own. States, counties, cities, and 
school districts could bail out on their own merits—regardless of what 
had happened in other jurisdictions that happen to lie within its borders 
or because it was subsumed in a covered jurisdiction. The standard could 
also be changed to a totality of the circumstances test that would consider 
the factors listed in the current bailout provision and any other evidence 
the jurisdiction wishes to present to demonstrate that they were wrongly 
  
 286. Id. § 1973b(a)(1)(A)–(F) (requiring jurisdictions seeking bailout to demonstrate that 
certain violations of voting rights have not occurred “within its territory”); see also S. REP. NO. 97-
417, at 56-58 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 177, 234-36. 
 287. Id. § 1973b(a)(1)(D) (requiring a jurisdiction seeking bailout to show all government units 
within its territory have complied with Section 5, including the requirement that no change be en-
forced without preclearance and the repeal of all changes denied preclearance). 
 288. Perhaps a jurisdiction would not be denied a bailout for “technical” non-compliance with 
Section 5; for example, if some “minute, unsubmitted change” could be identified. See Hancock & 
Tredway, supra note 215, at 418. However, the statute’s plain language and legislative history would 
seemingly indicate otherwise. See S. REP. NO. 97-417, at 48 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
177, 226 (noting unintentional failures to seek preclearance should not be excused because jurisdic-
tions had ample knowledge of the need for preclearance). 
Victor Andres Rodriguez argues that non-compliance with the current version of Section 5 
provides a justification for extending the statute. Rodriguez, supra note 20, at 808-09. One problem 
with this, which he points out, is that there is no real way to measure non-compliance. Id. at 808. In 
addition, it would be difficult to separate negligent non-compliance from non-compliance motivated 
by bad intent, and the congruence and proportionality doctrine would seemingly require some modi-
cum of proof that changes were not being submitted for the purpose of implementing discriminatory 
voting practices. 
 289. Id. § 1973b(a)(1). 
 290. See supra note 218 and accompanying text. 
 291. See § 1973b(a)(1). 
 292. See supra note 218 and accompanying text. 
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covered or that voting discrimination no longer presents a threat requir-
ing preclearance. 
The Department of Justice could also be allowed to process bailouts 
administratively as a surrogate for the United States District Court for the 
District of Columbia. Much like the current Section 5 preclearance proc-
ess, an administrative system could be created to review bailouts within a 
particular time frame, say 120 days. If the Department of Justice disal-
lowed bailout, a dissatisfied jurisdiction could then still bring an action in 
the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. In addition, 
the bailout provision could allow for a probationary period of at least five 
years in which a jurisdiction could be administratively recaptured by the 
Department of Justice if found to have passed and implemented a retro-
gressive change or engaged in some other act of voting-related discrimi-
nation. 
A streamlined bailout again would help make the Section 5 remedy 
more congruent and proportional to the ill it seeks to curb and simultane-
ously make for better targeted enforcement of Section 5. No longer 
would jurisdictions be permanently trapped in Section 5 because of what 
occurred in another place that lies within its borders or because it was 
lying within a covered jurisdiction. Bailout would not hinge on technical 
compliance with Section 5, but rather would look at the real-world con-
sequences of failure to comply. And the Department of Justice would 
provide a quick yes or no answer for bailout. Such a bailout process 
would also further streamline for the Department of Justice the number 
of jurisdictions subject to coverage so that the Department could devote 
more resources to those areas where problems most likely will occur. 
Perhaps the greatest problem with using the Department of Justice 
to process bailouts would be the potential drain on its resources. How-
ever, the Department of Justice typically faces a declining Section 5 
workload as a decade progresses—mostly owing to the fact that the De-
partment reviews the bulk of redistricting submissions soon after the 
release of the decennial Census.293 Thus, the problem of a potential drain 
on the Department of Justice’s resources could be solved by providing 
jurisdictions with specific time frames to submit bailouts. For example, 
the Department of Justice could be limited to reviewing bailouts during 
the five years immediately prior to the decennial Census. During years 
when the Department of Justice does not review bailouts, jurisdictions 
could still seek bailout in the United States District Court for the District 
of Columbia. 
  
 293. See Section 5 Changes 1990s, supra note 159 (showing that from 1990-1994 the Depart-
ment of Justice reviewed 2,890 redistricting submissions and that from 1995-1999, the Department 
reviewed 566 redistricting submissions). 
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In sum, making bailout more efficient and attainable would help an 
extension of Section 5 pass the congruence and proportionality test be-
cause it would further reduce the potential for overbreadth, and a revised 
bailout scheme could better focus Department of Justice enforcement of 
the statute. 
D. Some Concluding Thoughts on Revising Section 5 
The three revisions suggested in this Article do not, by any means, 
constitute the universe of proposals that might allow Section 5 to pass the 
congruence and proportionality test. It could be argued that covered ju-
risdictions should no longer be saddled with the litigation burden of insti-
tuting a declaratory judgment action for preclearance in the United States 
District Court for the District of Columbia and should be allowed to file 
such cases in local federal district courts (though the current burden of 
litigation in this venue seems minimal as most jurisdictions administra-
tively preclear changes through the Department of Justice).294 It could 
also be argued that the retrogression test should be eliminated in favor of 
a standard under which a change would only be objectionable if it had 
been adopted with an unconstitutional discriminatory purpose. 
The basic point is that a minimum of changes may need to be made 
to Section 5 to keep it a congruent and proportional remedy. To meet the 
congruence and proportionality test, Congress will seemingly need to 
find a means of: (1) ensuring that the coverage formula targets those 
places where recent discrimination has occurred; (2) reducing the amount 
of constitutional activity covered; and (3) streamlining the bailout proc-
ess.295 The Court has, in recent years, revived federalism concerns and 
Congress, if it chooses to extend Section 5, would do well to pay some 
  
 294. The Court has recognized the litigation burden of bringing claims before the United States 
District Court for the District of Columbia. See Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 559-60 
(1969). 
 295. Congress might also want to limit the length of the re-extension to, perhaps, fifteen years 
instead of twenty-five. See Boerne, 521 U.S. at 532-33 (approving of Congress’s seven-year exten-
sion of Section 5). 
Perhaps, though, the Court’s entertainment of “as applied” challenges under the congruence 
and proportionality doctrine negates the need for Congress to show any kind of restraint in enacting 
prophylactic remedies. See Lane, 124 S. Ct. at 2005 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (remarking that the 
“as applied” approach could eliminate any incentive for Congress to pass narrowly crafted enforce-
ment power legislation). It is unclear where the Court will go with this “as applied” rule. For exam-
ple, it may only work with regard to legislation that touches upon a vast number of constitutional 
rights rather than to legislation that only applies to a discrete type of constitutional rights. Id. at 1993 
(distinguishing previous congruence and proportionality decisions that did not allow for as applied 
challenges because these cases “concerned legislation that narrowly targeted the enforcement of a 
single constitutional right”). Even so, it seems unlikely that an “as applied” rule could rescue Section 
5 if Congress passes an overly broad coverage formula or an overly stringent bailout mechanism. 
Why? Because crafting a totally different coverage formula or bailout standard would, even for an 
activist Court, be too closely akin to abandoning a judicial role and assuming a legislative one. Id. at 
2005-06 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (describing how an “as applied” rule “cannot be squared with . 
. . the proper role of the Judiciary”). 
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heed to this revival. Otherwise, the Court may find Section 5 to be out-
of-step with its recent precedents.296 
CONCLUSION 
Since its initial enactment in 1965, the remedy encompassed in Sec-
tion 5 of the Voting Rights Act has helped prevent the erosion of gains 
made by minority voters and, by providing a prophylactic remedy, has 
significantly decreased the likelihood for the occurrence of voting-related 
discrimination.297 Thus, the statute has been a major factor in a wholesale 
shift, over the last three-plus decades, in the voting landscape from one 
in which discrimination against minority citizens was routine, to one in 
which discrimination against minority citizens has become less preva-
lent. 
When Congress revisits the need for Section 5, recognition of this 
shifting landscape may be required by recent Supreme Court decisions. 
The Court, under the auspices of the congruence and proportionality test, 
could strike down any attempt to continue implementation of the same 
stringent Section 5 remedy initially imposed decades ago. Yet the poten-
tial for voting discrimination has not disappeared, and while it seems 
unlikely that the situation will return to the days of Jim Crow, a need still 
exists to protect the more recent gains achieved by minority voters. Thus, 
Congress should carefully consider congruence and proportionality when 
it extends Section 5 because different circumstances and different Su-
preme Court jurisprudence may require different remedies. 
  
 296. A revision of Section 5 by Congress might make the Court more willing to carve out a 
voting rights exception to the congruence and proportionality test. As some scholars have noted, the 
scope of Congress’s enforcement power may reflect a continuing dialogue between the Court and 
Congress over which branch of the federal government has final authority to interpret the Constitu-
tion. See Carter, supra note 88, at 824, 851-53; McConnell, supra note 94, at 172. Through applica-
tion of the congruence and proportionality test, the Court has staked out a position that reclaims 
greater authority as the ultimate arbiter of constitutional norms. Put another way, the Court has sent a 
message to Congress that, in effect, tells Congress to scale back its exercise of the enforcement 
power. Thus, if Congress responds to the dialogue by indicating acceptance of the Court’s authority 
by slightly limiting the use of the enforcement power, then the Court may be willing to give Con-
gress the benefit of the doubt when reviewing the extension of Section 5. 
 297. McCrary, supra note 37, at 665-66 (describing how, by 1990, the inequality evident in 
voting laws in 1960 had been “transformed beyond recognition”). As Professor Richard Pildes 
recently observed: 
Of course, like all laws, the Voting Rights Act reflects the problems that shaped its 
creation. Last amended by Congress in 1982, the act was forged in a different America. 
Forty years ago, blacks were not permitted to vote in much of the South, an inequity that 
was the focus of the law. 
. . . . 
The South of 2003 is vastly changed. The reign of the one-party [Democratic] mo-
nopoly has come to an end. Partly because of the success of the Voting Rights Act, a sub-
stantial number of black legislators now wield power, even in the Deep South. Moreover, 
despite the persistence of racially polarized voting, white voters no longer abandon the 
[Democratic] party when it nominates black candidates; strong black candidates regularly 
get about a third of the white vote. The era of interracial harmony has not yet arrived, but 
these are changes with cultural and legal consequence. 
Richard H. Pildes, Less Power, More Influence, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 2, 2003, at A15. 
